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THE ATTACHMENT GAP: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW, WOMEN'S CULTURAL CAREGIVING, AND THE LIMITS
OF ECONOMIC AND LIBERAL LEGAL THEORY
Laura T. Kessler*
Title VII has prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy
since 1978, when Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"),
but it does not require employers to recognize women's caregiving obligations be-
yond the immediate, physical events of pregnancy and childbirth. The Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA ") also does little more than provide job secu-
rity to some relatively privileged women in the case of childbirth. Neither of these
statutes, which constitute the bulk of the United States' maternity and parental
leave policies, provides for the most common employment leave needs of caregivers,
who by all measures are disproportionately women. This lack of protection has
served to perpetuate a significant labor force "attachment gap" between men and
women that has had serious economic and social consequences for women and
children.
This Article examines the theoretical bases for the law's inability to recognize
women's cultural caregiving, i.e., the caregiving work that women perform within
the family that is unrelated to reproductive sex differences. Why has our law failed to
address the conflicts between work and family that continue to disproportionately
burden women? The author suggests that the answer lies in Title VII's categorical
framework, which is fundamentally unable to account for cultural experiences that
are not universally shared by all women; in societal and judicial commitments to
formal equality; and in the pervasive influence on our law of certain core concepts
underlying liberal and economic theory, particularly the value of formal equality
and the assumption that legal agents are autonomous, rational decision makers.
In the final part of the Article, the author reviews some of the primary responses
offered by feminist legal theorists to the dominant paradigm, and suggests that such
responses have failed to challenge it fully. Feminist theorists have focused on
characterizing women's experiences of caregiving as a condition of impaired
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agency growing out of gender socialization, attempting to fit women's nurturing
work into the limited but recognized exceptions to the autonomous, equal, and
rational person assumed by the dominant framework. While this strategy has
worked to obtain legal recognition of women's biological experiences of pregnancy
and childbirth, this Article suggests that it has proved less capable of addressing
the rhetoric of choice that legitimates discrimination on the basis of women's
cultural experience of caregiving. It is clear that a refinement of the theoretical
constructs underlying our law will be necessary before there will be any significant
recognition of women's disproportionate responsibility for caregiving as it affects
their wage work. This Article suggests that the beginnings of such a construct
should focus on the fundamental importance and value to society and to women
of women's caregiving labor, not upon depictions of caregiving as a socially-
determined, gendered activity. The Article concludes by outlining the beginnings
of an alternative paradigm on which to build a theory of workplace
accommodation for women's unpaid caregiving work, and reviews a number of
concrete legal reforms that might be consistent with this alternative vision.
INTRODUCTION
Women, more so than men, perform the unpaid family caregiv-
ing work within our society. Women are primarily responsible for
the care of children and housekeeping, whether or not they work
outside the home for wages.' It is women, more so than men, who
care for sick or disabled family members. Women more often than
men arrange or provide care for elderly parents. 3 While recent
studies indicate that the amount of time spent by women on child-
care and housework has declined since the 1970s, that decline has
been minimal.4 The American workplace and discrimination laws
governing employment have yet to address seriously this profound
existential difference between men and women with regard to* • 5
caregiving, despite women's substantial presence in the paid labor
1. See infra Part I.
2. See infra Part I.
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part I.
5. Of course, the failure of our law and culture more broadly to value women's care-
giving work is manifested in myriad ways, not just in the lack of protection from sex
discrimination in employment. For example, the state's failure to recognize the value of
unmarried, poor women's mothering has resulted in draconian welfare policies which push
poor women with young children into the labor force, often, ironically, into low-paid jobs
providing childcare to more privileged women. See generally MiMi ABRAMOVITZ, REGULAT-
ING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT
(1989) (documenting the historical role of American social welfare policy in stigmatizing
and punishing women who do not conform to the traditional "family ethic" of marriage and
motherhood) [hereinafter ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN]; MIMI ABRA-
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force for more than two decades." This Article examines the theo-
retical bases for the law's inability to recognize or accommodate
women's family caregiving work that is understood within our
MOVITZ, UNDER ArACK, FIGHTING BACK: WOMEN AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES
(1996) (recounting the gendered history of welfare in America and challenging the 1990s
assault on impoverished single mothers); KATHRYN EDIN & IAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS
MEET: How SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND Low-WAGE WORK 167-78, 235 (1997)
(finding, based on a study of single mothers receiving welfare, that almost half engaged in
market work to make ends meet, and suggesting that workfare is likely to leave welfare re-
cipients significantly worse off, because it requires such women to quit their informal
existing jobs); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAM-
ILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 101-42 (1995) (articulating the way in
which poverty discourses in the context of welfare policy construct mothering in single
parent families as deviant) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER]; FRANCES Fox
PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE
371-87 (updated ed. 1993) (depicting welfare as a mechanism to coerce workforce partici-
pation and contain social unrest); Johanna Brenner, Towards a Feminist Perspective on Welfare
Reform, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 99, 119, 126-29 (1989) (providing qualified support for the
work-related welfare reforms contained in the Family Support Act of 1988 and tracing the
role of women's organizations, as well as capitalist and patriarchal interests, in bringing
about such reforms); Laura T. Kessler, PPI, Patriarchy, and the Schizophrenic View of Women: A
Feminist Analysis of Welfare Reform in Maryland, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 317, 359-64
(1995) (arguing that the medfare, learnfare, and workfare welfare "experiments" in Mary-
land and states across the county in the early 1990s perpetuated a "schizophrenic" view of
women receiving welfare by requiring them both to conform to an idealized vision of
motherhood and to work full time outside the home for wages); Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work,
Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249, 1252-54 (1983) (arguing
that federal welfare-to-work programs devalue women's role as both caretakers of children
and wageworkers, since the "work" typically pushed on women who receive welfare is low-
paid, sex-segregated work consistent with stereotypical gender roles); Welfare Symposium, 9
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 4 (1998) (compiling articles that analyze the Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) block grant program, by which the federal government ended
welfare as a federal entitlement and required states to move poor parents into the paid
labor force); Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modication Welfare Reform
Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719 (1992) (demonstrating the empirical inaccuracies underlying
the learnfare and family cap "welfare reforms").
The state's failure to value the family caregiving work that women disproportionately
perform within marriage renders them poorer vis-h-vis men upon divorce. There is a vast
literature on the relationship between the law of domestic relations and the impoverish-
ment of women post-divorce. E.g., TERRY ARENDELL, MOTHERS AND DIVORCE (1986);
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds.,
1990); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 53-75 (1991); LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLU-
TION (1985); Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the
EconomicJustifications for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423, 2426 n.14 (1994) (collecting citations);
Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2227 n.1
(1994) (collecting citations).
With the state's complicity, women's paid caregiving work is also undervalued. Teachers,
nurses, non-professional health care workers, and childcare and food service workers,
among other workers in sex-segregated occupations that focus on caregiving, receive con-
siderably less pay than workers in non sex-segregated occupations. Press Release, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary Workers:
Fourth Quarter 1998, 1-2 tbl.3 (Jan. 20, 1999), available at http://stat.bls.gov/newsrels.htm.
6. See infra Part IIA.
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society to be culturally based, i.e., unrelated to biological sex dif-
ferences.
Title VII has prohibited employment discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy since 1978, 7 when Congress passed the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act ("PDA"), 8 but it does not require employers to
recognize women's caregiving responsibilities beyond the immedi-
ate, physical events of pregnancy and childbirth. The passage of
the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 9 which re-
quires covered employers to provide employees up to twelve weeks
of unpaid leave per year for the birth or adoption of a child or for
the care of seriously ill family members, seemed to alter this state
of affairs. However, a close examination of the FMLA reveals that it
does little more than provide job security to some women in the
case of childbirth. Neither of these statutes, which constitute the
bulk of the United States' maternity and parental leave policies,
provides for the most common employment leave needs of care-
givers, who by all measures are disproportionately women.10
To be sure, such statutes, particularly Title VII, facilitated the
mass entrance of women into the workforce over the last three
decades. Married women's labor force participation nearly dou-
bled from 1969 to 1998." The increase was even more pronounced
for married women with children less than three years of age, in-
creasing almost threefold over the same period.12 The role of
employment discrimination laws in effecting this social transforma-
tion should not be understated. Title VII has challenged
discrimination in the hiring and promotion of women based upon
the stereotypical view that their status as caregivers makes them
unsuitable for market work, both by reinforcing the perception of
7. In 1964, as part of the Civil Rights Act, Congress passed Title VII to prohibit em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of sex, among other classifications. Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1994)) [hereinafter Title VII].
8. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at § 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994))
(amending Title VII to include pregnancy-based discrimination as a prohibited form of sex
discrimination); see also discussion infra Part II.B.l.a.
9. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994)). The
FMLA generally requires covered employers to provide up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave
during a twelve-month period to any eligible employee who needs the time off (1) for a
serious health condition of the employee that prevents him/her from performing the es-
sential functions of his/her job; (2) to care for the employee's spouse, son, daughter, or
parent where that family member has a serious health condition; (3) for the birth of a child
of the employee, in order to care for the child; and (4) for the placement of an adopted or
foster child with the employee. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (1); see also discussion infta Part II.C.
10. See infra Part II.
1I. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT ON THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE 96, 98 chart 3-22
(1999) [hereinafter DOL REPORT ON THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE].
12. Id. at 96, 98 chart 3-23.
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women as wage earners and by providing some formal legal pro-
tections to women. The FMLA has afforded some women job
security with regard to the significant life event of childbirth. Still,
as this Article demonstrates, an examination of judicial decisions
applying and interpreting Title VII and the FMLA reveals that
these laws are of limited use to women who, once in the labor
force, are demoted or terminated on the basis of their cultural
caregiving responsibilities to their families.13 By cultural caregiving,
I mean the nurturing work performed by women that is under-
stood by the law and society more broadly to be a function of
gender socialization or an ethic of care.
Why has our law failed to address the conflicts between work
and family that continue to disproportionately burden women?
This Article suggests that the answer lies, in part, in the pervasive
influence of certain core concepts underlying liberal and eco-
nomic theory on cultural and legal discourse, on legal decision
makers, and ultimately on our employment discrimination laws. 4
Specifically, the theoretical constructs of autonomy, equality, and
rational choice, which constitute the foundations of our legal sys-
tem, possess a limited ability to recognize women's experiences
that are not grounded in immutable biological difference. First,
the assumption underlying both liberal and neoclassical economic
theory that humans are autonomous, unencumbered actors has
formed the foundation for the current structure of the workplace
and our employment discrimination laws, which are modeled on
an "ideal worker"'15 who has no caregiving responsibilities. 6 Sec-
ond, equality theory possesses only a limited ability to recognize
cultural differences between men and women such as women's
caregiving, for the simple reason that cultural differences that are
generally but not always true for women escape categorization as
sex-based classifications under the law.' Finally, the oversimplified
strain of neoclassical economic theory that has come to pervade
our country's political and legal discourse, and the influence of
rational choice theory in particular, have served to construct
women's caregiving as a freely chosen endeavor that is undeserv-
ing of protection from discrimination within the workplace.
8
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part II.
15. Joan Williams has described the theoretical employee unencumbered by caregiv-
ing responsibilities as the "ideal worker." Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 797,822 (1989).
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part III.
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Yet, there are circumstances when even the dominant theories
that so greatly influence our law recognize that a person is not
autonomous, equal, or rational. The traditional exceptions include
those circumstances when a person is disabled by force, fraud, du-
ress, or incapacity.19 Women's unique biological experiences of
pregnancy and childbirth-particularly childbirth, when women
are literally connected to human life and incapacitated by na-
ture-are consistent with such exceptions. Understood in this way,
Title VII, the PDA, and the FMLA, which focus primarily on the
impact of the physical experiences of pregnancy and childbirth on
women's labor force participation, represent limited but tradi-
tional exceptions to the model of the autonomous, equal, and
rational person underlying liberal and neoclassical economic the-
ory and our law.
This Article reviews some of the responses by feminist legal the-
ory to the limitations of the dominant theoretical framework
shaping discrimination law, and concludes that the predominant
responses have failed to challenge it fully.20 Feminist theorists, both
within law and other disciplines, have focused on characterizing
women's experiences of caregiving as a condition of impaired
agency, attempting to fit women's nurturing work into the limited
but recognized exceptions to the autonomous, equal, and rational
person assumed by the dominant framework.' While successfully
contesting certain aspects of the prevailing theoretical construct,
this Article suggests that such responses have had the unintended
effect of reinforcing the existing paradigm. For, while the domi-
nant account of women's "gendered li[ves]"2 2 at the center of the
19. See infra note 374 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist
Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REv. 25, 37 (1990) (developing the term "gendered life" to de-
scribe a common set of socially and culturally imposed harms experienced, or at least
potentially experienced, by all women). It should be noted here that the term "gender" is
commonly used to describe a number of related but distinct phenomena, including
(1) biological sex differences; (2) the complex societal system which assigns meaning on
the basis of those differences, i.e., social construction; and (3) the process by which that
societal system, in turn, is internalized by individual women such that their behavior is
shaped and limited, i.e., gender socialization. See generally SANDRA LPSlTz BEM, THE LENSES
OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON SEXUAL INEQUALITY (1993) (examining the
ways in which gender as a social construct shapes our views of social reality); MICHAEL S.
KIMMEL, THE GENDERED SOCIETY (2000) (reviewing and rejecting both biological and so-
cial psychological explanations for gender differences, and endorsing the "social
constructionist" approach); DEBORAH L. RHODE, THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL
DIFFERENCE (1990) (examining from a variety of disciplinary perspectives the recurring
questions about the nature, origins, and consequences of sexual difference). This Article
uses the term gender in the latter two respects.
[VOL. 34:3
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modern women's movement and of much feminist theorizing
about law has served as a valuable organizing principle for obtain-
ing legal recognition of pregnancy and childbirth, it has proved to
be less capable of addressing the rhetoric of choice that legitimates
discrimination on the basis of women's cultural caregiving work. It
is clear that a refinement of the theoretical constructs underlying
our law will be necessary before there will be any significant rec-
ognition of women's disproportionate responsibility for caregiving
as it affects their wage work. This Article suggests that the begin-
nings of such a construct should focus on the fundamental
importance and value to society of women's caregiving labor, not
upon depictions of caregiving as a socially-determined, gendered
activity.
Part I provides an empirical account of women's disproportion-
ate responsibility for caregiving within the family, highlighting the
ways in which such caregiving work negatively impacts women's la-
bor market participation and economic status. Part II details the
limitations of Tide VII and the Family and Medical Leave Act, both
in their initial conception and as applied and interpreted by judicial
decision makers. Specifically, Part II demonstrates that, while our
country's antidiscrimination laws have facilitated women's entrance
into and advancement in the workforce over the past few decades,
they have afforded women little protection from demotion or ter-
mination on the basis of their family caregiving responsibilities.
This lack of protection has resulted in a persisting labor force at-
tachment gap between men and women that has had serious
economic and social consequences for women and children. Build-
ing on the empirical and doctrinal analyses in Parts I and II, the
Article then takes a theoretical turn. Part III suggests that this seri-
ous limitation in the law is attributable, in part, to the ascendancy
of certain values and assumptions within our society and legal sys-
tem, particularly the value of formal equality and the assumption
that legal agents are autonomous, rational decision makers. Part IV
discusses some of the responses to this paradigm posed by feminist
legal theorists, and suggests that those responses have failed to
challenge it fully. Part V outlines the beginnings of an alternative
paradigm on which to build a theory of workplace accommodation
for women's unpaid caregiving work, and reviews a number of
concrete legal reforms that might be consistent with this alterna-
tive vision.
SPING 2001 ]
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I. WOMEN'S CULTURAL CAREGIVING WORK
AND THE LABOR FORCE ATTACHMENT GAP
Women, more so than men, perform the caregiving2 3 work
within the family and society. The truth of this statement is sup-
ported by a voluminous body of social science research and is
evident from even a cursory survey of the world around us. Women
are primarily responsible for the care of children and housekeep-
ing, whether or not they work outside the home for wages.2 4 It is
23. The term caregiving, not caretaking, is used to describe the work of attending to
the physical and emotional needs of dependents, because caregiving within the family is
uncompensated. Feminist legal scholars have identified the importance and significance of
language in feminist endeavors. See, e.g., FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 5, at
9 (consciously using "caretaker" to describe women's nurturing, because it is work, not a
gift); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of
Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 886 (1989) ("[I]t is an imperative task for
feminist jurisprudence ... to turn critical attention to the nature of legal reasoning and the
language by which it is expressed."); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Forward:
Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 61 (1987) ("Feminists' work has thus named the
power of naming....").
24. SARAH FENSTERMAKER BERK, THE GENDER FACTORY: THE APPORTIONMENT OF
WORK IN AMERICAN HOUSEHOLDS 128 tbl.5.1, 170 tbl.6.1 (1985) (showing that, whether
measured as the frequency and number of tasks performed each month, or the minutes of
housework time spent each day, wives performed, on average, seventy percent of the
household labor as compared to either their husbands or children); VICTOR R. FUCHS,
WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 78 tbl.5.1 (1988) (showing that in 1986 adult
women in the United States spent an average of 1,419 hours a year on housework and
childcare, while adult men spent an average of 603 hours a year on such tasks); ARLIE
HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 3-4
(1989) (finding that women worked an extra month of twenty-four-hour days each year);
BETH ANNE SHELTON, WOMEN, MEN AND TIME: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN PAID WORK,
HOUSEWORK AND LEISURE 66 tbl.4.1, 145 (1992) (finding that, from 1975 to 1987, employed
men's housework as a percentage of women's increased only eleven percent, from forty-six
to fifty-seven percent); Suzanne M. Bianchi et al., Is Anyone Doing the Housework? Trends in the
Gender Division of Household Labor; 79(1) Soc. FORCES 191, 196 (2000) (reviewing sociologi-
cal literature over the past twenty years which "unequivocally" show that women invest
significantly more hours in household labor than do men despite some narrowing of gen-
der differences in recent years); Scott Coltrane, Research on Household Labor: Modeling and
Measuring the Social Embeddedness of Routine Family Work 62 J. MAR. & FAM. 1208 (2000)
(reviewing more than 200 scholarly articles and books on household labor showing that
women still do at least twice as much housework as men); Gillian K. Hadfield, Households at
Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 GEO. L.J. 89, 97 (1993) (noting
that even women who earn more than men remain responsible for the caretaking of chil-
dren and other family responsibilities); Laura Sanchez & Elizabeth Thomson, Becoming
Mothers and Fathers: Parenthood, Gender, and the Division of Labor, 11 GENDER & Soc'Y 747, 765
tbl.4 (1997) (showing that when housework, childcare, and wage work are all considered,
women with young children work, on average, twenty more hours a week than men); Beth
Anne Shelton, The Division of Household Labor, 22 ANN REV. Soc. 299, 299-300 (1996)
(reviewing research which shows that, whether employed or not, women continue to do the
majority of housework, i.e., between sixty-five and eighty percent); Katharine Silbaugh,
Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. Rav. 1, 8-10 (1996) (reviewing
sociological studies showing that, by all measures, women perform substantially more
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women, more so than men, who care for sick or disabled family
members. 5 Women more often than men arrange or provide care
for elderly parents. 6 While recent studies indicate that the amount
of time spent by women on caregiving and housework has declined
since the 1970s, women continue to spend considerably more time
than men doing such work. 7 From the 1970s to the 1990s, the
amount of time spent by women on such work declined from four
times that spent by men to two or three times that spent by men.2s
Much of this small improvement is attributable to an overall de-
cline in the hours of housework performed by women, as opposed
to an increase in such work performed by men. 9 Moreover, when
childcare and routine, stereotypically female tasks are considered,
progress with regard to the gendered division of household labor
is less remarkable still.
3 °
In an effort to garner societal recognition of women's caregiv-
ing, feminist theorists have worked to provide a rich, complex,
housework than men, regardless of their employment status); Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage, 84 VA. L. REv. 509, 520 n.18,
522 n.21 (1998) (collecting sociological studies showing that the work-leisure gap always
favors the husband).
25. Eliza K Pavalko & Julie E. Artis, Women's Caregzivng and Paid Work: Causal Relation-
ships in Midlife, 52BJ. GERONTOLOGY SERIES B: PSYCHOL. SCI. & Soc. ScI. 170, 177-78 (July
1997) (finding that care of elderly, ill, or disabled family members or friends is dispropor-
tionately done by women and that such responsibilities often coincide with the peak of
women's labor force participation, causing many women to reduce their hours or to stop
working).
26. Id.; see also EMILY K. ABEL, WHO CARES FOR THE ELDERLY? PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
EXPERIENCES OF ADULT DAUGHTERS 4, 128 (1991) (noting that seventy-seven percent of all
adult children providing care to elderly parents are women); Patricia Braus, When The Help-
ers Need a Hand, 20 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS 66, 67 (1998) (finding that women make up seventy-
three percent of caregivers tending to elderly parents); Nadine Taub, From Parental Leaves to
Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 381, 387 n.26 (1984-85) (reviewing
research showing that women primarily act as caregivers for elderly parents).
27. See supra note 24.
28. Francine D. Blau, Trends in the Well-Being of American Women, 1970-1995, 36 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 112, 150-55 (1998); Coltrane, supra note 24, at 1208.
29. JOHN P. ROBINSON & GEOFFREY GODBEY, TIME FOR LIFE: THE SURPRISING WAYS
AMERICANS USE THEIR TIME 107-09 (1997) (showing that the decline in the average weekly
hours spent on family care by women from 1965 to 1985 was more than double the increase
of such care performed by men); SHELTON, supra note 24, at 145 (finding that a significant
part of the small increase in men's housework time as a percentage of women's from 1975
to 1987 was a function of a decrease in women's time); Bianchi, supra note 24, at 208 tbl.1
(reporting similar results regarding housework for the period of 1965 to 1995).
30. Bianchi et al., supra note 24, at 209 tbl. 1 (showing that, while women performed
about twice as much total housework per week as men in 1995, they did about four times
the amount of "core housework," i.e., cooking, meal cleanup, housecleaning, and laundry);
Sanchez & Thomson, supra note 24, at 756 (showing that in 1994, although couples without
children divided their total combined hours of housework and wage work roughly evenly
(albeit in a gendered manner), women in families with children contributed almost two-
thirds of the total family work hours).
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problematized account of women's nurturing experiences. Liberal
feminism began this project more than two decades ago by depict-
ing the confinement of women to the private sphere of nurturing
and homemaking as stultifying and oppressive.3 ' As the liberal
feminist critique has highlighted, caregiving is intensely physical.
Because much caregiving work focuses on attending to bodily
functions, such work often involves unpleasant, messy, and strenu-
ous physical tasks.32 It is women, primarily, who come into contact
33with feces, urine, vomit, blood, saliva, and mucus. It is women,
primarily, who literally carry, lift, and support others' bodies,
whether young children or persons who are sick or elderly.34 Care-
giving is also mentally taxing. Caregiving requires the ability to
focus simultaneously on multiple tasks and to be attentive to the
emotional needs of others. Such work can be self-annihilating,
mind deadening, and repetitive. Caregiving can be dream defer-
ring and socially isolating. This critique of the oppressive nature of
women's caregiving responsibilities-caring for children, the sick,
and the aged; cooking and cleaning; and the sexual and emotional
nurturance of men-continues today.'
31. Housework, rather than wage work, preoccupied feminist writers in the early days
of the modem feminist movement. See generally BETrY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE
19 (1963) (uncovering the empty life of the 1950s American housewife as "the problem that
has no name"). To a certain extent, this focus continues today. See Margaret A. Baldwin,
Public Women and the Feminist State, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 47, 61 (1997) (criticizing modern
feminism for "focus[ing] primarily on the situation of women in one location: the isolation
of women in the private, domestic sphere"). Actually, feminist criticism of domesticity can
be traced to the Women's Suffrage Movement and the Postbellum Period, though the focus
of the early feminists was on gaining monetary compensation for women's domestic labor,
not upon challenging their domestic role, per se. Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First
Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073,
1166, 1189-91 (1994).
32. Studies show that within the family, women do the more routine physical tasks of
childcare while men do more play, discipline, and education. E.g., ScoTr COLTRANE, FAM-
ILY MAN 48-49, 91 (1996).
33. My vulgarity here represents a purposeful attempt to bring home what more deli-
cate descriptions such as "changing diapers" and "wiping runny noses" so well hide.
34. While there exists limited data on the incidents of injuries to women from the
physical tasks of caregiving within the family, studies of those who perform caregiving work
within the market provide a clue. Both home and institutional health and personal care
workers experience job-related injuries at rates double or more than the national rate for
all occupations; such injuries include overexertion from lifting patients, bending, twisting,
and reaching, as well as falling. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SUM-
MARY 97-4, ISSUES IN LABOR STATISTICS: INJURIES TO CAREGIVERS WORKING IN PATIENTS'
HOMES (1997), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ils/pdf/ofbilsl .pdf.
35. See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME &
HOME BECOMES WORK passim (1997) (portraying caregiving at home as increasingly
unappreciated, rushed, tense, unfulfilling, and exhausting, particularly in comparison to
the modern workplace); ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 126 (1997) (depicting
housework and caregiving as tiring, repetitive, labor-intensive, and boring work, creating
"impotent rage" which is "not carried lightly"); Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay
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A more recent feminist project, both within law and other disci-
plines, explores the positive side of women's caregiving, if not by
depicting caregiving work as necessarily or exclusively pleasurable,
then at least by asserting the fundamental morality of such work.
Carol Gilligan's research showing that women and girls possess a
unique ethic of care and responsibility is a classic example.36 In
law, Martha Fineman has articulated the moral basis for a theory of
collective societal responsibility for dependency. 7 Critical Race
Feminism has highlighted the social, political, and spiritual impor-
tance of family caregiving work for women of color, who
historically have been deemed unfit to nurture their own children
and who have never had the luxury of receiving state "protection"
from the labor market.38 This is particularly so when black
women's caregiving is considered within the context of the histori-
cal and continuing control over their reproduction and labor
through slavery, Jim Crow, sterilization abuse, welfare, and surro-
gacy.39 Still other feminist scholars have depicted women's
on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COL. L. REV. 181, 183-85 (2001) (suggesting that
motherhood, and the expectation that all women will reproduce in their lifetimes, are a
product of cultural oppression).
36. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). According to Gilligan:
The moral imperative ... [for] women is an injunction to care, a responsibility to
discern and alleviate the "real and recognizable trouble" of this world. For men, the
moral imperative appears rather as an injunction to respect the rights of others and
thus to protect from interference the rights to life and self-fulfillment.
Id. at 100. Gilligan and her colleagues have since published several books and collections
that build on her earlier work. See LYN MIKEL BROWN & CAROL GILLIGAN, MEETING AT THE
CROSSROADS: WOMEN'S PSYCHOLOGY AND GIRLS' DEVELOPMENT (1992) (studying the strug-
gles of adolescent girls who are in the process of developing their female identities);
MAKING CONNECTIONS (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1990) (discussing the relational world of
adolescent women); MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN: A CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN'S THINK-
ING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND EDUCATION (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1988)
(discussing differences in moral voice and moral orientation);JILL MCLEAN TAYLOR ET AL.,
BETWEEN VOICE AND SILENCE: WOMEN AND GIRLS, RACE AND RELATIONSHIPS (1995)
(recording the experiences of a culturally and racially diverse group of girls over three
years); WOMEN, GIRLS, AND PSYCHOTHERAPY: REFRAMING RESISTANCE (Carol Gilligan et al.
eds., 1991) (compiling articles on women's psychological development).
37. See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independ-
ence, Autonomy and Self Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13, 13-15 (1999)
(arguing that there is a compelling need to reconsider the basic distribution of responsibil-
ity for dependency among societal institutions).
38. Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51 pas-
sim (1997).
39. See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION
AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997) (addressing the many dimensions of governmental
regulation of black women's reproductive decisions and the impact of this repression on
the way Americans think about reproductive liberty); see also Anita L. Allen, The Black
Surrogate Mother, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 17, 31 (1991); Cheryl I. Harris, Finding
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caregiving experiences as simultaneously pleasurable and painful,
leading women both to fear separation from those they nurture
and to seek independence from them,4° and as both a source of
41power and oppressive role conformity for women.
Concomitant with the wealth of feminist scholarship exploring
the significance of caregiving to women has been a parallel explo-
ration of the meaning in women's lives of wage work. Feminist
scholars have depicted wage work as a source of intellectual ful-
fillment, empowerment, individuation, and social connection for
women, both explicitly4 2 and implicitly,43 and often within the very
same works exploring the significance of family caregiving.4 Yet
feminist legal scholars also have criticized this positive depiction of
wage work for ignoring the real harm, degradation, and oppres-
sion of the workplace experienced by less privileged women, 5 and
46most acutely experienced by women of color living in poverty.
Sojourner's Truth: Race, Gender, and the Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 337-39
(1996); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity,
Critical Race Theory, and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 81-82 (1999).
40. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 14-21 (1988).
41. See Naomi R. Cahn, Gendered Identities: Women and Household Work, 44 VILL. L. REv.
525, 526 (1999).
42. See, e.g., ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE
QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (forthcoming 2001)
(manuscript at 14, on file with author) (describing work and opportunities for self-support
as crucial to full participation in a democratic society); Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 1881, 1886-92, 1959-61 (2000) (describing work as important for women
and as constitutive of citizenship, community, and personal identity).
43. For example, feminist legal scholarship urging workplace accommodation of
pregnancy and family caregiving is based on the assumption, whether stated or not, that
women's work outside the home is a positive experience from which women benefit. See,
e.g., Linda Krieger & Patricia Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive
Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 513, 517-18 (1983)
(arguing for the accommodation of pregnancy in the workplace); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking
Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 1007-13 (1984) (arguing for equal treatment
in the workplace except in areas relating to reproduction).
44. See, e.g., FRIEDAN, supra note 31, at 336 ("Women, as well as men, can only find
their identity in work that uses their full capacities.").
45. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 152 (2000) ("Working-class women's identity is 'multifaceted,'
framed not only around work but around family and other roles as well. This is true in part
because some three-fourths of working-class women hold low-status, low-paying, tradition-
ally female jobs.").
46. Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Cleaning Up/Kept Down: A Historical Perspective on Racial Ine-
quality and "Women's Work", 43 STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1336-53 (1991) (providing an account of
the special forms of workplace exploitation faced by women of color from the mid-
nineteenth century to the present, including segregation in dangerous, demeaning or un-
stable jobs, wage inequality, and relegation to the dirtiest service occupations); Roberts,
supra note 38, passim (describing the menial aspects of caregiving that black and other mi-
nority women historically have been relegated to perform in the labor market). Of course,
this critique of work has not been limited to feminist concerns. There is a vast wealth of
literature exploring the darker side of work generally and the failure of work to deliver on
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As this rich body of scholarship demonstrates, a woman's expe-
riences of wage work and caregiving are dependent upon her
place within the larger social context and are as complex as the
institutions of work and family themselves. Any consideration of the
problems confronted by women caught in the intersection of family
and market work must be attentive to differences among women,
both in its theoretical understanding and proposed solutions.47 Yet
there is also a compelling need to identify commonalities among
women and to resist the current trend, within the academy and
without, to dismiss the continuing relevance of "women" as an ana-
lytic category.48
One such commonality is the fact that, today, most women must
work in order to support their families. Given the decrease in real
wages over the last several decades, the breakdown of the family
wage system,49 and the emergence of the single-parent family as a
prominent family form, the recent explosion of women's labor
force participation can be explained as a matter of sheer economic
necessity. An unprecedented divorce rate of fifty percent and an
increase in out-of-wedlock births have left millions of women to
struggle as the heads of households to support themselves and
their children. Of families with children less than eighteen years
the American Dream. See, e.g., STUDS TERKEL, WORKING: PEOPLE TALK ABOUT WHAT THEY
Do ALL DAY AND How THEY FEEL ABOUT WHAT THEY Do (1972); Kenneth L. Karst, The
Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 523 (1997).
47. Indeed, one of the aims of this Article is to unerase less privileged women from
the predominant theoretical, doctrinal, and legislative discourses addressing women's work
and family conflicts.
48. Feminist legal theorists have addressed the benefits and dangers of antiessential-
ism in feminist endeavors. WEST, supra note 35, at 5-17 (critiquing the postmodern denial
of the self, and the connected self in particular, as peculiarly harmful to women); KimberlM
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidis-
crimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politic% 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 152-60
(arguing that viewing discrimination on the single axis of race or gender distorts the expe-
rience of black women); Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It
Makes, 2 COLUM.J. GENDER & L. 1, passim (1992) (arguing that a concept of women's differ-
ences from men is necessary to remedy socially and culturally imposed harms to women);
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 590-92
(1990) (criticizing theories of feminism that focus solely on experiences of gender and
neglect the impact of other factors such as race); Christine Littleton, Does It Still Make Sense
to Talk About "Women"?, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 15-16 (1991) (arguing that framing pol-
icy issues in gender neutral terms overlooks the importance of women's experience).
49. See Barbara Ehrenreich & Frances Fox Piven, The Feminization of Poverty: When the
"Family-Wage System" Breaks Down, 31 DISSENT 162, 162-64 (1984). The "family wage" refers
to the ability of a man to earn an income sufficient to support his wife and children. For the
history of the family wage ideal in the United States, see Martha May, Bread Before Roses:
American Workingmen, Labor Unions, and the Family Wage, in WOMEN, WORK, AND PROTEST: A
CENTURY OF U.S. WOMEN'S LABOR HISTORY 1 (Ruth Milkman ed., 1985).
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old, about one-third are single parent households. 5 Single women
heads of household must work full-time in the paid labor force to
keep their families above the poverty line; many are unsuccessful .
Today, even married women's paid work is necessary to provide
•• 52
the basics for their families, given the stagnation, or, in the case
of the least skilled, the substantial decline, in the real wages of
men.5 3  Finally, studies show a correlation between married
women's labor force participation and the rise of no-fault divorce.
54
With decreased opportunities under modern no-fault rules for
women to receive alimony upon divorce 5 5 married women's work
serves as a form of insurance against impoverishment in the even-
tuality of divorce.5 6 By 1998, over three-quarters of mothers were
participating in the labor force, including two-thirds of those with
children under age six.
5
7
But these dramatic social and economic changes do not tell the
whole story. Labor force participation rates merely indicate
whether women are working.58 They do not reveal the extent of
50. Lynne M. Casper & Ken Bryson, Household and Family Characteristics: March 1998
(Update), BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REP.
P20-515, at 108 tbl.ll (Oct. 1998) [hereinafter CENSUS HOUSEHOLD/FAMILY CHARACTERIS-
TICS].
51. Census data show that persons in female-headed single-parent households are
much more likely to be poor than persons in two-parent families: 43.1% of female-headed
single-parent households fell below the poverty line for at least two months in 1990, com-
pared with 12.7% of two-parent families. Martina Shea, Dynamics of Economic Well-Being:
Poverty, 1990 to 1992, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULA-
TION REP. P70-42, at 3 & 5 tbl.A (Jan. 1995).
52. Peter Cattan, The Effect of Working Wives on the Incidence of Poverty, MONTHLY LAB.
REv., Mar. 1998, at 22, 27-28 (finding that wives' earnings in married-couple families play a
major role in keeping their families above the poverty line, particularly in non-white fami-
lies).
53. Frank Levy, Incomes and Income Inequality, in STATE OF THE UNION: AMERICA IN THE
1990s 1, 43-45 (Reynolds Farley ed., 1995).
54. Allen M. Parkman, Why Are Married Women Working So Hard?, 18 INT'L REv. L. &
ECON. 41, 48-49 (1998) (finding that married women living in no-fault divorce states devote
4.5 more hours per week to wage work than those living in fault-based divorce states).
55. WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 163-80 (finding, inter alia, that no-fault has resulted in
a shift from permanent to short-term alimony awards, a reduction in the percentage of
settlements involving alimony, and the virtual elimination of alimony after short-term mar-
riages); Singer, supra note 5, at 2424-28 (summarizing the history of the breakdown of the
fault-based regime).
56. Parkman, supra note 54, at 43. Ironically, this behavior often has been a self-
fulfilling prophesy for women. As Martha Fineman has pointed out, because "maternal work
is incompatible with the traditional model of marriage," the increase in divorce rates can be
explained, in part, by the growth of women's labor force participation. Martha Albertson
Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare "Reform", 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 287, 297-
98 (1996).
57. See DOL REPORT ON THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE, supra note 11, at 140 tbl.6.
58. Howard V. Hayghe & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Married Mothers' Work Patterns: The Job-
Family Compromise, MONTHLY LAB. REv.,June 1994, at 24.
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women's labor force participation, i.e., whether it is full-time or
part-time, permanent or temporary, or how much time women
spend engaged in market work over any extended period .5 Herein
lies a second important commonality among women: women's
disproportionate share of family caregiving and housework has
resulted in a persistent labor force attachment gap between men
and women. While women's labor force participation has in-
creased dramatically over the past three decades, ° only fifty
percent of women actually negotiate full-time, year-round jobs to-
gether with family responsibilities.1 The extent of involvement in
paid work is even less for women with children under six years old;
only thirty-five percent of such women participate in the labor
force on a full-time, year-round basis.62 Nearly three-fourths of part-
63time workers are women. Women are more likely than men ei-
ther to accept voluntarily or to be funneled into lower paying
"mommy-track" professional jobs64 and noncommissioned retail
work.65 "Contingent" workers"-basically, workers with jobs that
are not expected to last-are more likely than noncontingent
workers to be women.6 More than one-third of married mothers
59. Id.
60. Married women's labor force participation nearly doubled from 1969 to 1998,
from forty-three percent to seventy-four percent. DOL REPORT ON THE AMERICAN WORK-
FORCE, supra note 11, at 96, 98 chart 3-22. The increase was even more dramatic for
married women with children less than three years of age: twenty-three percent to sixty-
three percent over the same period. Id. at 96, 98 chart 3-23.
61. See Philip N. Cohen & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Marriage, Children, and Women's Em-
ployment: What Do We Know?, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Dec. 1999, at 27 tbl.2, 30.
62. Id. at tbl.2.
63. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SUMMARY 96-9, ISSUES IN
LABOR STATISTICS: A DIFFERENT LOOK AT PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT (April 1996), available
at http://stats.bls.gov/opub/us/pdf/opbils05.pdf [hereinafter BLS, PART-TIME EMPLOY-
MENT].
64. Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimi-
nation Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 79, 89-90 (1989)
[hereinafter Dowd, Gender Paradox].
65. This issue arose most clearly in EEOC v. Sears, 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1305-08 (N.D. Ill.
1986), in which Sears successfully argued as a defense to a Tite VII discrimination case that
its female employees voluntarily "chose" lower-paying, noncommissioned sales jobs. For
discussions of the Sears case, see Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1749, 1752-54, 1802-05, 1840-41 (1990); Lucinda M. Finley,
Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 914, 937-40
(1987) (book review).
66. Contingent work refers to a broad variety ofjobs, including part-time, temporary,
seasonal, leased, involuntarily self-employed, contract, and home-based workers. Anne E.
Polivka & Thomas Nardone, The Quality of Jobs: On the Definition of "Contingent Work",
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1989, at9, 13.
67. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Contingent and
Alternative Employment Arrangements, 3 (Dec. 21, 1999), available at http://
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and nearly one-half of single mothers with children under age six
do no market work.68 In 1996, three out of four unemployed per-
sons were women,69 the majority, seventy percent, because of home
or family responsibilities."
The persistent attachment gap resulting from women's dispro-
portionate caregiving responsibilities at home has had tangible
negative economic and social consequences for women. The
part-time, temporary, or otherwise contingent jobs to which
women are often limited generally provide lower hourly wages
than full-time positions, tend to be less stable,72 and are less71 74
likely to offer health insurance, childcare benefits,74 pension
www.stats.bls.gov:80/news/release/conemp.nws.htm [hereinafter BLS, Contingent Em-
ployment].
68. Press Release, Bureau Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment Charac-
teristics of Families in 1997, tbl.4 (May 21, 1998), available at http://stats.bls.gov/
newsrels.htm; see also Howard V. Hayghe, Developments in Women's Labor Force Participation,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1997, at 41 (analyzing the changes in labor force participation
rates for women between 1975 and 1996).
69. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SUMMARY 98-4, ISSUES IN
LABOR STATISTICS: WHO'S NOT WORKING 1 (May 1998), available at http://stats.bls.gov/
opub/us/pdf/ofbilsl9.pdf [hereinafter BLS, WHO'S NOT WORKING].
70. Id.
71. See MICHAEL K. LETTAU, COMPENSATION IN PART-TIME JOBS VERSUS FULL-TIME
JOBS: WHAT IF THEJOB IS THE SAME? 7 (Office of Research and Evaluation, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Working Paper No. 260, 1994), available at
http://stats.bls.gov/ore/pdf/ec940080.pdf (finding that compensation per hour is substan-
tially lower for part-time jobs than for full-time jobs, even after taking account of differences
in human capital between full-time and part-time workers); Jerome E. King, Part-time Work-
ers' Earnings: Some Comparisons, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, COMPENSATION AND
WORKING CONDITIONS, Summer 2000, at 31 (analyzing national data showing that, on aver-
age, part-time workers receive forty-seven percent of the total compensation of full-time
workers); Stanley D. Nollen, Negative Aspects of Temporary Employment, 17J. LAB. RES. 567,
569-70 (1996) (reporting that 1994 average hourly wages of temporary workers were thirty-
five percent lower than wages of comparable full-time workers).
72. See SUSAN N. HOUSEMAN & ANNE E. POLIvKA, THE IMPLICATIONS OF FLEXIBLE
STAFFING ARRANGEMENTS FORJOB STABILITY 12-13 (Upjohn Institute Staff, Working Paper
No. 99-056, 1999), available at http://www.upjohninst.org/publications/wp/99-56.pdf
(finding that, except for independent contractors, workers in flexible staffing arrangements
such as agency temporary and part-time workers have less job stability than those in regular
full-time arrangements in the sense that they are more likely to switch employers, become
unemployed, or involuntarily drop out of the labor force within a year).
73. Only one in five contingent workers has employer-provided health insurance,
compared with more than one in two non-contingent workers. See BLS, Contingent Em-
ployment, supra note 67, at 4. Similarly, only about eighteen percent of part-time workers
receive direct health insurance coverage from their employers, compared with about sev-
enty percent of full-time workers. SHEILA R. ZEDLEWSKI, EXPANDING THE EMPLOYER-
PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM: EFFECTS ON WORKERS AND THEIR EMPLOYEES 29-
30, tbl.2-2 (1991); Donald R. Williams, Women's Part-Time Employment: A Gross Flows Analysis,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 1995, at 36, 43 n.8.
74. Non-contingent professional workers are fifteen times more likely than blue-collar
or service workers to have benefits such as non-taxable childcare reimbursement accounts,
employer funding for childcare, and on-site childcare. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
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benefits, 75 or opportunities for advancement. 76 Even for women
who work full-time, career interruptions for nurturing responsibili-
ties often translate into lower seniority, wages, and salaries vis-a-vis
male coworkers. 77 Such interruptions occur not just during a
woman's childbearing years, but later in life as well. Older women
who reduce their work hours or exit the workforce at the height of
their earning capacity to care for elderly parents experience not
only short-term losses of wages, but also potentially long-term re-
ductions in pension income.78
Furthermore, women's disproportionate responsibility for care-
giving at home has consequences well beyond their reduced
economic well-being. The "feminization of poverty' 79 weakensS 80
women's bargaining power within marriage, leaves women vul-
nerable to sexual abuse and domestic violence,81 and can decrease
DEP'T OF LABOR, SUMMARY 98-9, ISSUES IN LABOR STATISTICS: EMPLOYER-SPONSORED
CHILDCARE BENEFITS (Aug. 1998), available at http://stats.bls.gov/eb2/ebar0030.pdf.
75. Only about one-fifth of contingent workers are eligible for employer-provided
pension plans, compared with nearly one-half of noncontingent workers. BLS, Contingent
Employment, supra note 67, at 4.
76. See Anne E. Polivka, A Profile of Contingent Workers, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 1996,
at 10 (defining contingent workers as individuals who do not have an explicit or implicit
contract for ongoing employment). For more general discussions of the demographic char-
acteristics and workplace disadvantages faced by contingent workers, see NONSTANDARD
WORK: THE NATURE AND CHALLENGES OF CHANGING EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS (Frantoise
Carr6 et al. eds., 2000), and Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing Economy:
Endure, Adapt, or Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 557, 565-70 (1996)
(addressing the growing level of contract workers, temporary workers, and independent
contractors in the current economy).
77. SeeJoyce P. Jacobsen & Laurence M. Levin, Effects of Intermittent Labor Force Attach-
ment on Women's Earnings, MONTHLY LAB. Rv., Sept. 1995, at 18 (finding that the wages of
women who have taken leave from the labor market never catch up to the wages of women
who never left, even after as long as twenty years); Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental
Leave Revisited, 19 N. ILL. L. REv. 25, 33 & nn.38-41 (1999) (citing a study demonstrating
that while the wage gap for single women has narrowed, the wage gap for mothers has per-
sisted) [hereinafter Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave Revisited].
78. Pavalko & Artis, supra note 25, at 171 ("Interruptions that occur when women are
closer to retirement may lower their Social Security or private pension benefits." (citing E.R.
Kingston & R. O'Grady-LeShane, The Effects of Caregiving on Women's Social Security Benefits, 33
THE GERONTOLOGIST 230-39 (1993))).
79. The term "feminization of poverty" was first coined by Diana Pearce in 1978 based
on her research which demonstrated a correlation between sex and poverty and the impor-
tance of sex in understanding poverty. Diana Pearce, The Feminization of Poverty: Women, Work
and Welfare, URB. & SOC. CHANGE REV., Vol. 11, 1978, at 28.
80. For a review of the literature on the relationship between wives' income and bar-
gaining power within marriage, see Theodore Bergstrom, Economics in a Family Way, 34 J.
ECoN. LITERATURE 1903 (1996) and Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Bargaining and
Distribution in Marriage,J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1996, at 139.
81. Research shows a correlation between domestic violence and women's poverty. See
CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAw 177-200
(2001) (presenting a variety of materials showing connections between poverty and domes-
tic violence).
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the likelihood of women gaining or keeping the custody of their
children upon divorce.82 Moreover, because women are the pri-
mary caretakers of children in our society, the marginalization of
women's wage work has resulted in the widespread poverty of chil-
dren in America. s3 Finally, the failure of our law to recognize
women's work/family conflicts has, in large part, shifted the bur-
den of caregiving from one class of women to another-that is,
from economically privileged women able to conform to the rigid
expectations of the American workplace to low-paid domestic and
childcare workers who disproportionately are poor women and
women of color. 4 As demonstrated in Part II, the law's response to
82. This is particularly true when considerations of income are combined with power-
ful gender stereotypes. So, for example, even if the mother is a well-paid professional, a
father's post-divorce ability to provide a substitute full-time mother to the children-
through remarriage, family, or home-based childcare, for example-may seriously limit a
mother's chances of gaining or retaining custody of children. For discussions of the effect
of fathers' income and mothers' labor force participation on custody outcomes, see Jenni-
fer E. Home, Note, The Brady Bunch and Other Fictions: How Courts Decide Child Custody
Disputes Involving Remarried Parents, 45 STAN L. REV. 2073, 2118-29 (1993) ; Joan Williams, Do
Wives Own Half? Winning for Wives After Wendt, 32 CONN. L. REV. 249, 262-66 (1999); Cheri
L. Wood, Comment, Childless Mothers ?-The New Catch-22: You Can't Have Your Kids and Work
for Them Too, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 383,407-11 (1995).
83. In 1997, 19.9% of children in the United States were poor. JOHN ICELAND ET AL.,
ARE CHILDREN WORSE OFF? EVALUATING CHILD WELL-BEING USING A NEW (AND IM-
PROVED) MEASURE OF POVERTY AS OF 1997 (U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty Measurement
Working Papers, Apr. 1999), available at http://www.census.gov/hhhes/poverty/povmas/
papes/iceland/john.html. Children made up about forty percent of the poverty population,
though only about a quarter of the total population. Id. The poverty rate for children in
female-headed families was 49.0% in 1997. Id. Of those living in poverty in the United
States, children outnumber every other age group. Id. For a review of the sociological litera-
ture addressing the trends and causes of childhood poverty in America, see Daniel T.
Lichter, Poverty and Inequality Among Children, 23 ANN. REV. Soc. 121 (1997).
84. Sixty-one percent of children under age five are cared for by paid, non-relatives
when their parents work or are in school. KRISTIN SMITH, WHO'S MINDING THE KIDS?
CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS 5 tbl.2 (U.S. Census Bureau, Current Pop. Rep., Oct. 2000).
Such children spend an average of thirty-three hours per week in childcare. Id.
Ninety-six percent of private household workers, including childcare workers, cleaners,
and servants, are women; almost one half, forty-seven percent, are black or Hispanic. BU-
REAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY:
HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNUAL AVERAGES 180 tbl.11 (2000). In 1998, the median weekly earn-
ings of such domestic workers were $223, or approximately $11,600 a year. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 2000-2001,
at 357 (2000), available at http://www.stats.bls.gov./ocohome.htm [hereinafter OCCUPA-
TIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 2000-2001]. About one-quarter of white, and one-third of
black, domestic service workers live below the poverty level. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A PROFILE OF THE WORKING POOR, 1997, at 9 tbl.4 (Aug. 1999).
Non-private childcare providers, i.e., those that work in daycare centers, fare a little better,
but not much: they earn about $16,000 a year. See OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK
2000-2001, supra, at 355.
For general discussions of these issues, see Glenn, supra note 46; Roberts, supra note 38;
Peggie R. Smith, Organizing the Unorganized: Private Paid Household Workers and Approaches to
Employee Representation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 45, 52-58 (2000); Peggie R. Smith, Regulating Paid
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the labor force attachment gap and the resulting marginalized
economic status of women and children has been minimal.
II. THE LIMITED RESPONSE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW TO THE ATTACHMENT GAP: TITLE VII, THE PREGNANCY
DISCRIMINATION ACT, AND THE FAMILY
AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
A. History
For over a century, society expressed strong disapproval over,
and the Supreme Court validated, the exclusion of women's pres-
ence in the workplace-particularly white, privileged women.
Judicially enforced stereotypes of women as biologically and psy-
chologically unsuited for participation in the paid labor force
limited their employment-related constitutional claims.8' Women
who became destitute due to the loss or absence of their husbands
were assured protection from wage labor by state "Mothers' Pen-
sions"8 6 and, after the Great Depression, by the Federal Aid to
Dependent Children (ADC) program. Inherent in these welfare
programs was the assumption that women, particularly white, privi-
leged women, should not work. As Sylvia Law has noted, "Women
with children ... were presumed unemployable because tradition
[held] women to be physically and morally unsuited for wage la-
bor, and because both law and social custom assign [ed] them the
Household Work: Class, Gender, Race, and Agendas of Reform, 48 Am. U. L. REv. 851, 918-24
(1999).
85. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding prohibition on em-
ploying women as bartenders unless they are the wives or daughters of male bar owners);
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding hour caps for women employed in laun-
dries); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (upholding an Illinois law excluding women
from the practice of law); cf Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (upholding a Califor-
nia law that excluded pregnancy and childbirth from state disability insurance coverage).
See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CAL.
L. REv. 1532 (1974) (reviewing the Supreme Court's stereotyped notions of women).
86. See Brenner, supra note 5, at 109.
87. ADC was one of several federal anti-poverty programs constituting the Social Secu-
rity Act of 1935. See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, tit. IV, § 401, 49 Stat. 627 (1935)
(codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). ADC was renamed Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC) in 1962, after Congress made families who were needy due to a
father's unemployment, as opposed to only his death or absence, eligible for welfare. Social
Security Act Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, §§ 104(a)(3)(D), 156(b), 76 Stat. 172
(1962) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 606). Apparently, it was the presence of a father,
not a mother, that qualified those receiving welfare for the label "family."
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responsibility of caring for children.""8 The well-documented ex-
ception was black women, who always engaged in wage work in
large numbers, never had the luxury of receiving "protection"
from the perceived harms of the labor force, and were excluded
from government-sponsored welfare programs to ensure their
availability for wage work.89
This state of affairs remained largely undisturbed until the
modern women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s, when femi-
nists came together to define and demand substantive changes in
social, political, and economic institutions. Foremost among the
changes achieved by feminism's "second wave" 90 was the mass en-
trance of white, middle and upper-class women into the workplace,
facilitated and secured by changes in the law. In 1964, Congress
passed Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act which prohibited, in part,
employment discrimination on the basis of sex.91 Subsequently,
successful Title VII and constitutional litigation advanced women's
opportunities to enter the workplace and professions in large
numbers.92 By the early 1970s, the majority of mothers of school-
age children were working outside of the home.99 Since that time,
women's labor force participation has continued to increase dra-
matically, particularly for women with young children. For
example, married women's labor force participation nearly dou-
88. Law, supra note 5, at 1253.
89. See ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN, supra note 5, at 318-19, 325-
27; JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE
FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 7-8 (1985); MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING
POOR 145 n.44 (1989);JILL S. QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM UNDER-
MINED THE WAR ON POVERTY 21 (1994); ROBERTS, supra note 39, at 202-08.
90. The "first wave" consisted of the Women's Joint Marital Property and Suffrage
Movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See generally Siegel, supra note
31 (recounting the history of the first women's rights movement in America).
91. Mary Becker has presented a more complicated account of the common lore that
sex was added to Title VII by conservative opponents of racial equality in a last ditch effort
to defeat the bill. Compare Note, Developments in the Law--Employment Discrimination and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1166-67 (1971) (asserting that the
original proponent of the measure was a southern congressman who voted against the Act),
with Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism
and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209, 232 (1998) (asserting that "many women and men,
eventually even the President, worked for and supported the inclusion of 'sex' [in Title
VII]).
92. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that the em-
ployer bears the burden of proving that denial of partnership was not based upon sex);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (holding that mandatory maternity
leave requirement violates due process); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542
(1971) (per curiam) (stating that employers cannot discriminate against women with pre-
school age children when they hire men in the same category); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (prohibiting the exclusion of women from positions as
"pursers" and different pay rates for female stewardesses and male pursers).
93. Brenner, supra note 5, at 115 n.71.
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bled from 1969 to 1998.94 The increase was even more pronounced
for married women with children less than three years of age, in-
creasing threefold over the same period.9"5 Yet, because the
demands of caring for children and other dependents within the
family have decreased little for women, women's labor force par-
ticipation has remained marginalized.96
The law's response to the tension between women's work and
family responsibilities has been minimal and slow. As the next sec-
tion demonstrates, while Title VII facilitated the entrance of
women into the labor force in large numbers, the model of formal
equality and the categorical framework on which Title VII is based
have made it difficult for women to gain workplace accommoda-
tions for their culturally based caregiving responsibilities under
either a disparate treatment or disparate impact theory of dis-
crimination. The result has been continuing job insecurity for
women and the persistence of a significant labor force attachment
gap between men and women.
B. Title VII
1. Disparate Treatment Cases and the Sex-Plus Theory of Discrimina-
tion-In a disparate treatment case, a woman must prove that an
employer intentionally took some action because of her sex.97 But
women's caregiving is not absolute: not all women are caregivers.
Men also perform some caregiving. Thus, given the categorical
framework of Title VII, persuading a court that an employer who
takes an adverse action against a woman on the basis of her com-
peting family responsibilities is discriminating on the basis of her
sex proves difficult. The first Title VII case ever to reach the Su-
preme Court addressed this precise issue. Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp.98 concerned a hiring policy that explicitly excluded women
with preschool aged children, but not men who were similarly
situated. In 1966, after Martin Marietta rejected Ida Phillips' appli-
cation for the position of assembly trainee on the basis of this
policy, she brought suit under Title VII, claiming sex discrimina-
tion.99 Even though Martin Marietta demonstrated that more than
94. DOL REPORT ON THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE, supra note 11, at 96, 98 chart 3-22.
95. Id. at 96, 98 chart 3-23.
96. See supra Part I.
97. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-58 (1981).
98. 400 U.S. 542, 542-44 (1971).
99. Id. at 543.
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three-fourths of those hired for the position of assembly trainee
were women,'00 Phillips prevailed, and in a per curiam opinion, the
Court outlined for the first time what has since come to be known
as the "sex-plus" theory of discrimination.' °' Under the sex-plus
theory, employers may not treat female employees differently than
their male coworkers on the basis of their sex "plus" some facially
neutral characteristic, such as the fact that they have young chil-
dren. Thus, after Phillips, a woman could conceivably make out a
prima facie case of disparate treatment sex discrimination under
Tite VII on the basis of her caregiving responsibilities, even
though all women are not primary caregivers or even caregivers at
all.
However, the courts' narrow judicial interpretation of the sex-
plus theory of discrimination has rendered the success of such a
claim highly unlikely, perhaps explaining the paucity of reported
sex-plus women's caregiving cases. Courts have found that sex-plus
discrimination is a violation of Title VII only if the "plus," or fa-
cially neutral characteristic, is either a fundamental right or an
immutable physical characteristic. The first court to articulate this
narrow reading of Phillips was Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Pub-
lishing Co.102 In Willingham, the Fifth Circuit held that an
employer's grooming code that required men but not women to
wear their hair short did not violate Tite VII, because physical ap-
pearance is mutable.0 3 The court did concede, however, that
discrimination on the basis of sex plus a mutable characteristic
could constitute sex discrimination if the mutable characteristic
were a "fundamental" right such as "the right to have children or
to marry."0 4 Reasoning that hair length is neither immutable nor a
fundamental right, the court concluded that Macon Telegraph's
policy did not violate Title VII.1
0 5
Courts have applied Willingham 's test in a variety of contexts, but
the mutability/fundamental rights dichotomy has produced highly
inconsistent results. For example, while some courts have found
airline weight requirements a violation of Title VII when applied
100. Id. Of course, these were women without young children.
101. The term "sex-plus" was introduced by Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit in his dis-
sent to the denial of a petition for rehearing en banc in Phillips before it reached the
Supreme Court. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1969). He
said, "If 'sex plus' stands [as nondiscrimination under Title VII], the Act is dead." Id.
102. 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1091-92.
[VOL. 34:3
The Attachment Gap
differently to women and men,' °6 others have concluded that
weight is mutable and thus fair game for employer regulation even
if such rules purposefully target women.0 7 Some courts have de-
termined that employers who require their female but not male
employees to wear "sexy" or feminine uniforms violate women's
fundamental right to privacy;08 still others have upheld uniform
requirements as simply imposing professional or uniform stan-
dards of dress. 'a Most courts have struck down antiquated rules
requiring women to quit their jobs once they marry,"" but not all
have done so."' Before Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act,"2 discussed infra, women used the sex-plus theory of
discrimination with only mixed results to challenge employment
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy." '
In two separate decisions in 1974 and 1976, the Supreme Court
held that disparate treatment on the basis of pregnancy did not
constitute sex discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution or under Tide VII. In the 1974 opinion of
106. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (en
banc) (finding weight policy that applied only to stewardesses was unlawful sex discrimina-
tion); Ass'n of Flight Attendants v. Ozark Air Lines, 470 F. Supp. 1132 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(concluding plaintiff's showing that airline's policy imposed differing weight requirements
on women and men was sufficient to defeat a summaryjudgment motion).
107. See, e.g.,Jarrell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978) (affirming the
district court's finding that weight requirement did not violate Title VII, because weight is a
mutable characteristic fully within the employee's control). For an exhaustive review of the
airline weight cases, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance
Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2541, 2561-63 (1994).
108. E.g., EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding
that employer requirement that female employee wear revealing uniform infringed upon
her fundamental right to privacy and so constituted sex discrimination under Title VIl's sex-
plus theory).
109. E.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1217 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that
an appearance code requiring female anchorwoman to dress in a feminine manner does
not violate Title VII).
110. E.g., Sprogis v. United Air Lines Inc., 444 F.2d 1194,1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding
that employer's policy of terminating female, but not male, flight attendants upon marriage
violates Title VII);Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 331 F. Supp. 1184, 1187-88 (W.D. Pa.
1971) (holding that refusal to hire married women but not men violates Title VII).
111. E.g., Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892, 893 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding no
sex-plus discrimination if the no-marriage rule applies equally to men).
112. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at § 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1994)).
113. Compare, e.g., Cohen v. Chesterfield Sch. Bd., No. 71-1707, 1972 WL 2594.(4th Cir.
Sept. 14, 1972) (noting in dictum that mandatory maternity leave requirement for school
teachers violates Title VII, because only women become pregnant) (decided on constitu-
tional grounds) and Harper v. Thiokol Chemical Corp., 619 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding that under decisions precluding sex-plus discrimination, employer may not law-
fully single out for discriminatory treatment women returning from pregnancy leave who
have failed to sustain a normal menstrual cycle), with Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976) (upholding under Title VII employee disability plan that excluded pregnancy).
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Gedudig v. Aiello,' 4 the Supreme Court held that discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination under the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Geduldig ad-
dressed a California state disability insurance program that denied
benefits for normal pregnancy."5 Reasoning that the program did
not treat women differently from men, but only differentiated
pregnant and "nonpregnant persons,"' 16 the Court found no dis-
crimination on the basis of sex."7 In 1976, the Court extended
Geduldig's reasoning to Title VII in the case of General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert."8 While the Gilbert decision did not explicitly mention the
sex-plus theory of discrimination, the reasoning represented a re-
jection of the theory, even with regard to pregnancy.
a. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act-Soon after Gilbert, a coali-
tion of feminist activists, labor unions, and civil rights groups came
together to reverse the decision legislatively." 9 The congressional
response was swift: in 1978, Congress adopted the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act ("PDA"), 20 which amended the definitions section
of Title VII to include pregnancy in its definition of sex. 12 1 Subse-
quently, in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,122 the
Supreme Court acknowledged that Gilbert had been superseded by
the PDA and held that an employer could no longer deny insur-
114. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
115. The statute provided, in relevant part: "In no case shall the term 'disability' or
'disabled' include any injury or illness caused by or arising in connection with pregnancy up
to the termination of such pregnancy and for a period of 28 days thereafter." Id. at 489
(quoting CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2626). Because a California state court had previously
ruled that this provision did not bar benefits for disability related to medical complications
arising during pregnancy, only normal pregnancy was at issue in Geduldig. See id. at 490-92;
see also Rentzer v. Cal. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 108 Cal. Rptr. 336, 338 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1973).
116. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497 n.20.
117. ld.at502.
118. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
119. See Wendy S. Strimling, The Constitutionality of State Laws Providing Employment Leave
for Pregnancy: RethinkingGeduldig After Cal Fed, 77 CAL. L. REv. 171, 187 (1989).
120. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994)).
121. The pertinent language reads:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
122. 462 U.S. 669,670, 684 (1983).
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ance coverage for pregnancy if it provides employees with an oth-
erwise comprehensive health insurance plan.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act reconnected sex and preg-
nancy so as to make the sex-plus theory unnecessary in pregnancy
discrimination cases. Effectively, the PDA reclassified pregnancy,
childbirth, and "related medical conditions"13 -which the Court
previously had considered to be neutral "plus" factors constituting
legitimate bases for employment discrimination-as discriminatory
"sex" factors per se. 124 Subsequently, courts have dismissed sex-plus
pregnancy claims as duplicative where the plaintiff also pleads a
PDA claim .l The PDA allows a court to find that a plaintiff whose
employer discriminates against her on the basis of pregnancy has
made out a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII
without subjecting her to the vagaries of the sex-plus theory of dis-
crimination.
The PDA has had a significant impact on the perception of
women as wage earners. This change is highlighted by memories
of a not so distant time when a pregnant woman, once she began
to "show," was simply given a going away party and departed from
the workplace as a matter of course.1 26 Moreover, the PDA has
overcome the obstacle of categorization in the area of pregnancy
which the sex-plus theory articulated in Phillips had unsuccessfully
addressed. 12 7 However, narrow judicial interpretation of the PDA
has limited the Act's protection of pregnant women from dis-
crimination in the workplace, whether defined simply as the right
to nondiscrimination or to substantive employment benefits that
will put women on an equal footing with men.
Under the PDA, women are entitled to disability or other leave
for pregnancy only to the extent that such leave is available to
other employees for medical disabilities unrelated to pregnancy.
Put simply, "[e]mployers can treat pregnant women as badly as
they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant employees." 128 Thus,
if an employer or a state-sponsored insurance scheme does not of-
fer any disability leave, even pregnant women receive no
protection under the PDA.129 Some states have enacted legislation
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
124. Newport News,.A62 U.S. at 684 (asserting that under the PDA "discrimination based
on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex").
125. E.g., Brennan v. Nat'l Tel. Directory Corp., 881 F. Supp. 986, 996 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
126. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN
THE UNITED STATES 233, 302 (1982).
127. See supra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
128. Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994).
129. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285-86 (1987) (holding that
the PDA requires pregnancy leave only to the same extent that such leave is also offered for
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that goes beyond the PDA to guarantee pregnancy leave to women
whether or not an employer offers disability or sick leave, and the
Court has upheld such laws in the face of employer challenges
contending that they are preempted by Title VII's statutory
scheme. 3 0 But these states are few and far between,13 ' and those
that do offer affirmative protections for pregnancy significantly
limit the circumstances in which employees are entitled to job
guarantees. 13
Outside the pregnancy leave context, plaintiffs have been suc-
cessful in the rare instances where direct evidence of pregnancy
discrimination is available. For example, in Sheehan v. Donlen
Corp.,13 3 a manager's comments such as "Oh, my God, she's preg-
nant again" and "You're not coming back after this baby"
constituted sufficient direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination
to support a woman's Title VII PDA claim. But such overt dis-
crimination is rare. Unlike this example and the early pregnancy
leave cases, the typical case today involves circumstantial evidence
of discrimination. Successfully litigating such a case often requires
comparative evidence which, given the absence of similarly situ-
non-pregnancy related disabilities); cf Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 479
U.S. 511, 513-14 (1987) (holding that Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 U.S.C.
§ 3304(a) (12), permits states to disqualify from eligibility for unemployment compensation
workers who voluntarily quit their jobs due to pregnancy, so long as states similarly exclude
all workers who terminate their employment for non-work related reasons).
130. Cal. Fed., 479 U.S. at 292. In Cal. Fed., the Court upheld, in the face of an em-
ployer's challenge, a California state law granting pregnant womenjob security not available
to other workers, holding that the PDA did not preempt such positive action laws. Id. at 287.
Still, the Court agreed that the PDA only requires pregnancy leave to the same extent that
such leave is also offered for non-pregnancy related disabilities. Id. at 284. Thus, California's
law survived a preemption challenge under the PDA, not because the Court believed the
PDA provided women with protection beyond that provided to men, but because "Congress
intended the PDA to be 'a floor ... not a ceiling.'" Id. at 285; see also Miller-Wohl Co. v.
Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 479 U.S. 1050 (1987) (upholding similar Montana law on like
grounds). In neither decision did the Court address the question of whether state laws
mandating leave only for women would violate the equal protection clause. The constitu-
tional issue was not presented in Cal. Fed., and, while raised in Miller-Woh4 the Court did not
reach it, instead peremptorily remanding the case in light of its decision in Cal. Fed.
131. Before the FMLA was passed, of the thirty-four states that had some type of family
leave laws in place, only twelve states and the District of Columbia required employers to
provide job-protected maternity leave. Jane Waldfogel, Family Leave Coverage in the 1990s,
MONTHLY LAB. REv., Oct. 1999, at 13. Since the passage of the Act, no significant new state
legislation has been enacted. Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C.
L. REv. 707, 766 n.217 (2000).
132. Mark R. Brown, A Case for Pregnancy-Based Unemployment Insurance, 29 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 41, 44-54 (1995-96) (surveying state unemployment insurance, temporary disabil-
ity, and pregnancy leave laws and detailing their limitations); Donna R. Lenhoff & Sylvia M.
Becker, Family and Medical Leave Legislation in the States: Toward a Comprehensive Approach, 26
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 403, 410-12 (1989) (surveying state pregnancy leave provisions and
detailing their limitations).
133. 173 F.3d 1039, 1042 (7th Cir. 1999).
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ated male employees, can create insurmountable problems of
proof.13 4 Moreover, even where there is such direct evidence of dis-
crimination, the Supreme Court has held that if the employer's
adverse action is based upon both permissible factors and a plain-
tiffs sex, such comments do not necessarily show discriminatory
motive unless they are made at the moment of the adverse em-
ployment decision. 3 5 Because such remarks are rarely made when
a decision maker is exercising formal authority,13 this requirement
has limited the protections of the PDA even in instances where
there is direct evidence of discrimination.' Further limiting the
protections of the PDA has been courts' uncritical acceptance of
Title VII's "position elimination defense," enabling employers to
claim that a pregnant woman was dismissed due to elimination of
her position during her absence or downsizing, not to her use of
pregnancy leave.1
3 8
134. See, e.g., Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1155 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding
that because there was no other part-time employee besides plaintiff, she could not show
she was treated less favorably than similarly-situated, non-pregnant employees); Barrash v.
Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1988) ("One can draw no valid comparison between
people, male and female, suffering extended incapacity from illness or injury and young
mothers wishing to nurse little babies."). For a general discussion of the special problems of
comparative proof in the context of pregnancy discrimination cases, see Judith G. Green-
berg, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act: Legitimating Discrimination Against Pregnant Women in
the Workforce, 50 ME. L. REv. 225, 243-47 (1998).
135. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989).
136. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1213 (1995)
(summarizing an extensive review of cognitive psychology literature showing that inter-
group bias usually occurs long before the moment of decision, since normal decision
making is a multi-stage process which includes perception, interpretation, attribution,
memory, and judgment); Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 339-44 (1987) (drawing on Freudian psycho-
logical theory to argue that prejudice is typically repressed and thus more likely to slip out
when a person is not consciously self-aware of her thought process).
137. E.g., Geier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238, 242 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a su-
pervisor's comments in January and October 1991 warning the plaintiff that she had better
not get pregnant during the employer's busy season and threatening to fire her if she did
not immediately return to work after a miscarriage were not sufficiently causally linked to
her termination in early 1992 to prove discriminatory motive, even though she was fired just
two weeks after she informed her employer she was pregnant).
138. See, e.g., lhardt, 118 F.3d at 1155-56; Rhett v. Carnegie Ctr. Assoc., 129 F.3d 290,
297 (3d Cir. 1997); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 413, 422-23 (1st Cir. 1996);
Pearlstein v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 886 F. Supp. 260, 267 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). But see
Atchley v. Nordam Group, Inc., 180 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that elimina-
tion of plaintiff's position due to company "restructuring" while she was on maternity leave
constituted violation of Title VII). On the interplay between Title VII's position elimination
defense and pregnancy discrimination, see Victoria R. Riede, Comment, EmployerDiscrimina-
tion on the Basis of Pregnancy: Righting the Power Imbalance, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. Rav. 223
(1997).
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Most significantly, the PDA does not address the issue of
women's family caregiving beyond the immediate, physical events
of pregnancy and childbirth. This fact was made clear in Maganuco
v. Leyden Community High School District 212.'"3 In that case, Rebecca
Maganuco, a schoolteacher, presented a PDA challenge to a leave
policy that would not allow her to combine a period of paid sick
leave and unpaid maternity leave in order to extend her leave
from work following the birth of her child.140 While the school dis-
trict policy provided for both kinds of leave, it required her to
choose between them.141 The Seventh Circuit rejected Maganuco's
claim on the ground that the PDA "is limited to policies which im-
pact or treat medical conditions relating to pregnancy and childbirth
less favorably than other disabilities." 14 Because Maganuco sought
time off from work to nurture and parent her newborn child,
rather than to deal with a physical disability relating to pregnancy
or childbirth, the court held that her claim was not cognizable un-
der the PDA.
143
Similarly, the case of McNill v. New York City Department of Correc-
tion14 4 illustrates the narrow definition that courts have accorded
pregnancy under the PDA. Michele McNill, a New York City cor-
rections officer, experienced a difficult pregnancy. Because of
complications in her first trimester, she was confined to bed rest
on the advice of her physician for nearly her entire pregnancy.145
Her son was born with a cleft palate, a congenital birth defect re-
quiring surgery. 46 Because of his disability, McNill's son needed to
be breast-fed until he was old enough to undergo corrective sur-147
gery. In order to care for her son-literally to sustain his life-
McNill thus continued to remain absent from work to breast-feed
her son.18 When she was finally able to return to work after her
son's surgery, she was placed on probation for excessive absentee-
ism, not because of her "medical" absence during her difficult
pregnancy, but because of her post-delivery absence in order to
breast-feed.1 4 9 As an employee on probation, McNill became ineli-
gible for certain discretionary benefits, including a regular work
139. 939 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1991).
140. Id. at 443-45.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 444 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 444-45.
144. 950 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).




149. Id. at 567.
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schedule, 5 ° clearly an important benefit for a new mother. In find-
ing that the PDA did not protect McNill from her employer's
adverse action, the court reasoned: "The dictionary defines
'pregnancy' as 'the period during which a developing fetus is car-
ried within the uterus.' Childbirth is defined as 'parturition,'
'[t]he act of giving birth."" 5 In contrast to these physical condi-
tions, McNill's decision to nurse her son was a choice: "[I]f a
woman wants to stay home to take care of the child, no benefits




These are just a few examples, but courts addressing similar
situations have uniformly held that needs or conditions of a child
that require a mother's presence are not within the scope of the
PDA. Thus, for example, courts have held that women whose em-
ployers terminate, demote, or otherwise discipline them because
of their need for workplace accommodations or time off to breast
feed, 53 provide medical care to, 54 adopt, 5  or simply "rear"156 their
children are not protected by the PDA. 57 In sum, while the PDA
has had a significant impact on the perception of women as wage
earners, and has overcome the obstacle of categorization in the
area of pregnancy which the sex-plus theory had unsuccessfully
150. Id.
151. Id. at 569 (citations to Webster's Dictionary omitted).
152. Id. at 570 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4753 (legislative history of PDA)).
153. Jacobson v. Regent Assisted Living, Inc., No. CV-98-564-ST, 1999 WL 373790, at
*11 (D. Or. Apr. 9, 1999) (holding that Title VII and the PDA do not cover breast feeding
because it is not a medical condition related to pregnancy or childbirth); Fejes v. Gilpin
Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Colo. 1997) (holding that employer's refusal to
provide employee with part-time schedule for breast-feeding or child-rearing is not conduct
prohibited by Title VII, because "[n]othing in the PDA, or Title VII itself, obliges an em-
ployer to accommodate the child-care concerns of breast-feeding workers"); Wallace v. Pyro
Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Ky. 1990) ("While it may be that breast-feeding and
weaning are natural concomitants of pregnancy and childbirth, they are not 'medical condi-
tions' related thereto."), affd without apinion, 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991).
154. Barnes v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 846 F. Supp. 442, 443-45 (D. Md. 1994) (holding
that PDA does not cover leave to provide medical care for newborn twins).
155. Pearlstein v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 886 F. Supp. 260, 266 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(holding that plaintiff who took leave to adopt child is unprotected by PDA).
156. Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 927 F. Supp. 1226, 1238 (E.D. Mo. 1996), affd, 116
F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 1997) (denying relief to woman who was demoted while on maternity
leave by reason that "new mother[s]" are not a protected class under the PDA); Record v.
Mill Neck Manor Lutheran Sch. for the Deaf, 611 F. Supp. 905, 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(holding that Tide VII does not protect people terminated because they wish to take child-
rearing leaves, as opposed to women who wish to take pregnancy leaves).
157. For two articles providing a more extensive review of cases demonstrating the lim-
ited judicial interpretation of the PDA, see Greenberg, supra note 134, at 228-47 and Jendi
B. Reiter, Accommodating Pregnancy and Breastfeeding in the Workplace: Beyond the Civil Rights
Paradigm, 9 TEX.J. WOMEN & L. 1, 6-13 (1999).
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addressed, it has not countered the limits of formal equality theory
on which both Title VII and the PDA are based.
b. Salvaging Title VII's Sex-Plus Theory of Discrimination After the
PDA: Is Sex-Plus Good for Anything?-Given the limited scope of the
PDA, Title VI's sex-plus theory of discrimination remains as one
of the primary tools with which women are left to combat disparate
treatment in the workplace on the basis of their family caregiving
responsibilities. After all, the PDA was merely intended to carve
out pregnancy from the sex-plus theory so as to make discrimina-
tion on the basis of pregnancy per se sex discrimination; it was not
intended to eliminate the sex-plus theory in toto. However, as this
section demonstrates, the sex-plus theory offers little more to
women than the PDA. Employment discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy and childbirth-essentially women's biological differ-
ence-has become the outer limit to which employers can typically
be held liable.
158
Narrow judicial interpretation of the sex-plus theory of dis-
crimination as limited to those situations where the neutral "plus"
factor is either an immutable characteristic or a fundamental right
has rendered the success of sex-plus caregiving claims highly un-
likely.' 59 First, given prevailing societal conceptions of women's
caregiving as a product of either freely determined choice or per-
haps gender socialization, but certainly not biology, it should not
be surprising that there are no reported cases where the plaintiff
has argued or a court has found that a woman's status as a primary
caregiver is an immutable characteristic under Title VI's sex-plus
theory. Further, while commentators and courts often have cited
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp 6° for the proposition that "having
children" is a fundamental right,'6 ' no court ever has translated this
fundamental right to "have" children into a fundamental right to
receive workplace accommodations to care for them. At best, the
158. It should be noted that there is a paucity of reported decisions addressing whether
a woman whose employer discriminates against her on the basis of her cultural caregiving
unrelated to pregnancy constitutes discrimination under the sex-plus theory. There are two
possible reasons for this state of affairs. Narrowjudicial interpretation accorded the sex-plus
theory has limited its value to plaintiffs, and advocates for women are ambivalent, in any
case, about pushing a theory that emphasizes women's cultural differences for fear of rein-
forcing harmful gender roles.
159. See supra notes 102-18 and accompanying text.
160. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
161. E.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (en
banc); Keven H. Friedman & Christine R. Mertz, Note, 'Borderline' Sexual Harassment: A Study
of Sex Based Discrimination in the United States and Argentina and the Problem of Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Law, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 569, 578 (1998) ("[1]n Phillips v. Martin
Marietta. .. having children was the fundamental right protected.").
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Court's decision in Phillips and the sex-plus theory of discrimina-
tion give women the right both to "have" children and work within
the existing androcentric structure of the workplace. This
achievement should not be taken lightly. In part, Title VII deci-
sions such as Phillips facilitated women's entrance into the paid
workforce in large numbers.' 62 However, Title VII's utility as a tool
to restructure the workplace now that women have arrived has
proved inadequate, at best.
Revisiting the facts in Phillips illustrates this limitation. Phillips
was not seeking employment from Martin Marietta with an
accommodation for her childcare responsibilities, though, like
most women with young children, she probably could have
benefited from one. Rather, she was simply seeking to obtain a
position on the same terms and conditions as male applicants. The
evil that the Court aimed to address in Phillips was Martin
Marietta's allegedly stereotypical assumption that Phillips would be
absent from work more frequently than her male or childless
female coworkers. 6 3 As Justice Marshall noted in his concurring
opinion, "By adding the prohibition against job discrimination
based on sex ... Congress intended to prevent employers from
refusing 'to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations
of the sexes.' ,,164 But, what if women's experiences bore out the
stereotype? What if Phillips, like many women with young
children, would require some accommodation such as a flexible
work schedule or periodic absences from work to avoid the
"second shift"'6 5 at home or the delegation of her family
responsibilities to a relatively disadvantaged domestic caregiver?
Given the model of formal equality on which Title VII is based,
such accommodations are not attainable. Thus, plaintiffs have
162. See, e.g., In re Consol. Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142,
1145 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that a policy requiring female, but not male, cabin attendants
with children to accept ground duty positions was "a clear example of sex discrimination"
under Title VII), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.
385 (1982).
163. Cf In re Consol. PretrialProceedings, 582 F.2d at 1145-46 (defendant airline attempts
to justify no-motherhood policy on ground that mothers, but not fathers, of young children
would have an unacceptably high rate of absenteeism).
164. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
165. The "second shift," first identified as such by Arlie Hochschild in her book by the
same name, refers to the housework and caregiving responsibilities for which women still
remain largely responsible, despite the dramatic increase in their labor force participation
over the past three decades. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 24, at 2-4. Calling women's unpaid
family work a "shift" was part of the larger feminist project of exposing women's caregiving
as work deserving of recognition and compensation. See supra notes 31-35 and accompany-
ing text.
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been moderately successful in sex-plus employment discrimination
cases like Phillips concerning hiring or promotion, where, absent
any employment record, or at least any employment record for the
job in question in the case of promotion, the perceived threat of a
woman's family caregiving responsibilities can be dismissed as a
stereotype. 66 In contrast, plaintiffs have been far less successful in
sex-plus discrimination cases concerning demotion or termination,
where either the plaintiffs direct requests or her employment
record reveals that she requires an accommodation for her family
obligations. 67 In sum, where plaintiffs have attempted to use Title
VII to gain accommodations for their cultural caregiving work,
they have been largely unsuccessful. The stories of four women
presented in Chi v. Age Group, Ltd.,' 68 Martinez v. NBC,169 Fuller v.
GTE Corp., ' 70 and Bass v. Chemical Banking Corp.171 illustrate this
phenomenon.
i. Teresa Fong Chi-Teresa Fong Chi held a position as an im-
port coordinator with Age Group, a garment importer.' Age
Group required Chi to work overtime on a regular basis. 73 Chi be-
came pregnant and took an approved ten-week maternity leave
after her child was born.7 4 As the expiration of her leave grew
near, Chi notified Age Group that she wished to return to work on
a four-day a week basis and that she would not be able to resume
her pre-maternity leave schedule of working regular overtime. 7 5
When her supervisor informed her this would not be possible, Chi
agreed to return on a full-time basis, but persisted in her request
166. See Coble v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist. No. 6, 682 F.2d 721, 727 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1982)
(holding that school district's failure to promote female teacher based on the stereotypical
presumption that her childcare responsibilities would necessarily interfere with her job
performance violates Title VII); Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 2205 (MBM), 1998 WL
912101, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998) (holding that law firm's failure to promote plaintiff
with "consistently excellent employment evaluations" to managerial position, instead offer-
ing the position to less qualified men with children and women without children,
established prima facie case of sex-plus discrimination under Title VII); Carter v. Shop Rite
Foods, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1150, 1167-68 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (holding that employer's failure
to promote female grocery store employees to managerial positions, inter alia, because their
childcare responsibilities allegedly would prevent them from "taking on longer hours,"
violates Title VII).
167. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.b.i.
168. No. 94 Civ. 5253 (AGS), 1996 WL 627580 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1996).
169. 49 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
170. 926 F. Supp. 653, 656 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
171. No. 94 Civ. 8833 (SHS), 1996 WL 374151 (S.D.N.Y.July 2, 1996).
172. Chi, 1996 WL 627580, at *1.
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to work regular hours.7 Ultimately, Age Group deemed Chi un-
qualified to return to work because of her unwillingness to work
long hours and fired her.' Chi filed suit, alleging that Age Group
discriminated against her on the basis of her sex and her "status of
a mother with child" in violation of Title VII and the New York
Human Rights Law. Applying the three-step burden-shifting
framework first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,7"
the court ruled that Chi had failed to make out a prima facie case
of sex discrimination, even in light of the sex-plus theory 8°
The Supreme Court developed the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework in recognition of the fact that few employers
explicitly discriminate on the basis of sex as did Martin Marietta in
1966, thereby making it particularly difficult to prove intent in
employment-related disputes. 8' According to the McDonnell
Douglas framework, to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff
need only show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class;
(2) she was qualified for the position; 2 (3) her employment was
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at *4-6. Because Chi had not exhausted her administrative remedies as re-
quired by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e), (f) (1), the court dismissed her Tide VII claim.
Id. at *5. However, the court considered her claims under the New York Human Rights law
applying the "standards ... established by the United States Supreme Court for ... Title
VII." Id. (quoting Sogg v. Am. Airlines, 603 N.Y.S.2d 21, 23 (1993).
179. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
180. Chi, 1996 WL 627580, at *5-6.
181. The McDonnell Douglas opinion itself is conspicuously silent as to the Court's inten-
tion in adopting the now famous burden-shifting test; such formal acknowledgments did
not come until later. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977)
("[T]he McDonnell Douglas Formula does not require direct proof of discrimination
... ."); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 526 (1993) ("Because 'Title VII
tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise,' we devised a framework that would
allow both plaintiffs and the courts to deal effectively with employment discrimination re-
vealed only through circumstantial evidence.") (SouterJ., dissenting); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 215 (1989) ("[A] well-established framework of proof applies if
the plaintiff offers only indirect evidence of discriminatory motive."); Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 670 (1989) ("[I]n the ... event that intent has to be established
by inference, the employee may resort to the McDonnell/Burdine inquiry."); Trans World
Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) ("The shifting burdens of proof set forth in
McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the plaintiff has his day in court despite the
unavailability of direct evidence.") (quoting Loeb v. Textrom, Inc. 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st
Cir. 1979)); United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)
("There will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes."); Bd.
of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of New York v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 162 n.10 (1979) ("[D]irect
proof of an illicit motive is often unavailable....").
182. In cases of demotion and termination, some courts have interpreted this prong as
i quiring a showing of "satisfactory work performance" or that the employee was satisfacto-
rily meeting the legitimate expectations of her employer. E.g., Warfield v. Lebanon Corr.
Inst., 181 F.3d 723, 729 (6th Cir. 1999); Oates v. Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d 1161, 1171 (7th
Cir. 1997); Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 421 (1st Cir. 1996).
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terminated or she was not promoted; and (4) the discharge or
failure to promote occurred under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination based on her membership in
the protected class.1
8 3
The court found Chi to be a member of a protected class under
a sex-plus theory of discrimination, thereby satisfying part one of
the McDonnell Douglas test for making out a prima facie case.184
However, because Chi "was not willing to work late on a regular
basis," the court found that "Chi has not shown that she was quali-
fied for the position, which required her to stay late when needed
to communicate with Age Group's Far East manufacturers." 1 5
Thus, although the burden on the plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework is "not oner-
ous,"' 18 6 the court found that Chi failed to meet the requirement of
the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas test that she must be
"qualified for her position.' 1 7 The court did not consider the pos-
sibility that Age Group might work out a flexible schedule with
Chi, allowing her, for example, to shift her work hours to more
closely correspond with the business hours of Age Group's Far East
exporters. Under Title VII's model of formal equality, even as
183. E.g., Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-08; Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 254 (1981); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Once the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, the defendant employer must come forward with evidence to support a legiti-
mate non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07. If the employer
carries this burden of production, "the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebut-
ted" and "drops from the case." Id. at 507 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 & n.10). The
plaintiff then has the burden of showing that the proffered reason is merely a pretext to
mask purposeful employment discrimination. Id. at 507-08. Such a showing of pretext,
along with the plaintiff's prima facie case, may be sufficient to sustain a finding of inten-
tional discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 146-47 (2000).
184. Chi, 1996 WL 627580, at *6.
185. Id. at *5.
186. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
187. Chi, 1996 WL 627580, at *5. It is apparent that the Chi case was not litigated well.
While it appears that Chi was represented by counsel, her request for over a billion dollars
in damages, laundry list of claims, and failure to submit a separate statement of contested
material facts in response to defendant's summary judgment motion in accordance with the
local rule gives the case a distinct pro se flavor. Id. at *1. But these failings, as frustrating as
the court may have found them, are irrelevant to the question of whether Chi had sustained
a prima facie case, to which a substantial portion of the opinion is addressed. The court's
repeated references to Chi's deposition testimony, submitted by defendants, in its analysis
of her prima facie case were thus clearly erroneous, and evidence its hostility toward Chi
and the very concept of her claim. Id. at *2 (derisively quoting Chi's statements that she was
"treated like a dog," that Age Group made her stay late for "some stupid reason," that "it's
always difficult for people with family to stay that late," and that Age Group terminated her
based on her "status as being married with child."). The court's use of such references are
particularly insensitive given that English, in all likelihood, was not Chi's first language. See
id. at *6 (noting that Chi learned about her position at Age group from an advertisement in
a Chinese language newspaper).
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modified by the sex-plus theory of discrimination, such accom-
modations are inconceivable. Because Title VII provides women
nothing more than the right to participate in the workplace on
the same terms as men, 18 it is of little value to women like Teresa
Chi who seek affirmative accommodations for their caregiving
responsibilities.
ii. Alicia Martinez-Alicia Martinez was an associate producer
at "MSNBC," a 24-hour-a-day, all-news cable television network.'"'
Martinez told MSNBC that she was pregnant before she accepted
the position. °90 After returning from maternity leave, Martinez
brought an electric breast pump to work and with MSNBC's con-
sent, took three, twenty-minute breaks per day to pump her breast
milk so that she could breast feed her son while resuming her ca-
reer."' On several occasions, Martinez suffered intrusions by other
employees into the locked, empty "edit" room which she was using
to pump her milk, as well as offensive comments regarding her
breast pumping by a male coworker.' 92 Martinez also contended
that her supervisor began imposing onerous schedule changes,
exacerbating her existing difficulties juggling the overtime de-
mands of her position as a producer and caring for her infant
son. 93 Martinez asked for a more regular work schedule, but
MSNBC denied her request unless she would agree to accept a
demotion, salary cut, and Tuesday through Saturday schedule. 94 In
response, Martinez informed MSNBC that she would be looking
for other employment, but that she wished to remain in her cur-
rent position as a producer until her departure.'1 95 Subsequently,
MSNBC demoted Martinez anyway because she failed to work suf-
ficient overtime during a period of particularly heavy media
coverage surrounding the deaths of Princess Diana and Mother
Teresa. 96 Three months later, Martinez resigned, ultimately taking
a part-time position at CBS.
9 7
188. Use of the word "men" here is consistent with the empirical research set out in
Part I, which demonstrates that, by all measures, women continue to perform the bulk of
family caregiving and housework. See supra Part I.
189. 49 F. Supp. 2d at 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
190. Id.





196. Id. Of course, this is quite ironic given that the mass adoration of Princess Diana
and Mother Teresa is attributable to their selfless dedication to the care of others.
197. Id. at 308.
SPRING 2001]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Martinez filed suit, alleging that MSNBC discriminated against
her on the basis of her sex plus her need to pump breast milk in
violation of Title VII.19s Despite the fact that Martinez presented
credible circumstantial evidence of sex discrimination, as evi-
denced by her supervisor's imposition of onerous schedule
changes upon her return from maternity leave and tasteless and
offensive remarks directed at the fact that she was pumping breast
milk, the court did not provide Martinez with an opportunity to
demonstrate that she met the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
test for proving intentional discrimination with circumstantial evi-
dence. ' 9" Rather, the court declared that because "men are
physiologically incapable of pumping breast milk," Martinez had
failed to make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination, even
when considered under the theory of sex-plus discrimination. °°
The Martinez court acknowledged "the problems facing women
who wish to bear children while pursuing challenging careers," but
disagreed with Justice Stevens' opinion that Tide VII provides suf-
ficient basis for the judicial protection of qualities unique to
women, concluding "if breast pumping is to be afforded protected
status, it is Congress alone that may do so.
21
The court's reasoning in Martinez, as in Chi, demonstrates the
limitations of the sex-plus theory of discrimination in overcoming
societal and judicial commitments to formal equality. The sex-plus
theory has the potential to overcome the rigidity of the categorical
framework of Title VII by providing protection to a subclass of
women, e.g., women with children, even if an employer does not
discriminate against all women. But it cannot serve as a transfor-
mative device to achieve workplace accommodations for women's
cultural practices not rooted in biological sex differences, such as
caring for children and other dependants. While lactation is bio-
logically-based, breast feeding is seen by judicial decision makers
and our society more broadly as a function of women's rational
198. Id. Martinez also sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2) (1994), unsuccessfully arguing that lactation is a disability. Id. at 308-09.
199. Id. at 310.
200. Id. Of course, it is precisely because breast feeding is a condition unique to women
that discrimination aimed at breast feeding in the workplace should trigger the protections
of Title VII. Cf Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 161-62 (1976) ("By definition, such a
rule discriminates on account of sex; for it is the capacity to become pregnant which pri-
marily differentiates the female from the male.") (Stevens,J., dissenting).
201. Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 306, 311. In response to decisions like Martinez and
those cited supra note 153, a member of Congress has introduced legislation to amend te
Pregnancy Discrimination Act by adding "breast feeding" to "pregnancy, childbirth, or re-




decisions or possibly a cultural ethic of care, not as an immutable
condition. As such, it is not an activity or condition that is pro-
tected by Title VII. All Title VII provides to women is the right to
participate in the workplace as presently configured, with rare and
limited exceptions for those circumstances when women's agency
is deemed to be sufficiently impaired to justify protection, e.g.,
pregnancy and childbirth.
The stories of Teresa Chi and Alicia Martinez represent explicit
and bold, if not successful, attempts by women to use our country's
employment discrimination laws and judicial system to gain work-
place accommodations for their family caregiving responsibilities.
But, what about women who are willing, or, more likely, compelled
by economic circumstances to accept the structure of the Ameri-
can workplace in order to gain or maintain employment? As
demonstrated by Phillips, women have successfully used the sex-
plus theory of discrimination to challenge employers' failure to
hire or promote them on the basis of "stereotypical" assumptions
202
about their limitations due to their status as primary caregivers.
That is, before they are employed or promoted, women have suc-
ceeded in convincing courts that they can conform to the male-
worker norm. However, once employed, while some relatively
privileged women may be able to pass as male "ideal workers,,
20 3
perhaps by putting off childbearing or delegating their caregiving
and housework to the market, many women inevitably fail.204 When
women are penalized by their employers for failing to conform or
are disadvantaged vis-ti-vis coworkers without caregiving responsi-
bilities, Title VII and the model of formal equality on which it is
based offer little protection. The stories of Melissa Fuller and An-
drea Bass illustrate the difficulties experienced even by women
who are attempting to live up to the male worker norm.
iii. Melissa Fuller and Andrea Bass-Melissa Fuller's supervisor at
GTE Corporation repeatedly made negative comments about her
children and reprimanded her, inter alia, for leaving work to pick
up her sick child from daycare and failing to "get her priorities
straight." 0 5 After Fuller was constructively discharged due to what
she alleged to be ongoing harassment, she sued GTE, arguing that
202. See supra note 166.
203. See Williams, supra note 15, at 834.
204. Moreover, those who "succeed" often do so at great personal cost. There is a sub-
stantial body of sociological literature examining the relationship between work/family
conflict, or "role strain," and mental health, family relationships, and physical well-being. See
Maureen Perry-Jenkins et al., Work and Family in the 1990s, 62J. MAR. & FAM. 981, 989-90
(2000) (reviewing studies); Shelton, supra note 24, at 315-16 (same).
205. Fuller v. GTE Corp., 926 F. Supp. 653, 656 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
SPRING 2001 ]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex plus her
"status as a mother of young children." 20 6 The court found that she
failed to make a prima facie claim of discrimination, reasoning that
she "was replaced by another mother" and that she "failed to show
that she was treated differently from fathers with young children."
2 0 7
Fuller worked in a largely sex-segregated department,20 8 rendering
the generation of such comparative evidence nearly impossible, and
the person who replaced her had older children .20 ' But these
important facts, particularly given that Fuller's complaint
specifically alleged discrimination against mothers with young
children, did not find their way into the court's opinion.
Nor did a court find the facts presented by Andrea Bass, an As-
sistant Vice President and Product Manager at Chemical Bank,
sufficient to show that she was a victim of sex discrimination under
a sex-plus theory. ° Chemical Bank began giving Bass lukewarm
performance reviews, excluding her from important industry
meetings and social gatherings, and reducing her responsibilities,
only after she took maternity leave and began on occasion to ab-
sent herself from work during normal business hours to shuttle her
daughter to and from kindergarten and elementary school. 21' The
day Chemical Bank terminated her for an incident related to her
"excessive lateness and absenteeism," it promoted a single woman
with no children to Vice President, a position for which Bass had
been next in line. 12 According to the court, "because Bass has not
produced any evidence to show that Chemical treated her differ-
ently than married men or men with children with regard to
promotion," her Title VII claim "must fail."
2 13
By finding against the plaintiffs at the prima facie stage, the
Fuller and Bass courts successfully avoided any discussion of the real
206. Id.
207. Id. at 657.
208. Seventy-five percent of the employees in Fuller's department were women, and, of
the male employees, only one had children. Id. at 656.
209. Id.
210. Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833 (SHS), 1996 WL 374151, at *5
(S.D.NY.July 2, 1996).
211. Id. at * 1-3.
212. Id. at*3.
213. Id. at *5. Curiously, Bass's discriminatory termination claim did survive summary
judgment on the basis of evidence that her supervisor had difficulty working and communi-
cating with women, would not attend meetings conducted by women, invited male but not
female employees to lunch and to his home for get-togethers, and permitted men but not
women to attend certain business conferences and seminars. Id. at *6. Why this evidence
was not relevant to Bass's promotion claim is not explained by the court. The fact that a
woman was promoted instead of Bass apparently blinded the court to the relevance of these




gravamen of the plaintiffs' cases: Fuller and Bass required work-
place accommodations for their childcare responsibilities that are
not available under Title VII. Unlike Teresa Chi and Alicia Mar-
tinez, who formally sought accommodations from their employers
to care for their newborn children, Fuller and Bass were also seek-
ing accommodations, albeit privately and quietly with the hope
214that no one would notice. When they were "caught," like count-
less women privately suffering with the conflict between their
caregiving and work responsibilities, Title VII afforded them no
protection.2'5 As Kathryn Abrams pointed out more than ten years
ago, "An employer may not be able to penalize women when they
behave too much like men, but he is not barred from penalizing
them when they behave too much like women.
2
16
Perhaps the outcome in these cases and others like it should not
be surprising. The result was arguably presaged more than thirty
years ago when, in dictum, the Court suggested in Phillips v. Martin
Marietta that if Martin Marietta could show that conflicting family
obligations were "demonstrably more relevant to job performance
for a woman than for a man,"2 7 then it might be able to legally jus-
tify its discriminatory policy under Title VII's "bona fide
occupational qualification" (BFOQ) exception. 28 According to one
account, this language was added at the bequest of Chief Justice
Burger, who feared that judges might otherwise be required to
hire female law clerks and, consistent with prevailing attitudes of
the time, thought that women were naturally unsuited for some
jobs.2 '9 This language was the subject of much criticism, both by
commentators and Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion.
Justice Marshall warned, "The exception for a 'bona fide occupa-
tional qualification' was not intended to swallow the rule."22°Justice
214. In a footnote, the Fuller court seemed to acknowledge this when it defensively said,
"Despite the argument, valid in many cases, that women often take on greater responsibilities than
some men for parenting their children, this Court cannot find that parenting is unique to
women." 926 F. Supp. at 658 n.3 (emphasis added).
215. Cf Noyer v. Viacom Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 301, 302, 305-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding
that Senior Vice President of cable network whose job responsibilities were transferred in
part to a consultant and who was excluded from certain meetings and high level decisions
after her return from maternity leave did not suffer discrimination under Title VII or the
Family and Medical Leave Act).
216. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42
VAND. L. REv. 1183,1231 (1989).
217. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
218. Employers may utilize the statutory BFOQ defense "in those certain instances
where ... sex ... is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (e)(1) (1994).
219. Martha Chamallas, Mothers and Disparate Treatment: The Ghost of Martin Marietta, 44
VILL. L. REv. 337, 342-47 (1999).
220. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 545 (Marshall,J., concurring).
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Marshall's fears have never materialized, but not because the
221
Court ultimately interpreted the BFOQ defense quite narrowly.
Rather, it is the lower courts' commitment to formal equality that
has "swallowed the rule." As the four cases discussed herein dem-
onstrate, most sex-plus parenting cases never survive a pretrial
dispositive motion on the existence of a prima facie case, much
less succumb under the BFOQ defense. This is because Title VII
requires only that employers afford women an opportunity to en-
ter and advance in the workplace according to its preexisting
androcentric terms; it does not require any structural accommoda-
tions for women's cultural caregiving work now that they have
"arrived."
Recently, heartened by a few favorable decisions, a number of
commentators have looked to the underutilized sex-plus theory of
discrimination first articulated in Phillips as a potential resource for
challenging the gendered structure of the American workplace.
Martha Chamallas notes that disparate treatment theory affords
women the "opportunity to convince ajury that, in their case, the
work/family conflict was all in the employer's mind. 2 22 Similarly,
223citing the case of Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., Joan Williams urges that
"[t] hese new 'I had a baby, not a lobotomy' suits have tremendous
potential, for discrimination against mothers remains very open
today, precisely because it is not now conceptualized as discrimina-
tion., 224 In Trezza, a federal district court held an attorney with
children had established a prima facie case of sex-plus discrimina-
tion under Title VII when her employer thrice passed her over for
a promotion to management, instead offering the positions to less
qualified men with children and to a woman without children.22 '
Trezza is an example of a woman able to succeed according to the
traditional expectations of the American workplace-that is, to
work long hours with little flexibility or recognition of outside
caregiving obligations in the terms, conditions, or benefits of em-
ployment. As the court repeatedly emphasized, she had
221. See Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991) (holding that the BFOQ defense is allowed only
when "distinctions based on sex ... relate to ability to perform the duties of the job"); Do-
thard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977) ("Discrimination based on sex is valid only
when the essence of the business operation would be undermined by not hiring members of
one sex exclusively.") (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th
Cir. 1971)).
222. Chamallas, supra note 219, at 354.
223. No.98 Civ. 2205 (MBM), 1998 WL 912101 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998).
224. WILLIAMS, supra note 45, at 102; see alsoJoan Williams, Market Work and Family Work
in the 21st Century, 44 VILL. L. REV. 305, 328 (1999).
225. 1998 WL 91201, at *1-3, *6-7.
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"consistently excellent employment evaluations. But, as the sto-
ries of Teresa Chi, Alicia Martinez, Melissa Fuller, and Andrea Bass
demonstrate, we should be less sanguine about a legal strategy de-
pendent upon demonstrating that a woman's painfully real
work/family conflicts are simply a figment of her employer's
imagination. This is particularly so in cases of termination and
demotion, when the reality of women's family caregiving responsi-
bilities often can no longer be hidden.
And why should they be? Women's "satisfactory work perform-
ance""' given the current structure of the American workplace is
often dependent on conditions that have, at best, been elusive for
most women and, at worst, downright harmful. These conditions
include the disappearance of the gendered division of caregiving
within the family, the reemergence of the traditional, two-parent
family norm, and the delegation of family caregiving work to the
market, where it is typically performed by low-paid domestic and
childcare workers who are disproportionately poor women and
women of color.28 While the sex-plus theory of discrimination will
226. Id. at *2.
227. See supra note 182.
228. See supra notes 38, 46, 84 and accompanying text. Vicki Schultz has recently criti-
cized feminist legal theorists for proposing legal reforms that "assume[] that housework is,
and will continue to be, 'women's work."' Schultz, supra note 42, at 1905. She suggests that
feminists should continue to work toward a more egalitarian division of labor within mar-
riage. Id. at 1906-97. To the extent this egalitarian division is not attainable, Schultz
proposes that family work should be "handed over to day-care providers, cleaning services,
home health aides, landscapers, and the like." Id. at 1901. To be sure, in our modern soci-
ety, some commodification of household labor is both inevitable and healthy, and there has
been some limited progress on the home front with regard to men's contribution to house-
hold labor. See supra Part I. Moreover, as Schultz points out, a commodification strategy
offers opportunities to organize and protect domestic workers which are not available when
such work is performed behind the privatizing shield of the family and marriage. Schultz,
supra note 42, at 1901-02. However, this classically liberal reallocation/commodification
strategy has been elusive for all but the most privileged women. Despite thirty years of advo-
cacy, and despite significant increases in women's labor force participation, women still
perform the vast majority of childcare and household work in our society. See supra Part I.
Moreover, to the extent that the commodification/reallocation strategy assumes the pres-
ence of a man and the financial resources and desire to hire outside domestic help, it
perpetuates a distinctly white, heterosexist view of the family. Given our country's history of
control over minority women's reproduction, mothering, and labor, see supra notes 39 and
46 and accompanying text, we should not assume that all women seek to transfer their fam-
ily caregiving work to the market, or that doing such work in the market, even for decent
wages and under favorable conditions, represents progress for all women. Finally, the real-
location/commodification strategy fails to fundamentally challenge the discriminatory
structure of market work. It simply seeks to enlist men and the market in assisting women so
that they can participate in the workplace according to the male-worker norm. Of course,
we should continue to contest the gendered division of labor within the family, and we
should work doggedly to ensure that women have meaningful access to paid work and the
economic, social, and political benefits that flow from it. But we should do so in ways that
do not discredit the significance of caregiving to living a full life, and in ways that do not
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continue to be useful for some women, particularly to privileged
women who are seeking to enter and advance in the workforce,
the foregoing analysis suggests that it cannot fundamentally chal-
lenge the discriminatory structure of the American workplace. 9
Indeed, to the extent that the theory is used to press claims similar
to Phillips' and Trezza's, it may in fact harm those women most in
need of the law's protections by reifying the existing structure of
work.
2. Disparate Impact Cases-Because discriminatory intent is dif-
ficult to show in an era when employers rarely differentiate
explicitly between male and female employees, and because of the
limitations of the disparate treatment theory of discrimination
even if a woman could show discriminatory intent, a more likely
vehicle to challenge the current structure of work is the "disparate
impact" claim under Title VII. Under this approach, women might
challenge a variety of "neutral" criteria that disparately impact
them because of their caregiving responsibilities.3 ° Proof of dis-
criminatory motive is not required under disparate impact
theory.2 3 This framework is seemingly well suited to address the
discrimination women experience at work on the basis of their cul-
tural caregiving, which is typically the product not of hostile intent,
but of the distinctly American structure of work which assumes that
workers do not have competing family obligations. Still, even the
disparate impact theory of discrimination is limited in its ability to
address women's work/family conflicts.
exploit or leave behind women not privileged by race, class, and marriage. Schultz's other
proposals, such as reducing the standard workweek, are more consistent with these criteria
than a reallocation/commodification strategy. See Schultz, supra note 42, at 1957.
229. The "English-only" cases also illustrate Title VII's limited ability to protect employ-
ees from discrimination on the basis of mutable and real, e.g., cultural, differences. In these
cases, employees challenging employer English-only work rules under Title VII as discrimi-
nation on the basis of national origin "plus" language rarely have prevailed. Applying the
sex-plus theory of discrimination, courts reason that language is mutable, particularly where
the employee speaks some English, and that there is no fundamental right to speak one's
native language where it "disrupts" the established operation of the workplace. See Mary
Ellen Maatman, Listening to Deaf Culture: A Reconceptualization of Difference Analysis Under Title
V7I, 13 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 269, 298-308 (1996) (summarizing English-only cases). Courts
have similarly rejected workplace accommodation of "ethnic traits," such as braided hair. See
Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE
L.J. 365; Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin" Discrimination
Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1994); Stephen M. Cutler, Note, A Trait-Based
Approach to National Origin Claims Under Title VII, 94 YALE LJ. 1164 (1985).
230. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (construing Title VII to pro-
scribe "not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but
discriminatory in operation").
231. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36, 335 n.15 (1977) (citation omit-
ted) (construing Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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First, a "neutral" employer policy or practice must be identified
before it can be challenged under Title VII's theory of disparate
impact. As other critics of the existing legal framework have ob-
served, Title VII merely provides women with the negative right
to be free of employment discrimination, but places no affirma-
tive duties on employers to make women, who are differently
situated with regard to their family obligations, equal in fact. 3 2 So
long as the harm to women of the current workplace structure is
viewed as stemming from employers' positive actions, then Title
VII will be incapable of addressing women's work/family con-
flicts, even under a disparate impact theory of discrimination. ss
While there are many identifiable, affirmative employer practices
and policies that serve to disadvantage women in the workplace,
they are so entrenched, so accepted as the norm, that they are
virtually invisible. Such invisible, "non policies" and practices
include the expectation of long work hours, 4  rigid work
232. See, e.g., Dowd, Gender Paradox, supra note 64, at 141-42 ("The limited potential of
discrimination analysis is also related to its inability to reach cases in which an employer has
failed to adopt any policy ... ").
233. See, e.g., Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1977) (finding that em-
ployer's failure to provide sick pay during mandatory pregnancy leave is not a per se
violation of Title VII under disparate impact theory). There are rare exceptions to the "non
policy" problem of Title VII. Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (holding that ten-day maximum disability leave policy disparately impacts
women, because only women can become pregnant). The Abraham court asserted, "it takes
little imagination to see that an omission may in particular circumstances be as invidious as
positive action." Id.; see also Roberts v. United States Postmaster Gen., 947 F. Supp. 282, 289
(E.D. Tex. 1996) ("[A]n employer can ... violate Title VII by failing to provide an adequate
[leave] policy.").
234. There is an ongoing debate among economists sparked by Juliet Schor's book,
THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN (1991), about whether the average hours per worker in the
United States has been increasing over the past few decades. Lonnie Golden & Deborah
Figart, Doing Something About Long Hours, 43 CHALLENGE 15, 22 (2000) (summarizing con-
troversy). Schor presented findings based on federal Department of Labor data that annual
work hours are increasing significantly. SCHOR, supra, at 1-15. Subsequent research, while
not uniform, indicates that the average hours worked per week for all workers in the United
States have, in fact, remained relatively steady over the past forty years, or have been increas-
ing slightly. DOL REPORT ON THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE, supra note 11, at 80-81; Deborah
M. Figart & Lonnie Golden, The Social Economics of Work Time: Introduction, 56 REv. Soc.
ECON. 411, 441 tbl.1 (1998) (summarizing key studies).
However, there is a general consensus that certain sectors of the workforce are indeed
working substantially more. DOL REPORT ON THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE, supra note 11, at
80-81. Longer workweeks are most common among professionals and managers, married
couples, and white men. Jerry A. Jacobs & Kathleen Gerson, Who Are the Overworked Ameri-
cans?, 56 REv. Soc. ECON. 442, 445 (1998). At the same time, less educated workers,
nonprofessional workers, and African American men are working fewer hours per week
than in the past. Id. The result has been a bifurcation of the workforce between overworked
salaried employees and underemployed, part-time employees without benefits. Id. at 445-
47; Golden & Figart, supra, at 26.
Moreover, research suggests that the recent attention to the "overworked American" and
long work hours may be as much a function of major social changes as of increasing work
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schedules,235 limited personal leave,236 strict limits on absenteeism,
prolonged probation or evaluation periods, frequent or ex-
tended travel, and the general second-class treatment of part-
time employees2 3 1 just to name a few. In America, such non poli-
cies are so much a part of the employment landscape that they
are subsumed within the very definition of employment. They are
not seen as policies or practices, but simply "work." This poses a
major obstacle to obtaining relief given the current configura-
tion of the law. Unmasking the ways in which non policies and
practices disproportionately disadvantage women is no mean
feat, entailing a radical revisioning of the structure of work just
to fashion a prima facie claim of disparate impact discrimination
under Title VI. 23s The existence of only a handful of mostly un-
successful disparate impact challenges to employer leave,3 9
hours among certain segments of the population. Jacobs & Gerson, supra, at 443, 455-56.
To the extent that women's labor force participation has increased dramatically over the
past three decades, even if most do not work excessive hours, women uniquely experience a
time bind because they continue to be disproportionately responsible for housework and
childcare. See supra Part I. Similarly, men in dual earner families are also likely to experi-
ence pressures from the loss of familial support that has accompanied women's entrance
into the work force. Jacobs & Gerson, supra, at 443. For a general discussion of trends in
work hours over the past thirty years and an argument for a reevaluation of the way work
hours are regulated, see Jerry A. Jacobs & Kathleen Gerson, Toward a Family-Fiendly,
Gender-Equitable Work Week, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. 457 (1998) [hereinafter
Jacobs & Gerson, Work Week].
235. The proportion of American workers who are able to vary their work hours some-
what through informal arrangements has increased over the past decade, from 15.1% to
27.6%, but less than six percent have formal flexible work schedules. DOL REPORT ON THE
AMERICAN WORKFORCE, supra note 11, at 103.
236. In 1997, twenty percent of American workers in medium and large private estab-
lishments received paid personal leave; the average was 3.5 days per year. Id. at 195 tbl.45.
237. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
238. Joan Williams has called for such a revisioning process, urging an organized, fully-
theorized strategy for "litigating motherhood" in Market Work and Family Work in the 21st
Century, supra note 224, at 318 n.92, 328-30.
239. E.g., O'Hara v. Mt. Vernon Bd. of Educ., 16 F. Supp. 2d 868, 887 (S.D. Oh. 1998)
(holding that policy requiring teachers taking unpaid parental leave to remain on leave
until the beginning of the next school year, even if they are ready to return to work, is not
discrimination under Title VII); Payseur v. Grainger, Inc., Nos. 88 C 5707, 88 C 5708, 1989
WL 152583 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 1989) (unsuccessful challenge to employer practice of deny-
ing personal leaves of absence for childcare purposes). But see Roberts v. United States
Postmaster Gen., 947 F. Supp. 282, 288-89 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (denying defendant's motion
to dismiss Title VII claim alleging that employer's policy of not allowing employees to use
sick leave to attend to medical needs of family members had disparate impact on women);
EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 655 (N.D. Il1. 1991) (holding that employer's
policy requiring employees to work at least one year before they were eligible for sick leave




trvl240 poain 24 ' an2. 42travel, 4  probation,' and layoff policies, and not a single case, to
this author's knowledge, challenging long or inflexible work hoursunde a i paateimpat - 243
under a disparate impact theory, is a testament to this Herculean
challenge.
Second, the limitations of the categorical framework of Title
VII, while partially solved by the PDA and the sex-plus doctrine in
the disparate treatment context,244 continue to plague disparate
impact theory. At first blush, the theory of disparate impact ap-
pears to encompass a more expansive theory of discrimination
such that sex discrimination may exist even though all the women
in a particular workplace may not be affected by a given employer
policy. According to this view, so long as the "neutral" policy or
practice in question disproportionately impacts women in a statis-
245tically significant manner, the fact that all women are not
caregivers should not defeat a disparate impact claim. Courts have
not agreed on this issue, however. While some have determined
that the categorization problems of disparate treatment analysis
are irrelevant in a disparate impact case, others have continued to
focus on differences among women to deny relief under this the-
ory as well. 46
Furthermore, even where plaintiffs have succeeded in persuad-
ing courts to see invisible non practices and policies as "neutral"
240. E.g., Goicoechea v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1983)
(unsuccessful challenge to extended travel requirement).
241. E.g., Nweke v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 25 F. Supp. 2d 203, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(unsuccessful challenge to disparate impact of "low-production" probationary period on
women who take maternity leave).
242. SeeIlhardtv. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1155-56 (7th Cir. 1997) (unsuccessful
challenge to employer's practice of laying off part-time workers before full-time workers);
Schallop v. New York State Dep't of Law, 20 F. Supp. 2d 384, 402-03 (N.D.N.Y. 1998)
(unsuccessful challenge to employer's practice of terminating part-time female employees
more frequently than full-time employees).
243. But cf Gleklen v. Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 18, 20
(D.D.C. 1999). Under a disparate treatment theory, plaintiff challenged employer's deci-
sion to terminate her after she refused to change from a part-time to full-time schedule.
The court ruled against her, even though the request was made shortly after she announced
that she was pregnant for the second time. Id. at 19-20.
244. See supra Part II.B.1.
245. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
246. Compare Payseur v. Grainger, Inc., Nos. 88 C 5707, 88 C 5708, 1989 WL 152583, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 1989) ("[N]ew mothers, as individuals seeking childcare leave ... are
not members of a protected class. To the extent, then, that plaintiff's claim is based upon
disparate impact on new mothers, it must fail."), with Roberts v. United States Postmaster
Gen., 947 F. Supp. 282, 288-89 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (rejecting defendant's argument that,
because plaintiff is alleging disparate impact of employer sick leave policy upon "women
with children," she does not fall into a class of persons protected by Title VII), and EEOC v.
Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 654 (N.D. I1. 1991) (rejecting defendants' argument
that its no sick leave policy did not disparately impact women, but rather only pregnant
employees).
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ones that disparately impact women because they are more likely
to have caregiving responsibilities than men, still other aspects of
the Title VII's statutory framework have precluded the successful
use of the statute to address women's work/family conflicts. In or-
der to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact
discrimination, the plaintiff must offer "statistical evidence of a
kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question"
has caused prohibited discrimination. 47 While the Supreme Court
has rejected rigid mathematical formulas in analyzing statistics
purporting to show a disparate impact, "statistical disparities must
be sufficiently substantial that they raise ... an inference of causa-
tion."24 Because few men serve as primary caregivers, plaintiffs
have had difficulty developing relevant comparisons and therefore
providing statistically significant evidence of disparate impact.
249
Finally, the "business necessity" defense presents yet another ob-
stacle to women's use of the theory of disparate impact to address
the androcentric structure of work. An employer whose facially
neutral practice is deemed to have a disparate impact on women
may avoid liability by proving that the challenged discriminatory
policy or practice is required by business necessity.2 ° According to
the business necessity defense, the challenged practice must be
'job related for the position in question and consistent with busi-
247. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
248. Id. at 995.
249. See, e.g., Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1157 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding
plaintiffs evidence, consisting of studies showing that the majority of part-time workers are
women with child-care responsibilities, insufficient to support claim of illegal disparate
impact on women of employer's practice of laying off part-time workers; no comparison was
possible because defendant employed no male part-time employees); O'Hara v. Mt. Vernon
Bd. of Educ., 16 F. Supp. 2d 868, 887 (S.D. Oh. 1998) (illustrating that the absence of men
taking parental leave makes it impossible to prove defendants' parental leave policy dispar-
ately impacts women); Schallop v. New York State Dep't of Law, 20 F. Supp. 2d 384, 402
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that plaintiffs evidence that women employees who work part-
time are terminated at almost double the rate of male employees who work full-time inade-
quate to support a disparate impact claim, because no men work part-time); Payseur, 1989
WL 152583, at *2 (concluding sample size insufficient to show disparate impact of leave
policy that prohibits leave for parenting).
250. The Supreme Court first recognized the business necessity defense in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971), holding that if a discriminatory employment prac-
tice "cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." In
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Supreme Court in dictum re-
treated from the Griggs strict business necessity standard, stating that the challenged
practice need not be "essential" or "indispensable" to the employer's business to pass mus-
ter, and shifting the burden of proof from the employer to the plaintiff. Id. at 659-60.
Congress reinstated the stronger standard when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994)).
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ness necessity." 25' Because there is thought to be less employer cul-
pability in a disparate impact case, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the business necessity defense as offering greater pro-
tections to employers than the BFOQ defense in disparate
treatment cases.52 A plaintiff can still win in a case where an em-
ployer proves business necessity if she can demonstrate the
existence of a less discriminatory alternative (LDA), thus showing
that the employer was "using its tests merely as a 'pretext' for dis-
crimination." 253 However, courts have taken the stance that they are
"generally less competent than employers to restructure business
practices,"254 rendering the business necessity defense very difficult
to rebut. 55 For these reasons, Title VII has proved to be at best a
crude tool to eliminate work rules that disadvantage women with
family caregiving obligations.5 6
3. Summary-In sum, the two primary deficiencies plaguing
Title VII's utility as a transformative device to restructure work are
the rigidity of its categorical framework and limitations of the
model of formal equality on which it is based. Because, at any
given time, not all women are either pregnant or caregivers, courts
historically were unable or unwilling to see employment
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or caregiving as sex
discrimination. The passage of the PDA in 1978 finally put an end
to courts' categorization problems with regard to pregnancy,
reconnecting sex and pregnancy so as to render purposeful
employment discrimination on the basis of pregnancy illegal sex
discrimination. However, the PDA left untouched the limits of
Title VII's categorical framework with regard to women's cultural
251. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
252. See Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991).
253. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (citing McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801, 804-05 (1973)).
254. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978).
255. See, e.g., Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 1001 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding
that airline policy of automatically removing flight attendants from flight duty once their
pregnancies were discovered constituted a business necessity, even though less discrimina-
tory alternative of transferring plaintiffs to available ground positions would not have
disrupted defendant's operations).
256. See, e.g., Goicoechea v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 559, 560 (9th Cir.
1983) (dictum) (finding that employer's extended travel requirement had a "manifest rela-
tionship" to plaintiff's job as a cable splicer); Ahmad v. Loyal Am. Life Ins. Co., 767 F. Supp.
1114, 1119 n.2 (S.D. Ala. 1991) (dictum) (finding that employer practice of not hiring indi-
viduals who will require a leave of absence soon after hire serves legitimate goals of
company and constitutes business necessity); Marafino v. St. Louis County Cir. Ct., 537 F.
Supp. 206, 214 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (same). But see EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp.
647, 655 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that policy requiring employees to work at least one year
before they were eligible for sick leave served no legitimate business goal).
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caregiving, for all women are not caregivers. Courts have been
willing to disregard such differences among women to the extent
that the plaintiff is using the sex-plus theory to press a classic
stereotyping discrimination claim. Thus, Title VII has been
moderately successful in caregiving discrimination cases
concerning hiring or promotion, where a woman is able to argue
that an employer refused to hire or promote her on the basis of
the "stereotypical" assumption that her family responsibilities will
interfere with her job performance. However, this innocent-until-
proven guilty reasoning has not protected women demoted or
terminated to the extent that the reality of their work/family
conflicts has become apparent in the workplace. Moreover, Title
VII's categorical framework continues to plague disparate impact
theory, often leaving outside the law's protections mothers
disadvantaged by employer practices that do not similarly affect all
women.
The second limitation of Title VII is rooted in the model of
formal equality on which the statute is based. All that Tide VII re-
quires is the "equal" treatment of men and women. Accordingly, to
the extent that employers or states provide leave or disability bene-
fits for conditions experienced by men, they must also provide
such leave or benefits to women for analogous conditions such as
pregnancy. However, employers that do not provide such benefits
to members of their workforces are in full compliance with Title
VII, which imposes no affirmative obligations to provide anything,
so long as the employer treats all of its workers "equally."
Similarly, Title VII does not require any affirmative employer
accommodations for women who are disproportionately burdened
with family obligations. First, narrow judicial interpretation of the
sex-plus theory requires the "plus" to be a fundamental right or an
immutable characteristic. This leaves employers free to discrimi-
nate against women on the basis of their cultural caregiving work,
because such work is understood by judicial decision makers and
society more broadly to be a product of women's choices or gen-
der socialization, but certainly not immutable biological
difference. Moreover, while courts have identified "having" chil-
dren as a fundamental right, none has ever held that receiving
workplace accommodations to care for them is.
Even Title VII's disparate impact theory, which is uniquely ca-
pable of addressing structural employment discrimination
resulting from employers' "neutral" policies or practices, has been
unable to address such employer inaction. Where the disparate
impact theory has been successful in reaching some employer non
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policies, such as inadequate leave, insurmountable problems of
proof and the statute's broad business necessity defense have frus-
trated women's efforts to challenge the discriminatory structure of
the workplace through Tide VII. In sum, while Tide VII has facili-
tated the entrance of women into the workforce, its failure to
provide women with meaningful job security has served to per-
petuate a labor force attachment gap between men and women
that has serious economic and social consequences for women and
children. The FMLA, discussed in the next section, represents a
limited and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to fill in the gaps left
by Title VII.
C. The Family and Medical Leave Act
In 1993, Congress passed the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA or Act)21 7 in recognition of the fact that "private sector
practices and government policies had failed to adequately re-
spond to recent economic and social changes that have intensified
the tensions between work and family. 2 58 The FMLA requires em-
ployers to provide up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in a twelve-
month period for the care of family members with serious health
conditions, for an employee's own serious health condition, or for
the birth or adoption of a child.2'9 While the language of the FMLA
is gender neutral, this can largely be attributed to a strategy deci-
sion among mainstream women's rights organizers who feared that
legislation aimed specifically at women would result in a back-
lash.2 60 The findings of the Act explicitly address this issue in the
257. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 (1994)).
258. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 4 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6.
259. Specifically, the FMLA requires covered employers to provide up to twelve weeks
of unpaid leave during a twelve-month period to any eligible employee who needs the time
off (1) for a serious health condition of the employee that prevents him/her from perform-
ing the essential functions of his/her job; (2) to care for the employee's spouse, son,
daughter, or parent where that family member has a serious health condition; (3) for the
birth of a child of the employee, in order to care for the child; and (4) for the placement of
an adopted or foster child with the employee. 29 U.S.C. § 2612.
260. This position is reflected in Eleanor Holmes Norton's testimony in support of the
FMLA in 1987:
Faced with the knowledge that job-protected leaves were required for working moth-
ers and working mothers only, employers would very likely be reluctant to hire or
promote women of child-bearing age. Under the proposed legislation, however, be-
cause employers would be required to provide job-protected leaves for all employees
in circumstances that affect them all approximately equally, they would have no in-
centive to discriminate against women.
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statement that "employment standards that apply to one gender
only have serious potential for encouraging employers to discrimi-
nate against employees and applicants for employment who are of
that gender."2 6 Yet, also codified within the Act is the finding that
"the primary responsibility for family caregiving often falls on
women, and such responsibility affects the working lives of women
more than it affects the working lives of men."262 While cloaking
the Act in gender neutrality might have eased the Act's passage
and may very well protect it from an equal protection challenge, I
contend here as I have elsewhere that such benefits do not come
263without a cost to women. Like Tide VII and the PDA, the Family
and Medical Leave Act has increased public perceptions of women
as wage earners. However, at the same time, the gender neutrality
of the Act perpetuates the myth that women and men share
equally in the burdens of caregiving. Ironically, this is the very
myth that underlies the current discriminatory structure of the
workplace which the FMLA purports to ameliorate.2 4 In an effort
to expose the myth of the "ideal worker"265 which the FMLA fails to
challenge, I discuss the implications of the Act exclusively for




In doing so, I do not mean to deny that progress has been made
with regard to the redistribution of caregiving and housework
within the family. Few men today expect to be immune from
household work, and some men contribute significantly. 26v Further,
studies indicate that men want to be more involved with their chil-
dren.268 Nor can we ignore the influence of patriarchy on men in
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1987: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil Service and the
Subcomm. on Compensation and Employee Benefits of the Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service on
H.R. 925, 100th Cong. 39 (1987) (statement of Eleanor Holmes Norton) (citation omitted);
see also Lenhoff & Becker, supra note 132, at 418-21 (asserting that gender neutral structure
of the FMLA is necessary to prevent sex discrimination against women by employers);
Dowd, Gender Paradox, supra note 64, at 81 n.5 ("There is... a strategic problem with label-
ing work/family conflict a women's issue .... [I]t will fall to the bottom of political
priorities and social consciousness .... [1]t will become invisible.").
261. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (a) (6).
262. Id. § 2601 (a) (5).
263. See Kessler, supra note 5, at 323-24 (arguing that the name "Aid to Families with
Dependent Children" disguises the fact that welfare is a women's issue).
264. Christine Littleton made this argument, much more fully than I do here, in Does It
Still Make Sense to Talk About "Women"?, supra note 48, at 19-38.
265. Here, I use Joan Williams' term for the theoretical employee unencumbered by
caregiving responsibilities. Williams, supra note 15, at 822.
266. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2).
267. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave Revisited, supra note 77, at 34-36 & nn.46-59
(collecting studies).
268. See Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1047, 1064-66 &
nn.1 16-20 (1994) [hereinafter Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave]; Malin, Fathers and Parental
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explaining the continuing imbalance between men and women in
the distribution of caregiving work. 69 Workplaces are often hostile
toward men seeking parental leave.2 10 As Katharine Bartlett has
stated, "The mystifying ideologies of gender construction control
men, too, however much they may also benefit from them."71 ' But
feminists' earlier vision that women's entree into the wage market
and public world would be accompanied by the equal sharing ofS • 272
caregiving labor by men has not materialized. By all measures,
women remain responsible for the vast majority of housework and• • • 273
childcare as we enter the third millennium. Moreover, while the
transformation of male behavior is a worthy goal, such a strategy is
troubling to the extent that it is premised upon the existence of
the heterosexual, two-parent family, leaving out, among others,
single mothers who now make-up fully one-third of families with
children less than eighteen years old. 4 Indeed, single motherhood
is the predominant family form in the African-American commu-
nity.2 7 5 For these reasons, the peculiar injury to women of the
failings of our employment antidiscrimination laws remains the
focus of this Article, and I will discuss the limitations of the FMLA
with regard to women, despite its gender neutrality.21
Leave Revisited, supra note 77, at 33-36; Selmi, supra note 131, at 711 n.12 (collecting stud-
ies).
269. I nod here to Joan Williams' extensive scholarship on the organization of market
work in America, in which she has emphasized the role of "masculine gender performance"
in perpetuating the current structure and in harming working class men unable to live up
to the male-worker ideal in particular. E.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 45, at 25-30, 78.
270. See, e.g., Knussman v. Maryland, 16 F. Supp. 2d 601, 609 (D. Md. 1998) (denying
employer's summary judgment motion where state police officer was denied FMILA leave to
care for newborn); see also Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, supra note 268, at 1077-79.
271. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829,876 (1990).
272. A uniquely European response to this universal failure was a recent initiative by
the Green Party in Germany to seek the passage of a law obliging men to do a share of mar-
ried couples' housework and giving wives who do not work a legal claim to part of their
husband's income. Laws That Will Make Men Do the Chores, DAILY MAIL, May 20, 1999, avail-
able at 1999 WL 19060988.
273. See discussion supra Part I.
274. See CENSUS HOUSEHOLD/FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 50, at 117 tbl.11.
275. Id.; see also Twila L. Perry, Caretakers, Entitlement, and Diversity, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER
Soc. PoL'y & L. 153, 156 ("A theory in which the perceived rights of women are not de-
pendent on their relationships to men places the choices of women not attached to men or
attached to low-income men on the same level as the choices of women who are linked to
men who have money.").
276. It is acknowledged that a legislative solution that applies only to women in all like-
lihood would not pass constitutional muster under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court
has struck down virtually all sex-specific legislation benefiting women as inconsistent with
the Fourteenth Amendment. Becker, supra note 91, at 249-50. Moreover, some commenta-
tors suggest that the Court's recent decision in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996),
in which the Court held that Virginia's refusal to admit women to its state-supported mili-
tary academy violated the Fourteenth Amendment, signals that the Court is moving toward
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The FMLA covers only a portion of America's workforce, bene-
fits only the most privileged workers, and does little to address the
everyday leave needs of women, who bear a disproportionate share
of nurturing responsibilities in our society. The FMLA applies only
to employers with fifty or more employees,2" exempting from the
Act's coverage ninety-five percent of American businesses and
about half of the work force . The Act does not cover employees
who work on average less than twenty-five hours per week.2 79 To be
eligible for FMLA leave, an employee must be employed by a cov-
ered employer for at least twelve months.2 ° These conditions,
taken together, effectively limit the Act's application to a minority
of women workers, since women are more likely than men to work
for small businesses, l to work part-time,282 to work in occupations
with littlejob security, and to interrupt their careers due to fam-
ily responsibilities. Moreover, the FMLA's provision of unpaid
a strict level of scrutiny for sex. E.g., Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1657, 1675 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 72-79 (1996). Still, others have argued otherwise.
Candace Kovacic-Fleischer suggests that in requiring the Virginia Military Institute not only
to admit women but also to accommodate their physical strength and privacy concerns by
adjusting the school's physical skills requirements and altering its housing set-up, the Court
articulated a new sex discrimination jurisprudence of substantive equality. Candace Saari
Kovacic-Fleischer, Litigating Against Employment Penalties for Pregnancy, Breastfeeding, and
Childcare, 44 VILL. L. REv. 355, 359-63 (1999).
277. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(a) (2000).
278. H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. 1, at 60 (1993) (reporting that Act only covers five percent
of American businesses); DAVID CANTOR ET AL., BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND
EMPLOYERS: FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS § 1.6, at 1-9 (2000) (Westat report
funded by the Dep't of Labor under contract MS-23F-8144H), available at http://
www.dol.gov/dol/asp/public/fmla/toc.htm (reporting that in 1995, 54.9% of public and
private sector employees combined, and 46.5% of private sector employees, worked in es-
tablishments covered by the FMLA and were eligible for FMLA leave); Waldfogel, supra
note 131, at 14 (reporting that the FMLA covered forty-six percent of the private-sector
workforce when passed, and about sixty percent as of 1996).
279. Specifically, an employee is covered if (s)he works "at least 1,250 hours ... during
the ... 12-month period" immediately preceding commencement of FMLA leave (on aver-
age, twenty-five hours per week). 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2) (a) (ii) (1994).
280. SeeJessie v. Carter Health Care Ctr., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 613, 617 (E.D. Ky. 1996).
281. See 139 CONG. REC. S1691 (Feb. 2, 1993) (citing report of Small Business Admini-
stration to the President regarding the FMLA).
282. See BLS, PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT, supra note 63.
283. Contingent workers holding jobs that are not expected to last are more likely than
noncontingent workers to be women. BLS, Contingent Employment, supra note 67, at 3.
Occupations predominated by women, e.g., food and health service workers, secretaries,
and retail sales workers, are among those with the lowest employee tenure. Press Release,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employee Tenure in 1998, tbls.5 & 6 (Sept.
23, 1998), available at http://stats.bls.gov/newsrels.htm. One-third to one-half of U.S. work-
ers of childrearing age, regardless of sex, have been employed with their current employer
for twelve months or less at any given time. Id. at tbl.3.
284. In 1996, three out of four persons who were neither working nor looking for work
were women. BLS, WHO's NOT WORKING, supra note 69, at 1. The large majority, seventy
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leave renders its protections out of reach of all but the most privi-
leged working women and constitutes little more than a cruel
286joke for single mothers, who are disproportionately women of
color.2 s7 The Act's provision that employers may deny guarantees
of post family-leave reinstatement to those among the top ten per-
cent in compensation at a particular work site may exclude
privileged women too. s8 Like the PDA's "position elimination" de-
fense, the FMLA's provision that employers' responsibilities under
the Act "cease at the time the employee is laid off" 2 89 leaves women
vulnerable to the common business practice of laying off those
employees unable to protect their positions because they are ab-
290sent from work or unable to conform to the male-worker norm.
percent, interrupted their labor force participation because of caregiving responsibilities.
Id.
For an example of how interruptions in women's careers for caregiving can subsequently
limit their eligibility for family and medical leave, see Robbins v. Bureau of Nat ' Affairs, 896 F.
Supp. 18, 21 (D.D.C. 1995) (finding that a pregnant employee could not include her previ-
ous FMLA-covered maternity leave when calculating the hours of service eligibility
requirement, and thus she was not entitled to take FMLA leave because she worked only
875.75 hours in the twelve months preceding the beginning of the leave).
285. Women most likely to take family leave are married, have a graduate school educa-
tion, earn higher incomes, and are salaried workers. CANTOR ET AL., supra note 278, § 2.1.4,
at 2-9. Because the FMLA makes no provision for wage-replacement, only about one-fifth of
eligible employees covered by the Act even take family or medical leave, and few for more
than a couple of weeks. Id. § 2.1.2, at 2-7, § 3.5.1, at 3-13; Most Employees in United States Are
Not Aware of FMLA Provisions, BNA Telephone Survey Finds, 147 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 521,
523-24 (Dec. 26, 1994). Of those employees who need family or medical leave and do not
take it, more than three-quarters cite being unable to afford it as the primary reason. CAN-
TOR ET AL., supra note 278, § 2.2.4, at 2-15 to 2-16.
286. As compared to all employees, leave-takers are significantly less likely to be sepa-
rated, divorced, widowed, or never-married (twenty-five percent) than married or living
with a partner (seventy-five percent). CANTOR ET AL., supra note 278, app. tbl.A2-2.4. Those
who need employment leave but are unable to take it are significantly more likely to be
hourly workers, to earn less than $30,000 a year, and to be separated, divorced, or widowed.
Id. § 2.3, at 2-19. It is no small irony that Congress justified the FMLA, in part, because,
"[I]ower-income employees, who have the fewest resources to cushion the financial loss of
absence from work, are most in need of job-protected leave and most in need of govern-
ment's assurance that they can get it." S. REP. No. 102-68, at 83 (1991).
287. Single parenthood is the predominant family form among blacks. Just over one-
half of all black families with children under eighteen are female-headed, single parent
families. CENSUS HOUSEHOLD/FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 50, at 117 tbl.11.
288. The statute allows employers, under certain circumstances, to deny leave to cer-
tain "key employees" if they are "among the highest paid [ten] percent" of employees. 29
U.S.C. § 2614(b)(2) (1994). Because there are far fewer women than men in high-paid
positions, the "key employee" exemption has the perverse effect of forcing women in dual-
earner marriages to take leave instead of their husbands. For a discussion of these and other
problems with the "key employee" exception to the FMLA, see Neil S. Levinbook, Note, The
Family and Medical Leave Act: Unlocking the Door to the "Key Employee" Exemption, 15 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 513, 514, 531-33 (1998).
289. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a) (1) (2000).
290. See, e.g., Ilhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1157 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding
that employer had no obligation to offer reinstatement to employee on FMLA leave, since
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In the case of childbirth or the adoption of a child, an employer
may require that an employee take her twelve weeks of FMLA leave
all at once, rendering part-time or otherwise modified work
schedules a non-option in many circumstances.9  Moreover, the
twelve-week maximum applies to all types of leave.292 Thus, for ex-
ample, if a woman takes four weeks of leave to deal with a difficult
pregnancy or to care for a seriously ill relative, she would be left
with only eight weeks to care for her newborn. This rule has the
perverse effect of rendering women less likely than men to have a
full twelve-weeks of leave to care for a newborn, since women
alone face the risk of physical disability during pregnancy, and
since women disproportionately care for seriously ill family mem-
bers.293 Furthermore, the Act's definitions of those dependents
triggering an employee's eligibility for parental leave reflect an
unmistakably white, middle class, and heterosexist vision of the
family, excluding domestic partners, children unrelated to the
worker, and grandchildren. 4
Most significantly, the FMLA does little to address the everyday
leave needs of caregivers, the vast majority of whom are women.
Given the narrow regulatory and judicial interpretations of
"serious health condition," the Act does not provide for leave to
attend to common childhood illnesses. While the Department of
Labor regulations state that the Act covers health conditions last-
ing more than three consecutive calendar days, explicitly excluded
are the common cold, the flu, earaches, upset stomachs, minor
ulcers, headaches, and routine dental or orthodontia problems,
among other common illnesses, "unless complications arise. "295
her position was eliminated during her absence); Patterson v. Alltel Info. Serv., Inc., 919 F.
Supp. 500, 505 (D. Me. 1996) (holding that termination as part of company-wide reduction-
in-force was not related to FMLA leave).
291. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (b)(1) (1994) provides: "Leave under subparagraph (A) or (B) of
subsection (a)(1) of this section [for the birth or adoption of a child] shall not be taken by
an employee intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule unless the employee and the
employer of the employee agree otherwise." Given this provision, only fifteen percent of
employees using family and medical leave to care for a newborn, newly adopted, or newly
placed foster child do so on an intermittent basis. CANTOR ET AL., supra note 278, § 2.1.5, at
2-12 to 2-13 & tbl.2.13.
292. 29 U.S.C. § 2612.
293. See sources cited supra notes 25-26.
294. Recent census information reveals that while only 6% of white children less than
fifteen years of age live with persons other than their father or mother, 14.7% of black chil-
dren and 10.6% of Hispanic children do. Terry A. Lugaila, Marital Status and Living
Arrangements: March 1998 (Update), BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CUR-
RENT POPULATION REP. P20-514, at tbl.3 (Dec. 1998).
295. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(c) (2000). Similarly,
the regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor limit pregnancy leave under the
Act to a "period of incapacity due to pregnancy," 29 C.F.R. §825.114(a)(2)(ii) (2000)
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Thus, for example, courts have determined that a parent who
must stay at home with a child who has an uncomplicated ear in-
fection or the chicken pox, even if it lasts for a week or more,
would not be eligible for leave and is not protected from termina-
tion under the Act. 2'6 Nor does the Act permit leave to care for
extended relatives, such as grandparents. 197 Most glaring, the
FMLA does not provide for any leave to care for a healthy depend-
ent who is not a newborn.29 Obviously, children need full-time
care before they are school age. Even for children in school, the
school day is considerably shorter than the average work day, and
school-age children have far more holiday and vacation leave than
their parents. 2m  Often, elderly parents or relatives need assistance
even though they may not be seriously ill.°° Nor does the Act ad-
dress common daycare or other family emergencies. ' 1 In sum, the
(emphasis added), but do not mention normal pregnancy. Thus, courts have interpreted
the FMLA as requiring a woman to have medical proof that her pregnancy is abnormal and
incapacitating in order for her to invoke FMLA leave prior to delivery. E.g., Gudenkauf v.
Stauffer Communications, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 475 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that because
morning sickness, stress, nausea, back pain, swelling, and headaches are part of normal
pregnancy, employee terminated due to absences during pregnancy was not protected by
FMLA). For detailed discussions of the narrow judicial interpretation of "serious health
condition" under the FMLA, see Ruth Colker, Hypercapitalism: Affirmative Protections for People
with Disabilities, Illness and Parenting Responsibilities Under United States Law, 9 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 213, 240-44 (1997), and William McDevitt, Evaluating the Current Judicial Interpre-
tation of "Serious Health Condition" Under the FMLA, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 697, 704-14 (1997).
296. Reich v. Midwest Plastic Eng'g, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 266, 268 (W.D. Mich. 1996)
(holding that employee terminated because of absence from work to care for children with
the chicken pox not protected by FMLA); Seidle v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 871 F.
Supp. 238, 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that employee who lost job because of absence
from work to care for child with an ear infection not protected by FMLA).
297. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(c). (1994) (stating an employee entitled to leave in order
to care for a spouse, son, daughter, or parent); see also, e.g., Krohn v. Forsting, 11 F. Supp. 2d
1082, 1091 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (holding that firefighter not entitled to FMLA leave to care for
her ninety-four year-old grandparent).
298. See, e.g., Krohn, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1092 (holding that firefighter was not entitled to
FMLA leave to care for her son who was more than one year old and did not suffer from a
serious health condition).
299. Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 ARiz. L. REv. 431,
449 n.106 (1990) (reviewing studies showing that school-age children are not in school
eighty-three days per year on average, exclusive of weekends) [hereinafter Dowd, Restructur-
ing Work].
300. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. Cf., e.g., Cianci v. Pettibone Corp.,
No. 95 C 4906, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4482, at *20 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that FMLA does
not provide leave to visit ill parent, onlyto care for ill parent).
301. See, e.g., Kelly v. Crosfield Catalysts, 962 F. Supp. 1047, 1048 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(finding that FMLA is not a general grant of leave for every family crisis and that an em-
ployee's emergency trip to prevent child from being declared a ward of the state did not
meet standards for FMLA coverage); see also Martyszenko v. Safeway, 120 F.3d 120, 123 (8th
Cir. 1997) (holding that time off to supervise child suspected of being molested not covered
by FMLA).
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FMLA makes little provision for women's most common, day-to-
day caregiving responsibilities.
Feminist proponents of the Family and Medical Leave Act ar-
gued for its passage as a necessity to "fill the gaps" left by Title VII
and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Testifying before Congress
in 1985 in support of the FMLA's unsuccessful but essentially simi-
lar predecessor, the Parental and Disability Leave Act, Wendy
Williams explained, "[W] hile Title VII as amended by the PDA has
required that benefits and protections be provided to millions of
previously unprotected women wage earners in this country, it
leaves gaps which an antidiscrimination law cannot, by its nature,
fill. This bill ... is designed to fill those gaps. 30 2 But an examina-
tion of the final contours of the FMLA reveals that it only
minimally filled one such "gap." As the table infra illustrates, be-
cause the FMLA does not provide job security to women who are
absent from work to care for healthy children older than three
months of age, to address daycare or other family emergencies, or
to care for elderly or sick family members who are not seriously ill,
among other reasons, the Act does not fill the "gap" left by the
failure of Title VII's sex-plus theory of discrimination to protect
women from demotion or termination on the basis of their most-
typical competing family responsibilities. Second, because the
FMLA provides for only twelve weeks of unpaid leave, which em-
ployers may require employees to take all at once, the Act does not
fill the "gap" left by the inability of Title VII's theory of disparate
impact to address employer "nonpolicies" that disadvantage
women workers due to their family caregiving responsibilities. At
most, the FMLA addresses the limitations of the model of formal
equality in the areas of pregnancy and childbirth by requiring em-
ployers to provide women with job security when they must be
absent from work for the immediate, physical event of childbirth
and its aftermath, including a relatively short period to recover
and bond with a newborn. Thus, the FMLA does little more than
round out Title VII's protections in the limited area of pregnancy,
solving the problem of formal equality mainly for privileged
women where the PDA fell short. As the following table demon-
strates, still unaddressed by Title VII, the PDA, or the FMLA, are
women's work/family conflicts that result from their cultural care-
giving work.
302. A&P Hearings, H.R. 2020, at 12 (1985) (testimony of Wendy Williams).
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303. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
304. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
305. See supra Part II.B.L.b.i.-iii.
306. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
308. 434 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1977); see also supra note 233 and accompanying text.
309. See supra Part II.B.2.
310. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
312. See supra Part II.B.2.
313. See supra Part II.B. l.a.
314. 479 U.S. 511 (1987); see also supra note 129 and accompanying text.
315. 939 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1991); see also supra notes 139-56 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 139-56.
317. See supra Part II.C.
318. See supra Part II.C.
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In summation, current protections for women's disproportion-
ate caregiving within the family, insofar as these responsibilities
conflict with their ability to work for wages, are limited to two dif-
ferent statutory enactments, neither of which provides adequate
support for the most common leave needs of caregivers, who typi-
cally are women. The model of formal equality and the categorical
framework on which Title VII is based have made it difficult for
women to gain accommodations in the workplace for their cultural
caregiving, under either a disparate treatment or disparate impact
theory of discrimination. The PDA provides only limited protec-
tions for the physical and immediate events of pregnancy and
childbirth. The PDA does little to address the issue of women's
most common caregiving responsibilities. Title VII's sex-plus the-
ory has served women only to the extent that they can demonstrate
that their family obligations will not interfere with their wage work.
This has rendered Title VII moderately successful at facilitating
women's entrance into and advancement in the workforce, but
distinctly unable to ensure women job security such that their at-
tachment to the workplace is protected. Disparate impact theory
possesses only a limited ability to address employer inaction, a ma-
jor source of harm to women who have significant caregiving
obligations. Further, plaintiffs attempting to use this theory have
been hindered by insurmountable problems of proof and the for-
midable business necessity defense. Under the FMLA, women
receive limited, unpaid job protection for instances when they or
their family members are incapacitated due to pregnancy, child-
birth, or serious illness. But women's typical caregiving
responsibilities, i.e., caring for young but healthy children or eld-
erly but not seriously ill parents; dealing with minor family
illnesses; cooking and cleaning; transporting children or parents
to routine medical appointments; and coping with unexpected
family emergencies-all the work that women disproportionately
and invisibly perform within the family-does not even register as
a blip on the radar screen of the American legal system. While
feminism as well as global economic changes have had the result of
ending the exclusion of women from the workplace, the transfor-
mation of the male-centered norms that structure the workplace
beyond a minimal concession to women's experiences of preg-
nancy and childbirth has yet to be achieved.
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III. ROOT CAUSES: THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL
AND ECONOMIC THEORY
A gap between a law's reach and the aspirations of those who
seek to use it to accomplish substantial societal reform is a
common enough phenomenon, but this is small consolation,
and critics look for explanations.
-Katharine T. Bartlett,
Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards,
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality319
This section seeks to explain the inability of the current legal
framework to recognize and accommodate women's cultural
caregiving work as it impacts their labor force attachment. I pro-
pose that the liberal and neoclassical economic theories that
dominate our law have dictated the limited response to the con-
flict between women's private nurturing responsibilities and their
wage work. There is now a great wealth of literature critiquing
the assumptions of liberal legal and law and economic theory,
both by feminist and other critical legal scholars. Among the
tenets of liberal theory that have been examined exhaustively are
autonomy, neutrality, privacy, and equality. For example, critical
legal theorists and communitarians in particular have criticized
the liberal ideal of autonomy as producing legal regimes that
romanticize individualism, contribute to mass societal alienation,
and ignore the value of social connection. Feminist legal theo-
rists have critiqued the liberal ideal of autonomy as failing to
account for women's fundamental existential conditions of
connectedness and interdependence, resulting in laws that
either ignore or actually harm women . 21  Similarly, the
319. Bartlett, supra note 107, at 2542.
320. For the classic communitarian critiques, see LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael
J. Sandel ed., 1984); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY
(1981); MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OFJUSTICE (2d ed. 1998); CHAR-
LES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 187-210 (1985); ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
321. Among the feminist critiques are Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources,
Thoughts, and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989); West, supra note 40. Elizabeth
Fox-Genovese's FEMINISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: A CRITIQUE OF INDIVIDUALISM (1991) pro-
vides a parallel critique outside of law. For a feminist critique of the feminist critique, see
Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1174 (1992) ("[Tlhe feminist critique of liberalism as presenting an
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neutral state, that is, the assertion that because no person's
definition of "the good" can be presumed to be better than anyone
else's, the state must act as a neutral arbiter of competing visions,
has been critiqued by outside legal scholars. Among the critics of
the neutral state are the "comprehensive liberals" who believe, inter
alia, that the state has an affirmative obligation to promote the
"good life."02 1 Similarly, feminist legal theory and methodology, at
their core, are premised on a challenge of the "neutral" state.3 2 4 As
Martha Albertson Fineman has plainly put it, "Neutral treatment in
a gendered world or within gendered institutions does not operate
in a neutral manner .... 3 25 So too has liberalism's assertion of the
sacred realm of the private sphere into which the state must not
intervene, i.e., the "public/private split, 32 6 been questioned. At the
forefront of this critique have been feminist legal theorists3 2 7 who
atomistic and unconnected conception of the person attacks a caricatured picture of liber-
alism.").
322. For examples of the proponents of state neutrality, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SO-
CIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980) (arguing for the constraint of "neutral
dialogue"); BRIAN BARRY, JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY (1995); CHARLES E. LARMORE, PAT-
TERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 43 (1987) ("The ideal of neutrality can best be understood as
a response to the variety of conceptions of the good life."); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBER-
ALISM (1993) ("[P]olitical liberalism ... has to be impartial ... between the points of view
of reasonable comprehensive doctrines."); Brian Barry, In Defense of Political Liberalism, 7
RATIOJURIS 325, 328 (1994) (describing a principle of "constitutional neutrality" that does
not favor any one conception of the good).
323. E.g., WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY
IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991) (arguing that liberalism is committed to a distinctive concep-
tion of the human good); MICHAELJ. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND
MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991) (arguing for an "ecumenical" rather than a neu-
tral political dialogue); JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986) (presenting a
perfectionist account of political morality); Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and
Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. REv. 385 (1996) (arguing autonomy is a normative good which
the state should promote, not an instrumental good on which the state's false neutrality is
premised); Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideals After All, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1350, 1353 (1991) (defending comprehensive liberalism by showing the gaps
in the case for neutrality).
324. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990) (setting
forth feminist legal methods aimed at exposing the gendered nature of purportedly neutral
rules); Ann C. Shalleck, Feminist Legal Theory and the Reading ofO'Brien v. Cunard, 57 Mo. L.
REV. 371 (1992) (same).
325. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 5, at 26.
326. For an exploration of the concepts of public and private within liberal theory, see
Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus, The Liberal Conception of the Public and the Private, in PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 31 (Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus eds., 1983); Symposium,
The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
327. For a critique of the public/private distinction from a feminist perspective, see
Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992); Carole
Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL
LIFE, supra note 326, at 281, 283 ("[T]he separation and opposition of the public and pri-
vate spheres is an unequal opposition between men and women.").
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have exposed the ways in which concepts of privacy have been used
to shield rape and domestic violence from the law's reach s3 " and to
privatize the cost of caregiving work done by women. 9 Indeed, the
feminist critique of the public/private split has left its mark on
mainstream liberal legal theorists. 330 Finally, the last two decades
have witnessed a thorough critique of liberalism's golden calf of
equality. The modern critique of liberalism's emphasis on equality
has not been so much of the concept of equality itself-that is, that
like things should be treated alike-but in the courts' failure to see
difference where it exists. This has been a major area of feminist
legal theory's critique of liberalism.
For a feminist critique of the feminist critique, see Baldwin, supra note 31, at 48 (arguing
that feminist accounts of women's lives have suppressed their public experiences, thereby
"foreshorten [ing] the horizon line of feminist demands for public reform").
328. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 5, at 177-98 (identifying pri-
vacy's failure to protect nontraditional families from the state and its tendency to cloak
violence against women and children within the traditional family); Sally F. Goldfarb, Vio-
lence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 57-85 (2000) (tracing
constitutional attacks on the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) on federalism grounds
to age old concepts of public and private spheres); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of
Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 973, 974 (1991) ("The concept of freedom from state intrusion
into the marital bedroom takes on a different meaning when it is violence that goes on in
the marital bedroom.").
329. See Abrams, supra note 216, at 1224 ("Most employers view the present boundary
between work and family as a natural feature of the workplace, thus making the conflict a
problem for parents alone."); Dowd, Gender Paradox, supra note 64, at 133 (arguing that
focusing on workplace reforms to the exclusion of the family sphere may serve to reinforce
the public/private distinction that underlies the discriminatory structure of work); Dowd,
Restructuring Work, supra note 299, at 469 ("The primary role of the law in the work-family
relationship has been non-intervention .... "); Maxine Eichner, Square Peg in a Round Hole:
Parenting Policies and Liberal Theory, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 133, 158 (1998) ("[11n the area in which
work-and-parenting issues intersect, parenting issues are ... bracketed as domestic and
therefore inappropriate for intervention in the work sphere . . . ."); Martha A. Fineman,
Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 955, 955--56
(1991) (criticizing current doctrine of family privacy for protecting only traditional nuclear
families); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1120 (1986) ("The public-private dichotomy is
entrenched in and fostered by our legal system ... illustrated by the judicial tolerance of
excluding pregnancy from disability or other benefit plans, by the fact that women still can
be legally fired from certain jobs when they become pregnant, by the difficulty pregnant
women or new mothers have in some states in obtaining unemployment compensation, and
by the general lack of adequate pregnancy and maternity leave and benefit policies in this
country.").
330. See, e.g., John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 765, 791
(1997) ("[T]he principles ofjustice enjoining a reasonable constitutional democratic soci-
ety can plainly be invoked to reform the family.").
331. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 50-74, 219 (1990)
(deconstructing the limited and limiting assumptions about difference in mainstream legal
theory); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW
306-09 (1989) (summarizing relational feminist scholarship of the 1970s and 80s); WEST,
supra note 35, at 100 ("Women sustain physical, emotional, psychic and political harms in daily
life-indeed, for many women, on a daily basis-which have no or little counterpart in
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Critical legal scholars also have questioned the foundational as-
sumptions of homo economicus, on which neoclassical economic
theory and Law and Economics rest. Among the foundational
elements of Law and Economics that have been subjected to scru-
tiny is rational choice theory, which goes beyond liberalism's
assumption that all individuals are rational decision makers to as-
sert that individual rational decisions always benefit the decision
maker, i.e., utility maximization. In fact, "objections to the ra-
tional actor model in Law and Economics are almost as old as the
field itself. 3 33 While not addressing Law and Economics or rational
choice theory in particular, recent works employing Freudian and
cognitive psychology to examine sex and race discrimination also
represent challenges to the rational actor model."4 Feminist legal
theory has exposed the manner in which the rhetoric of choice has
been used to deny women public subsidies and legal protection
from institutional and familial harm. Finally, critical scholars,
including feminist legal theorists, have called into question the
alleged neutrality of the market,36 and the assumption within Law
men's lives."); Herma Hill Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 39, 66 (arguing for
equal treatment except during periods when women engage in uniquely female experi-
ences such as pregnancy, menstruation, and rape); Krieger & Cooney, supra note 43, at 517;
Law, supra note 43, at 1007-13 (arguing for equal treatment except in areas relating to
reproduction); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279
(1987) (arguing that all sexual differences should be made "costless"); West, supra note 40,
at 14-18 (arguing that all modem American legal theory is "masculine" in that it ignores
the fundamental difference of women's interconnectedness); cf CATHARINE A. MACKiN-
NON, SEX EQUALITY (forthcoming 2001) (page proofs at 4-24, on file with author)
(critiquing mainstream "Aristotlelian" equality thinking for its preoccupation with same-
ness, while also questioning whether the recognition of difference is an appropriate
theoretical solution).
332. Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 385.
333. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1473 (1998) (collecting citations).
334. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 136 (arguing that much discrimination is a result of
unintentional categorization-related judgment errors characterizing normal cognitive func-
tioning); Lawrence, supra note 136 (arguing that most discrimination is a result of
unconscious racism of which the discriminator has no awareness due to denial).
335. Contemporary feminist critiques of choice include Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and
Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761 (1990); Finley, supra note 65, at 931-40; Robin West,
Colloquy: Submission, Choice and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1449,
1455-56 (1986);Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1559 (1991).
336. Through the aggregation of decisions, the market according to economic theory
is the mechanism that allows the self-interest of human beings to operate to the benefit of
the collective. As such, the market in Law and Economics is akin to the neutral state under-
lying liberal theory-both are seen as the only fair mediator of endless conflicting desires.
See sources cited supra note 322. This is, of course, the essence of Adam Smith's "Theorem
of the Invisible Hand":
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and Economics that the goal of law, above all others, should be to
promote efficiency. 37
The law's failure to address the conflict between women's work
and family obligations is arguably a function of each of these as-
sumptions. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the project
of exposing the manner in which these assumptions have contrib-
uted to the law's stunted ability to address women's needs for
accommodation in the workplace already has begun s.338 Recounting
each of these critiques in detail is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, our law's foundational tenets of autonomy, equality, and
rationality will be revisited here to make a specific argument about
the law's inability to recognize women's cultural caregiving. I sug-
gest that the liberal and neoclassical economic theories which so
greatly influence our law, including our discrimination laws, are
unable to account for women's experiences that are culturally
The statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they
ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary
attention, but assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no sin-
gle person, but to no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so
dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy
himself fit to exercise it.
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONs 423 (The Modem Library, New York 1937) (1776).
Classic Critical Legal Studies' critiques of the alleged neutrality of Law and Economic analy-
sis include MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 126 (1987) ("Law and
Economics really is conservative ideology .... ") and C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 4 (1975) (noting the conservative ideology in
Chicago school of law and economics). A powerful feminist critique is set out in Robin
West's CARING FORJUSTICE, supra note 35.
337. See, e.g., KELMAN, supra note 336, at 121 (noting that, as an empirical matter, effi-
ciency only benefits society on average, in the aggregate, and over time, but there will always be
individual winners and losers even within a perfectiy efficient legal regime); Ann Laquer
Estin, Can Families Be Efficient: A Feminist Appraisal 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 33 (1996)
("Feminist theorists cannot use or accept efficiency-based arguments for family policy, be-
cause they are based on a descriptive theory premised on the continuation of the traditional
gender system in marriage and in the world outside the family sphere."); Fineman, supra
note 37, at 21 n.15:
[T]he ... "efficiency and exploitation" model ... is really nothing more than the as-
sertion that if women allow themselves to be exploited as unpaid or underpaid
caretakers, that is then the most efficient resolution for the problem of caretaking
and dependency and should not be disturbed. Aside from the fact that this arrange-
ment is not working and that it results in. massive poverty and other social ills, this
type of argument demonstrates how little economics has to offer to considerations of
justice.
See also Martha T. McCluskey, Subsidized Lives and the Ideology of Efficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL'Y & L. 115, 121 (1999) (criticizing neoliberalism's embrace of efficiency at the
expense of equitable distribution).
338. See supra notes 320-34.
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based. By cultural, I mean those aspects of women's lives that are
understood to be the product of gender socialization, not biologi-
cal forces. Caregiving, which women disproportionately perform
but which men are also capable of performing, is just such a cul-
tural experience, at least according to modern social scientific
theory.339
This prevailing view, of course, grew in large part out of modern
feminism's challenge to the historical conception of women as bio-
logically unsuited for wage labor or public participation.3 ° The
popular understanding that women's caregiving is attributable to
gender socialization, not biological difference, can also be traced
to the link between the Civil and Women's Rights Movements. Sex
discrimination law grew out of the Civil Rights Movement, which
was grounded upon the theory that all humans are inherently the
same and thus deserving of the same liberties, rights, and privi-
leges of citizenship. 3 4' At the core of the rejection of racial
segregation were the powerful notions that blacks are fundamen-
tally the same as whites, and that it is irrational for surface
342differences such as skin color to carry any significant meaning.
Thus, the modern Civil Rights Movement rested on a showing that
racism was socially constructed. The belief that discrimination was
due to irrational prejudice or historical disadvantages that grew
out of irrational prejudice was a means of overcoming powerful
dehumanizing ideas about blacks' natural or biological inferiority
which were the basis for treating them as chattel, the very root of
slavery. 43 Sex discrimination law grew out of this scheme as a prac
339. See sources cited supra note 22.
340. "Protective legislation" common in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries relied on a vision of women's biological frailty to justify the forced exclusion of women
from employment 1) in certain professions, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948)
(upholding restrictions on women tending bar); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872)
(upholding restrictions on women practicing law); 2) at certain hours, e.g., Act No. 466 Pa.
Laws (1913) (restriction on night work for women); or 3) for particular numbers of hours,
e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding state law prohibiting employment of
women more than ten hours a day). The "protection" of women out of certain professions
and public endeavors continued into the latter part of this century. E.g., Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding the requirement that prison guards be male as a bona
fide occupational qualification under Title VII); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)
(upholding male-only draft as constitutional).
341. JOHN RAWLS,A THEORY OFJUSTICE 5 (1971) ("[I]nstitutions arejust when no arbi-
trary distinctions are made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties
342. Actually, the distinction between slaves and non-slaves was based on "blood," not
skin color, ensuring that even blacks who looked white would be subjected to slavery. F.
JAMES DAVIS, WHO Is BLACK? 5 (1991); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1709,1740 (1993).
343. See, e.g., Franz Samelson, From "Race Psychology" to "Studies in Prejudice": Some Obser-
vations on the Thematic Reversal in Social Psychology, 14 J. HIST. BEHAV. Sci. 265 (1978)
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tical strategy among feminists working to include women within
the existing model of formal equality underlying civil rights laws.3 4
As with race, this political strategy was consistent with a developing
consensus among anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists
that sex differences were illusory and not the proper basis for dif-
ferential treatment.
345
While the "social construction" story underlying the women's
rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s and our present sex dis-
crimination laws made limited gains in breaking down the family
wage and separate-spheres doctrines, I contend that it is incapable
of fundamentally challenging certain aspects of liberal and neo-
classical economic theory which form the basis of our law and
which continue to perpetuate the labor force attachment gap be-
tween men and women. The concepts of autonomy, equality, and
rationality which form the foundation of our law have the peculiar
ability only to recognize women's immutable biological differences
from men, leaving women's cultural caregiving beyond the law's
reach. This explains, in part, the limited ability of Title VII, the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act,
and judges interpreting these statutes, to recognize much beyond
women's immediate, physical experiences of pregnancy and child-
birth.
(examining the shift in psychology from embracing the idea of racial inferiority to labeling
it as irrational bias). "In 1920, most psychologists believed in the existence of mental differ-
ences between the races." Id. at 265.
344. Feminists' efforts to link sex and race discrimination are exemplified in Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg's defense of the Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
especially in Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 16-23 (1975), and Sex Equality
and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REv. 451, 474-75 (1978); in Pauli Murray's strategy papers
and legal memoranda written in an effort to get sex added to Title VII, see Becker, supra
note 91, at 223-25, 234 (1998) (citing, inter alia, PAULI MURRAY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A
BLACK ACTIVIST, FEMINIST, LAWYER, PRIEST, AND POET 356-57 (1987)); in Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973), the first Supreme Court decision to explicitly discuss the
standard of review appropriate in sex discrimination cases brought under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause ("[S]ex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth ... ."); and in the court record of Phillips v. Mar-
tin Marietta, the first Title VII case ever to reach the Supreme Court, discussed in Part II.B
supra. See Chamallas, supra note 219, at 341-47 (noting that the Phillips case was jointly
litigated by NOW, NAACP, and ACLU, and that the lawyers for Ida Phillips were successful,
in large part, because they analogized sex and race discrimination).
345. See CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN'S PLACE: OPTIONS AND LIMITS IN PROFES-
SIONAL CAREERS (1970); MARGARET MEAD, SEX AND TEMPERAMENT IN THREE PRIMITIVE
SOCIETIES 205-06 (1935); John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, in ESSAYS ON SEX
EQUALITY 123-242 (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1970). While Mill's writings preceded the modem
consensus about the origins of men and women's sex-roles by a half a century, his forward-
looking writings on women were resurrected in a number of primers on feminist theory in
the 1970s.
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Before proceeding, it is important to make clear that I am not
intending to argue that women's biological difference should be
the basis for workplace accommodation, though, unlike the formal
equality position, I do not deny that there are real differences be-
tween the sexes that are relevant to law. Rather, my ultimate point
will be that even the "social construction" story of women's caregiv-
ing, at least as it has been marshaled by many feminist theorists,
represents an acceptance of the premises underlying the biological
inferiority model that has been so widely criticized. Both rely on a
depiction of constrained agency, thereby failing to challenge the
dominant framework that provides support only for "innocent"
actors who have little control over their predicament. My assertion
that the law as currently constructed respects only biological dif-
ference is thus a descriptive, not a normative, endeavor.
A. Autonomy
As other commentators have highlighted, the assumption within
both liberal and economic theory that humans are individuals first,
that "what separates us is epistemologically and morally prior to
what connects us," 46 has formed the basis for the model worker on
which the workplace is structured.347 That "ideal worker," as Joan
Williams has identified him, is an individual unencumbered by
childcare or other nurturing responsibilities." s This ideal worker is
available for work at least forty hours a week and has no need for
even intermittent time off to care for sick children, much less for
more substantial leave to deal with the physical limitations of
pregnancy and childbirth, to raise infants and young children, or
to care for elderly relatives. The limited protections of Title VII
and the FMLA, while representing an acknowledgment of the
falsehood of the ideal worker, at the same time reinforce that ideal
through their cramped definitions of the circumstances when a
worker is encumbered. Both statutes, at bottom, only recognize
346. West, supra note 40, at 2. Robin West was paraphrasing political philosopher Mi-
chael Sandel's assertion that "[w]hat separates us is in some important sense prior to what
connects us-epistemologically prior as well as morally prior. We are distinct individuals
first, and then we form relationships and engage in co-operative arrangements with others;
hence the priority of plurality over unity." MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS
OFJUSTICE 133 (2d ed. 1989).
347. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 216, at 1221-22; Dowd, Gender Paradox, supra note 64,
at 100-01; Dowd, Restructuring Work, supra note 299, at 466; West, supra note 40, at 2; Wil-
liams, supra note 15, at 822.
348. Williams, supra note 15, at 822.
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biological conditions: pregnancy, childbirth, and serious illness-
and this recognition was achieved only after two decades of
legislative advocacy and litigation.3 49 Put simply, the powerful
notions of the autonomous individual have worked to define
biological incapacity as the outer limit of cognizable dependence
within the current legal scheme.
B. Equality
The embeddedness of the concept of equality within our legal
system-particularly the peculiar form of formal equality that has
dominated judicial decision making over the past decade35°-is a
primary source of the law's failure to recognize the conflict be-
tween women's work and family responsibilities. The ideal of
equality, that like things should be treated alike, is a fundamental
concept underlying our liberal legal system. That similarly situated
persons or groups of persons should be treated similarly is the goal
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 5'
This notion of equality is similarly at the heart of Title VII's prohi-
bition of sex discrimination. The feminist critique of equality has
been not of the concept of equality itself-that like things should
be treated alike-but of the failure of legal decision makers to see
difference where it exists.35 2 As the feminist critique highlights, the
process of classification is a precondition of equality analysis. For,
if justice requires that like things be treated alike, the object of the
law must be categorized in order for the law to function justly.
Viewed through the categorical lens of equality analysis,
women's nurturing poses a difficult problem for the law. Because
349. See supra Part II.
350, See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 530 (2000) (overturning court ordered man-
ual recounts in contested presidential election); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000)
(invalidating racially conscious voting qualification system for trustees of state minority
affairs office); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (invalidating racially conscious redistricting
plan); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (same); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)
(same); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (overturning school desegregation plan);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (striking down minority preference
system in government contracts); City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
(same); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (1996) (rejecting racially conscious law school ad-
missions program). Recent critiques of the Supreme Court's equality jurisprudence can be
found in Symposium, Discrimination and Inequality: Emerging Issues, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1181
(2000).
351. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
352. See sources cited supra note 331.
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the caregiving that women disproportionately perform is defined
within the dominant discourse as a cultural, not a biological, phe-
nomenon, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the law to recognize.
Cultural differences are "more or less" differences, as Christine
353Littleton has described them, i.e., those experiences that are
generally but not always true for women. Women's disproportion-
ate responsibility for the care of dependents is such a "more or
less" difference. Put simply, because not all women are necessarily
caregivers, and because men can and do nurture others, even if
such nurturing is the exception, the law is unable to equate nur-
turing with women and thus to recognize discrimination on the
basis of nurturing responsibilities as sex discrimination. This phe-
nomenon has also been called the problem of the "perfect proxy":
because caregiving is not a perfect proxy for the female sex, dis-
crimination on the basis of caregiving is not considered sex.... 354
discrimination. As demonstrated in Part II.B., Title VII is plagued
by this flaw and the sex-plus theory of discrimination has not suc-
cessfully overcome it.
Feminists are deeply divided over whether seeking the law's rec-
ognition of women's differences detracts from women's equality,
or is a necessary precondition to it. Some feminist legal scholars
have cautioned against celebrating or accommodating women's
differences from men, whether biological or cultural, since differ-
ence has always meant women's difference and historically has
provided the basis for treating women worse as well as better than
men. 35 Other feminist legal scholars have opposed celebrating
women's gender specific experiences, because those experiences
have been constructed and limited by patriarchy. Still other femi-
nist legal theorists argue for accommodation, but only with regard to
biologically-based differences such as pregnancy, menstruation, or357
rape. Feminist theorists and legal advocates for women have been
hesitant to urge accommodation of strictly cultural differences for
353. Christine Littleton distinguishes between "more or less" and "yes or no" differ-
ences in Reconstructing Sexual Equality, supra note 331, at 1324-28.
354. Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns": Constitutional Sex Discrimi-
nation Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1447, 1449-50 (2000).
355. See id. at 1477-78; Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture,
Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 175, 196-200 (1982); Wendy W. Williams,
Notes from a First Generation, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99.
356. See, e.g., Catharine MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32 (1987).
357. E.g., Kay, supra note 331, at 81-87 (arguing for equal treatment except when
women experience uniquely female phenomena such as pregnancy, menstruation, and
rape); Krieger & Cooney, supra note 43, at 517 (arguing for the accommodation of preg-
nancy in the workplace); Law, supra note 43, at 1007-13 (arguing for equal treatment
except in areas relating to reproduction).
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fear of essentializing women's experiences and reinforcing gender
roles which have served to harm women.
However, even if feminists could come to a consensus around a
strategy that seeks recognition of women's cultural differences-
and many have noted that, at least within the academic literature,
such a consensus is beginning to develop 35 8-the foundational
tenet of equality underlying the dominant liberal legal framework
will pose a major impediment to gaining legal recognition of
women's nurturing work, which is a "more or less" difference. In
other words, the law's inability to recognize women's caregiving is
a fundamentally theoretical problem, as well as practical one. This
presents a far greater challenge for feminist legal theorists than
the current understanding of the predicament would imply. For,
even if we could "[s]top fighting each other!"059 as Joan Williams
has recently implored, the categorization problem of equality the-
ory on which our discrimination laws are founded presents an
insurmountable epistemological obstacle to gaining accommoda-
tions for women's cultural experiences.
Title VII, the PDA, and the FMLA plainly manifest this limita-
tion of equality theory and thus our law. Women whose employers
discriminate against them on the basis of their cultural differences
from men have received uneven protection from Title VII under
either the sex-plus or disparate impact theory of discrimination .36
The PDA provides for accommodation of women's family caregiv-
ing experiences in the workplace only to the extent that those
experiences are rooted in the biologically unique phenomena of
361pregnancy and childbirth. Moreover, even this limited accom-
modation of biological difference is only available to the extent
that an employer also provides leave for comparable biological
disabilities that are not sex-based-that is, to the same extent that
362men are covered. Similarly, while the FMLA makes some provi-
sion for women's nurturing experiences, it too is focused on a
biologically-based conception of women's nurturing. The twelve
weeks of leave is modeled largely on a medicalized conception of
childbirth, not parenting, both in its limited duration and in the
requirement that it be taken all at once.363 That men are also per-
mitted to take "family leave" belies the primary target of the Act:
358. E.g.,Joan Williams, Do Women Need Special TreatmentDo Feminists Need Equality?, 9J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279, 279 (1998).
359. Id. at 319.
360. See supra Part II.
361. See supra notes 139-57 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 139-57 and accompanying text.
363. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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the physical experience of childbirth, but not the cultural experi-
ence of caregiving.14 Thus, Title VII, the PDA, and FMLA
demonstrate the limits of using formal equality theory to address
the conflict between work and family experienced by women. Be-
cause women's caregiving is not an "all or nothing" immutable
biological difference, our employment antidiscrimination laws
possess a limited ability to recognize it.
C. Rational Choice Theory
The law's limited response to the conflict between women's dis-
proportionate responsibility for caregiving and their wage work
can also be attributed to the influence of the Law and Economics
movement, which exploded into prominence in the 1980s.6 Law
and Economics is diverse in theory and perspective: there are the
Chicago and New Haven Schools, the Public Choice wing, first and
366second generations, and so on. Yet, common among these per-
spectives has been an embrace of rational choice theory, which has• 367
greatly influenced employment discrimination law. Rational
choice theory hypothesizes, first, that human beings always are mo-
tivated by self-interest, that they are "utility maximizers. 3 68 Second,
it assumes that all human behavior is a result of rational decision
making.369 In its most simplified form, rational choice theory posits
that a person, in deciding to engage in any particular behavior,
370compares the costs and benefits of the action. If the benefit ex
ceeds the cost, she will engage in the activity; she will refrain if the
reverse is true.37' By definition then, according to rational choice
theory, if a person engages in an action, it is in her self-interest. If
it were not, she would not have acted. 372 "If consent can be
364. Furthermore, the FMLA's leave provisions for nurturing responsibilities other
than childbirth only cover time needed to attend to family a member's "serious illness."
While women are disproportionately responsible for the care of those who are ill, their
responsibilities encompass infinitely more tasks than dealing with medical emergencies.
365. See Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599,
604-14 (1989).
366. Id.
367. See RICHARD POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 19-22 (1992) (summarizing
the history and growing influence of Law and Economics theory).
368. See infra note 372.
369. See infra note 372.
370. See infra note 372.
371. See infra note 372.
372. The foregoing is largely based on Thomas Ulen's summary of rational choice the-
ory set out in Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 433, 457:
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observed, the benefit can be inferred, even if we do not under-
stand the reasons for the transaction ourselves.0
73
Rational choice theory does have outer limits, however. There
are circumstances when even traditional economic theory, and our
law which has been so greatly influenced by economic concepts,
recognize that a person is not acting of her own free will. The tra-
ditional circumstances are narrowly defined as those where an
actor's agency is impaired by physical or psychological factors out-
side of her control. As expressed in contract and criminal law, for
example, force, fraud, duress, incapacity, and "heat of passion" are
commonly recognized defenses to liability.3 7 4 Short of these limited
conditions, our law presumes the actor is squarely situated within
the rational choice model. As Richard Epstein has stated, "The ex-
change need only be monitored [by the law] ... to ensure that
force and fraud and incompetence are not involved. When those
minimum conditions are satisfied, then the consent of both parties




Viewed through the lens of rational choice theory, women's cul-
tural caregiving is a mere choice, for which the state owes no
support and employers owe no accommodation. Perhaps the most
often cited evidence of this reasoning can be seen in Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,376 in
which Sears successfully argued as a defense to a Title VII dis-
crimination case that its female employees voluntarily "chose" low-
paying, noncommissioned sales jobs so as to facilitate their family
• '" • 371
responsibilities.
Recall the bare bones of rational choice theory. Decision-makers are rationally self-
interested; they have complete, transitive, and reasonably stable preferences; they
can learn about and compute the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action;
and they seek to maximize as many of their preferences as they feasibly can. Where
the outcomes of current action lie in the future, rational actors compute the prob-
ability of the various outcomes, evaluate the utility to them of those outcomes, and
choose that action that promises the maximum expected utility.
373. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 26 (1992).
374. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts §§ 23 (capacity required to form a contract), 234
(duress, coercion, intimidation invalidates contract) (1991); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law
§§ 34-36 (capacity required for criminal liability), 160-67 (coercion/duress constitutes
defense) (1998); 40 AM.JUR. 2D Homicide §§ 49, 241 ("heat of passion" is a mitigating factor)
(1999).
375. EPSTEIN, supra note 373, at 25.
376. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
377. For a discussion of the Sears case, see Schultz, supra note 65, at 1840-41 (analyzing
fifty-four federal sex discrimination cases from 1972 to 1989 in which the issue of choice was
raised, including the Sears case); see a/soWilliams, supra note 335, at 1608.
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In contrast, rational choice theory does have a limited ability to
recognize women's biological differences, which are viewed as ir-
revocably bound-up in nature and beyond women's control. While
women often "choose" to become pregnant, once this choice is
made-even if we assume that all pregnancies are desired, which
clearly they are not-short of abortion, women cannot "choose" to
avoid birth. Understood in this way, the PDA and FMLA can be
explained as examples of limited but traditional exceptions to the
model of personhood that is at the heart of rational choice theory.
Both statutes are focused on women's biological differences from
men, despite the FMLA's gender neutral language and provisions
for "parental" leave. Each represents a grudging recognition that
women's experiences of pregnancy and childbirth-childbirth
really-cannot be accommodated within a legal system and society
so invested in the concept of the rational decision maker.3 7 9 In such
a world, women's other caregiving experiences, even those with a
biological component such as breast feeding, to say nothing of the
basic day-to-day care of children and other dependents, are de-
fined as a choice undeserving of the law's recognition.
D. Summary
In summary, the foundational tenets of liberal and economic
theory, particularly the concepts of autonomy, equality, and ra-
tional choice, have served to render women's caregiving
responsibilities nearly invisible within the current legal framework.
First, the assumption underlying both liberal and economic theory
that humans are autonomous, unencumbered actors has formed
the foundation for the current structure of the workplace, which is
modeled on a worker who has no caregiving responsibilities. Sec-
ond, equality theory possesses only a limited ability to recognize
cultural differences such as women's caregiving, for the simple
reason that such "more or less" differences between men and
women escape categorization as sex-based classifications. Third,
the influence of rational choice theory has served to construct
women's caregiving, not only as a freely chosen endeavor, but one
which by definition is assumed to benefit women.
378. See discussion supra Parts II.B.l.a., II.C.
379. Normal pregnancy has been deemed by both administrative and judicial decision
makers beyond the reach of the FMLA. See discussion supra note 295.
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Of course, the constructs of autonomy, equality, and rational
choice are just that-constructs. Constructs are just ideas, after all.
They must live in the world with real people, with real women.
While theoretical constructs have a tenacious ability to resist con-
tradictory information, particularly when those constructs are
controlled by those who benefit from them, even the most power-
ful theories must reckon with blatant, existential phenomena to
the contrary. Upon Christopher Columbus' safe return from his
voyage, the prevailing theory that the earth was flat no longer
could be maintained. In the same way, women's unique biological
experiences of pregnancy and childbirth-particularly child-
birth-are "in your face" phenomena that cannot be maintained
within the prevailing theoretical constructs undergirding our em-
ployment discrimination law. In contrast, the myth of autonomy,
the limits of equality analysis, and the culturally-privileged account
of the rational actor render women's gender-based caregiving ex-
periences invisible and beyond the law's reach. Thus, while our
legal system has yet to acknowledge women's cultural caregiving as
it affects their workforce participation, it has produced limited job
protections for women to the extent that the strictly biological
conditions of pregnancy and childbirth limit their wage work. Title
VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and the Family and Medical
Leave Act are able to perceive circumstances when women are not in
fact autonomous, rational, or equal to men, but those circumstances
are limited, in the words of the judge who denied parenting leave to
Michele McNill, to the moment of "parturition,"mo when a woman is
literally connected to human life and utterly and totally overtaken
by nature. Our country's employment laws protect women from
workplace discrimination only to the extent that their agency is
impaired due to physical factors outside of their control.
IV. FEMINISM'S RESPONSE
The constraining effect of liberal and economic theory on the
law has received a great deal of attention from feminist legal theo-
rists. As discussed in Part III, feminist theorists have critiqued the
elemental constructs underlying these predominant jurispruden-
tial movements in an effort to show how they represent an
androcentric conception of humanity and limit the law's ability to
address the conflict between women's work and family obliga-
380. McNill v. New York City Dep't of Corr., 950 F. Supp. 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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tions.9' These responses can be categorized into two general
themes, one which has been significantly more popular than the
other. The first response is that women are neither autonomous
nor rational decision makers, because biological forces dictate the
inevitability of their role as nurturers. I call this the "story of biol-
ogy." Robin West's work provides an example of such a strategy,382
383though she is not alone. According to West:
[T]he biological relationship of the mother to the newborn is
radically different from that of the father .... First, the
mother, but not the father, is necessarily physically there when
the baby is born. And second, the mother, but not the father,
will lactate, and if she is to avoid painful engorgement of her
breasts, will breast-feed. A newborn baby instinctually knows
how to breast-feed and knows from which parent to do so.
From the baby's birth, the mother is physically connected,
and remains physically connected, to the baby in ways which
are not true of the father, simply by virtue of physical proxim-
ity and her ability to lactate. Mothers are more inclined to
nurture their children, perhaps, in part simply because they
are necessarily physically proximate and universally capable of
doing so from the beginning of life.8 4
The story of biology has received little attention as a transformative
device among feminist legal theorists, largely because of the his-
tory of discrimination against women on the basis of their
perceived biological weakness.8s
In contrast, the prevailing response to the rhetoric of autonomy
and choice is that women are neither autonomous nor rational
decision makers, because gender socialization greatly influences
their decisions to take on caregiving responsibilities. I call this the
"gender socialization story." A related cousin of the gender
381. See supra Part III.
382. WEST, supra note 35, at 117.
383. E.g., Greenberg, supra note 134, at 230 ("According to the court, the biological
consequences of pregnancy ... do not include a period of time at home with a newborn
.... What about the physical changes that come with lactation or the suppression of lacta-
tion? Are they not medical conditions related to pregnancy? What about the psychological
changes of the postpartum period and of bonding with a newborn?"); Kovacic-Fleischer,
supra note 276, at 392 ("Presumably society does not want to discourage all women from
having children, nor should women be made to feel that they must give tip natural biologi-
cal functions, such as having children and breastfeeding, in order to work.").
384. WEST, supra note 35, at 117; see also id. at 14 ("We can hardly.... simply rul[e] out
of bounds by fiat the existence and relevance of the natural world, both around us and
within us, in toto.").
385. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
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socialization story is that of false consciousness, which goes one
step further to posit that women are constrained by gender
socialization, but, through a process of internalization and denial,
believe that they are acting of their own free will. Examples of the
story of gender socialization and its false consciousness cousin can
be found in the work of countless feminists, both within and
outside of law.
38 6
The concept of gender as an organizing principle for under-
standing women's inequality, as it relates to women's work/family
conflicts and in other contexts, has been the yeoman of modern
feminism. Most significantly, an understanding of women's care-
giving as rooted in gender socialization has successfully contested
older conceptions of women as naturally unsuited for public par-
ticipation and market work. 7 Further, the notion of a gendered
world successfully contests the highly individualistic, victim-specific
conception of who is harmed by sex discrimination. If the harm to
women from discrimination is expanded to include all affected by
a societal system of gender, then a space is opened for all women
to lay some legal claim to protection, even if there are differences
386. E.g., Dowd, Restructuring Work, supra note 299, at 451 ("While connected to
women's biological role of bearing children, the critical role of family is primarily based on
women's social role as primary or sole parents."); Fineman, supra note 48, at 2 ("The idea of
a gendered life is not the same as asserting the notion of 'essential' femaleness. The concept
of a gendered life is based on the belief that most differences between the sexes are socially
manufactured, not inherent."); Littleton, supra note 331, at 1292 n.77 ("Asymmetries in
areas such as responsibility for childrearing need not, of course, be attributed to nature, but
rather to the complex combination of legal, social, and psychological incentives presented
to women and men."); Williams, supra note 15, at 800 n.1 1 ("[A] focus on connection is not
determined by biology (i.e., sex) but on socialization (i.e., gender)."). Vicki Schultz's work
on the "lack of interest" defense in Title VII cases presents an interesting twist on the story
of gender socialization, positing that women's employment preferences are molded by a
powerful system of workplace socialization. See Schultz, supra note 65, at 1816. For an exam-
ple of the false consciousness story, see WILLIAMS, supra note 45, at 37 (women confined by
the "force field" of domesticity speak of making a choice, when in fact they have internal-
ized domesticity's constraints).
387. Compare Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) ("The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life.") (Bradley, J., concurring), and Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,
422 (1908) ("The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed
by each ... in the capacity for long-continued labor ... ."), with Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975) ("No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the
rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas
...."), and Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978)
("Myths and purely habitual assumptions about a woman's inability to perform certain
kinds of work are no longer acceptable reasons for refusing to employ qualified indi-
viduals, or for paying them less.").
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among them and even if all women have not individually experi-
enced overt sex discrimination. ss
Still, I suggest that this latter and widely accepted socialization
story has had a limited ability to fundamentally challenge women's
work/family conflicts given our legal system's difficulty in recog-
nizing socially-constructed or "cultural" differences between men
and women. While an understanding of the "force field ' 89 that
gender exerts upon women may challenge the myth of autonomy,
it serves to reinforce women's inability to achieve justice through
equality analysis. For, if women's caregiving is simply a socially
manufactured predisposition, but not an inevitability, if some men
are caregivers and some women are not, then laws that discrimi-
nate on the basis of women's caregiving escape categorization as
sex-based classifications under equality analysis. s9 Moreover, given
the crude model of the rational decision maker that now pervades
our law, choices constrained by gender socialization are typically
not considered sufficiently bounded or coerced to justify protec-
tion or accommodation by legal decision makers.3 9 ' After all,
women can just act out of their gender roles. Little short of physi-
cal force, whether the force of a gun or the force of Mother
Nature, warrants the law's recognition of dependence according to
neoclassical economic theory, at least as it has been conceptual-
ized within popular discourse and deployed -by legal decision
makers. In sum, a theoretical paradigm that rests on an under-
standing of women's caregiving as a manifestation of culturally
constrained agency, while representing a logical strategy to fit
women's caregiving into the dominant framework's justifications
for accommodation, i.e., biological incapacity, has been and will
remain largely unsuccessful as a transformative device against the
disciplining aspects of formal equality and rational choice theory.
388. For example, Martha Fineman uses the concept of the "gendered life" to describe
women's common "socially manufactured" experiences that can bring together "women
across our differences in areas where social and cultural definitions of 'Woman' operate to
potentially oppress us all." Fineman, supra note 48, at 4; see also Martha L. Fineman, Chal-
lenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REv. 25,
36-37 (1990).
389. Joan Williams describes the disciplining nature of gender as a "force field." WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 45, at 37-39.
390. See supra Part II.
391. See supra Part II.
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND LAW
A. Theory
The liberal and neoclassical economic theories on which our
antidiscrimination law is based tend to link women's biological
differences from men with notions of innocence and incapacity,
and to link characteristics that are understood to be culturally
based or socially constructed with assumptions of autonomy, ra-
tional choice, and responsibility, despite feminists' arguments to
the contrary.9 2 Under this set of assumptions, pregnancy and
childbirth receive limited accommodation within the workplace. In
contrast, women's cultural caregiving, which is constructed by the
theories dominating our law and the culture more broadly as a
function of women's free choice or perhaps gender socialization,
but certainly not immutable biological difference, is not supported
by the state, whether in the form of a comprehensive national in-
surance system, as in many other countries, or even in the form of
393less comprehensive workplace antidiscrimination measures.
Of course, the suggestion that the law tends to support biologi-
cal characteristics over which the legal subject is assumed to have
little control and to ignore cultural practices over which the legal
subject is assumed to have more control contradicts a core premise
of equality feminism, that is, that emphasizing differences between
women and men-especially biological differences-will lead to
sex discrimination. 94 But biological characteristics can correspond,
and within the employment discrimination context have corre-
sponded, with the law's assumptions of innocence and
immutability. Characteristics seen as culturally based or socially
constructed can, and with regard to women's nurturing responsi-
bilities have, corresponded with assumptions within the law of
agency and responsibility. Thus, as our antidiscrimination laws
demonstrate, biological difference can just as easily justify subor-
dination and discrimination as it can accommodation and support.
Similarly, cultural difference can just as easily support the decision
to withhold the law's protections as it can a theory of nondiscrimi-
nation. As such, neither a biological nor a social understanding of
women's caregiving-even if it were possible to determine its
source-will guarantee women's equality. Rather, the purpose for
392. See supra Parts III, IV.
393. See supra Parts II, 11.
394. See sources cited supra note 355 and accompanying text.
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which decision makers and the law ignore or acknowledge
women's experiences will determine the outcome for women.
So, the question remains: if the law primarily respects immuta-
ble biological difference, what should be the response of legal
theorists and others working to gain recognition in the law for
women's cultural caregiving work? One response has been the
suggestion that women's disproportionate caregiving responsibili-
ties are dictated by biological forces. 95 While this approach may be
logically sound, it fails to fundamentally challenge the prevailing
construct, for it simply seeks to include women within the tradi-"
tionally recognized exceptions of the dominant framework, e.g.,
duress, coercion, incapacity.
A second response has been the argument that women, actually
all human beings, are dependent and therefore worthy of the law's
attention. Martha Fineman's work on derivative dependency pro-
vides an example of such an approach. 396 Fineman's primary point
is that dependency is a natural part of human existence-the asser-
tion that certain persons are not dependent, e.g., workers or men,
can only be maintained by abstracting such allegedly independent
persons from the family and society.397 Second, "those who care for
others are themselves dependent on resources in order to under-
take that care."3 98 Similarly, Joan Williams' concept of the male
"ideal worker" whose existence is dependent on the "flow of
household work from women" exposes the myth of autonomy and
the discrimination against women that result from a workplace
structured on such a myth .3 9 By universalizing dependency, Fine-
man, Williams, and other feminist theorists4°° pose a formidable
challenge to the myth of autonomy, a corrosive myth which has
served to privatize the costs of women's caregiving work and which
has precluded the adoption of employment laws that provide for
the accommodation of women's caregiving. However, while uni-
versalizing dependency successfully contests the myth of
autonomy, such an approach may not be sufficient to challenge
rational choice theory. For if, as Fineman observes, "derivative de-
pendency [dependency that is a consequence of caregiving] is
395. See supra Part III.
396. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Inevitability of Dependency and the Politics of Subsidy, 9
STAN. L. &c POL'Y REV. 89, 92-93 (1998);Jeffrey Evans Stake et al., Roundtable: Opportunities
for and Limitations of Private Ordering in Family Law, 73 IND. LJ. 535, 542 (1998) (Martha
Fineman presentation).
397. Fineman, supra note 37, at 13-15.
398. Id. at 20.
399. Williams, supra note 358, at 287.
400. E.g., EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE's LABOR 14 (1999).
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culturally assigned" to women, 4 1 unlike biological or "inevitable
dependency, 402 then according to the rhetoric of choice that per-
vades our political discourse and judicial decisions, women can
simply act out of their culturally-assigned roles as caregivers. Put
another way, women can solve their work/family conflicts simply
by ceasing the uncompensated "flow" of household labor to men.
Indeed, given the failure of men to share equally in caregiving and
housework, many women have adopted some formulation of this
"strike" solution by delaying pregnancy,403 delegating their caregiv-
ing work to relatively disadvantaged domestic workers,04 or by
forgoing families altogether.0 5 These solutions are fundamentally
unjust to women, particularly to the women least able to alleviate
the burden of unpaid caregiving work or to negotiate the terms of
their employment in the marketplace, and of course, to children.
In sum, Williams' ideal worker and Fineman's derivative depend-
ent are powerful rhetorical tools of deconstruction against
dominant liberal legal paradigms that currently regulate and con-
struct women's work/family conflicts, particularly the myth of
autonomy. But these concepts, alone, cannot address the narrow
vision of Law and Economics or the limiting effects of rational
choice theory on our law. Nor can the concepts of the derivative
dependent or the ideal worker fully challenge the categorization
problems inherent in liberalism's commitment to formal equality,
for all women are not derivative dependents and all men are not
ideal workers.
In making this argument, it is not my intention to deny the
complex combination of sociological, biological, economic, and
political forces that constrain women's agency when it comes to
caregiving. Moreover, it is not a simple matter to overcome so-
cially-assigned gender roles, as the current theoretical framework
seems to assume. In fact, as Fineman has pointed out, it may be
harder to do so than to overcome biology.40 6 Women have gained
control over their unique biological role in reproduction through
401. Stake et al., supra note 396, at 542 (Martha Fineman presentation).
402. Id.
403. FRANCINE D. BLAU ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK 281-86
(1998) (describing the "negative substitution effect" of women's labor market earnings on
fertility decisions, i.e., as women's potential for market earnings increases, so do the oppor-
tunity costs of children, since women bear the bulk of caregiving responsibilities).
404. See supra notes 38, 46, 84 and accompanying text.
405. See supra note 403.
406. Fineman, supra note 48, at 2 ("Changing society is not an easy task. In fact, in some
ways it might be easierwere differences the result of nature or biology. In that instance tech-
nology might prove of assistance.").
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technological innovation; they have made less progress challeng-
ing gender socialization.
Nor can the distortion of women's agency within dominant so-
cietal and judicial discourses be discounted. Kathryn Abrams has
noted that "women are presented either as fully autonomous
choosers (sometimes even manipulative hyperagents) or as wholly
compromised victims." 4 7 In contrast, the law has adopted a more
balanced view of male subjects, recognizing that men sometimes
must operate under "context-based restraint" not reflective of
some "characterological" defect. °" Abrams looks to areas of law
where the legal subject is viewed with greater objectivity such as the
Uniform Commercial Code provision on unconscionability for
paradigms that might challenge the distorted depiction of women
as legal subjects." Uncovering the divergent ways in which the law
treats men and women who are constrained by systemic inequality
is an important feminist project. For one, such a project, like Fi-
neman's and Williams' work,41 ° starts with the assumption of the
universal nature of dependency, and thus can challenge liberal-
ism's limiting assumption of autonomy. Second, by focusing on
how the law constructs women as legal subjects, Abrams' approach
removes from the discussion the decades-old and ultimately ir-
resolvable debate about women's essential nature. Such a
disruption in the discourse could open a significant space for al-
ternative theories of inequality, bring women with divergent
interests and experiences together, and minimize the spillover
costs for women that victories based upon a universal theory of the
legal subject often have on other areas of law. If successful, these
achievements alone would be substantial.
However, focusing on women's bounded agency, alone, cannot
fundamentally challenge the theoretical constructs that so effec-
tively stunt the law's ability to respond to the experience of
caregiving. Constraints on agency have been legally cognizable
under only extremely narrow circumstances that typically involve
physical force, threat of force, or serious psychological impair-
ment.4 11 While there certainly are exceptions that might prove
fruitful for exploration, and while it is not my intention to deny
the existence of gender as a powerful operating force on women
407. Kathryn Abrams, Changing the "Subject" of Inequality (unpublished manuscript pre-
sented at the Feminism and Legal Theory Workshop on Discrimination and Inequality,
June 17-19, 1999, Cornell Law School) (on file with author).
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. See supra notes 396-99 and accompanying text.
411. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
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and men alike, I suggest that our discrimination law and the theo-
retical framework that is its cornerstone possess a limited ability to
recognize or accommodate decisions constrained by conditions
short of brute force.42 As such, with regard to women's conflicts
between work and family, employment discrimination on the basis
of biological difference is the primary target of the law. It is clear,
then, that refining the theoretical constructs underlying our em-
ployment discrimination laws will be necessary before such laws
will recognize women's culturally based caregiving work.4 3
One place to start might be to redefine the justifications for ac-
commodation. At present, the primary justifications within our law
for accommodating dependency are innocence and immutabil-
ity.4"4 Where a woman is considered to have no responsibility for
her predicament and little control over achieving self-sufficiency,
within the prevailing construct the law might afford her a limited
accommodation to the extent that she can demonstrate that men
have received similar dispensations in similar circumstances. Thus,
Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and the Family and
Medical Leave Act provide women with limited protections from
employment discrimination on the basis of their "incapacity" re-
lated to childbirth. However, because women's caregiving work is
understood to be either a choice or a cultural activity, under the
current theoretical framework there exists little justification for
restructuring the workplace to account for such work. Thus far,
many reformers have approached this dilemma by depicting
women's caregiving as a manifestation of constrained agency-
either due to biological or sociological forces-so that it fits into
412. This may explain the limited progress that women have made in fashioning legal
recognition for sexual harassment in the workplace. Behind such claims lies the specter of
physical assault and rape, even though physical touching is not required to make out a
prima facie case of either quid pro quo or hostile work environment sexual harassment. But
a review of successful cases demonstrates that, absent some explicit sexual advance or physi-
cal touching, a woman's practical chances of prevailing on such a claim are quite slim. See
Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1710-38 (1998)
(detailing the way in which courts have restricted the conception of hostile work environ-
ment harassment to male-female sexual advances and other explicitly sexualized actions). I
suggest that the element of physicality may provide an explanation for feminists' recent
progress in this area, in addition to judicial recognition of the complex female subject, as
Abrams proposes. Abrams, supra note 407 (suggesting that sexual harassment might be a
fruitful area of law for feminist exploration, because it recognizes that women can be con-
strained by systemic inequality and provides a complex depiction of women as
simultaneously "agentic" and constrained).
413. It is also clear that while law reform may play a role in social transformation, the
law has only a limited ability to alter widely shared basic assumptions that are at the core of
our cultural ideology.
414. See discussion supra Part III.
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the dominant framework's justifications for accommodation . 5
An alternative approach that might achieve the accommodations
caregivers require while at the same time challenging the limited
scope of the innocence and immutability bivalent would be to
assert the fundamental morality of caregiving work, and the im-
portance of such work to the sustenance of society.
I do not claim this to be a novel approach. Assertions of this
kind have been interjected periodically into the decades-old collo-
quy among feminist legal theorists about the merits of the "special"
versus equal legal treatment of women. In 1987, Christine Littleton
compared the importance of women's caregiving work in society to
that of military service, suggesting in Reconstructing Sexual Equality
that women who leave the workforce for caregiving should receive
honor, compensation, and job re-entry preferences comparable to
those received by military veterans.16 Lucinda Finley stated in her
1986 article Transcending Equality Theory that "[e] mployers should
bear the costs of these [caregiving] responsibilities because child-
bearing and rearing are crucially important social functions that are
connected to and have major impacts on the work world. If the
work world does not accommodate these functions, both it and
society in general will suffer."4 7 More recently, Martha Fineman
has been developing a theory of collective societal responsibility
for dependency to address the increasing inequitable and unequal
distribution of societal resources that has resulted in the poverty of
women and children. 8 The foundation for such a theory, she as-
serts, "must be grounded on an appreciation of the value of
caretaking labor."419 According to Fineman, caretaking labor
"produces and reproduces society ... [and] provides the citizens,
the workers, the voters, the consumers, the students and others
that populate society and its institutions." 20 Mainstream scholars
415. E.g., KITrAY, supra note 400, at 99 ("If the means by which a society distributes re-
sponsibility for dependency work is not guided by principles of justice, then coercive
measures-often in the guise of tradition and custom, sometimes in the guise of merely
apparent voluntary life choices-are the predictable response.").
416. Littleton, supra note 331, at 1330.
417. Finley, supra note 329, at 1175 (emphasis added).
418. Fineman, supra note 37, at 15-16.
419. Id. at 16.
420. Id. at 19. Fineman focuses her assertion of the fundamental morality of caregiving
work on biological dependency, arguing that the inevitable and universal nature of biologi-
cal dependency creates a societal debt and "claim of right." Id. at 16-18. She continues to
justify the support for cultural or "derivative dependency," however, on a concept of
bounded agency. Because "individual choice occurs within the constraints of social condi-
tions," she argues, it is unjust for society not to support women's caregiving work. Id. at 21-
22. Clearly, the fear of perpetuating gender roles that serve to limit women's opportunities
continues to be significant to feminist legal theorizing. See note 357 and accompanying text.
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also have begun to acknowledge the moral value of women's nur-
turing and the role of the family in "maintain[ing] an enduring
society,, 41 in no small part due to the influence of feminist legal
theorists.
Joan Williams has expressed reservations about the ability of
broad assertions of morality or need to secure for women tangible
accommodations in the workplace for their unpaid caregiving la-
bor. She reminds us that "[i]n the U.S., 'rights talk' is a key
resource for articulating mioral claims in legal language."4 22 But
there does not have to be an "either/or" approach; developing a
defining moral vision, even a utopian one as Fineman has done,423
does not preclude concrete claims of right. In fact, the former may
be constitutive of the latter, for as the current legal framework
demonstrates, practical claims for women's equal rights absent a
unifying theoretical vision are unlikely to move our legal decision
makers or society more broadly to recognize women's cultural
caregiving.
It is also clear that part of this project will require feminist legal
theorists to move beyond utilitarian justifications. In addition to
articulating the value of caregiving to society, we need to provide a
rich account of the fundamental importance of family caregiving
work to women as individuals. Heretofore, feminist theorists have
been hesitant to discuss the positive meaning for women qua
women of their cultural caregiving, for fear of reinforcing harmful
424gender roles. This undertheorization limits our ability to re-
spond to those who question the "special treatment" that parents,
and women in particular, are allegedly receiving in the work-
Indeed, as Joan Williams recently observed, this fear largely has determined the approach
within the public policy context. Williams, supra note 358, at 279-80.
But the price feminist theorists and women have paid for their strategic decision to limit
their claims of right to women's biological difference has been too high. Such a cautious
approach fails to challenge the dominant theoretical framework that categorizes innocent,
immutable, i.e., biological, dependency as deserving of accommodation, and dependency
arising from women's cultural differences from men as undeserving. Moreover, this tem-
pered equal treatment approach has resulted in laws such as Title VII and the Family and
Medical Leave Act that protect women from discrimination only on the limited bases of
childbirth and pregnancy, leaving women to grapple individually and privately with the
costs of their cultural caregiving work.
421. Rawls, supra note 330, at 788.
422. Williams, supra note 358, at 316.
423. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 5, at 232.
424. Even Carol Gilligan's famous research on women's "different voice" focused on
the moral significance of women's relational orientation, not upon the personal satisfac-




place. Opponents of social welfare programs and workplace
regulation, and women for whom having children may not be cen-
tral to their life plans, 26 are asking why they should subsidize the
private decisions of others to have children. The answer must pro-
vide a richer and more positive account of women's cultural
caregiving work than can be conveyed by the stories of biology or
gender socialization. For example, given our country's record of
exploitation and control of the mothering and wage work of white
working class women and women of color,4 7 family caregiving
work for some women might be viewed as a form of powerful po-
litical resistance: a product of choice, not constraint or
oppression. Feminists must begin to mine such complexity if they
425. E.g., ELINOR BURKEIT, THE BABY BOON: How FAMILY-FRIENDLY AMERICA CHEATS
THE CHILDLESS (2000).
426. E.g., Franke, supra note 35, at 183-89 (questioning the heteronormaive assump-
tions of cultural feminists and arguing that society is reproduced through "cotntless
reiterative practices" such as market-based consumption, not just biological reproduction).
Franke's criticism of feminist legal theorists' normalization of white, middle-class, hetero-
sexual motherhood, and of Martha Fineman's work in particular, represents a fundamental
misunderstanding of such work. Fineman uses "Mothering" as a metaphor for all caregiving
labor, notjust biological reproduction. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 5,
at 235. Moreover, if there is any unifying theme in Fineman's work, it is the destigmatization
of mothering by single, minority women. E.g., id. at 101-42. Fineman's work, in its effort to
expose the construction of single parenthood as a form of deviance, also serves to challenge
the stigmatization of the sexual relationships of gay, lesbian, bixsexual, and transgendered
persons. Moreover, Fineman cannot be fairly read to "de-eroticize" women and mothers in
a material sense. Rather, she aims to break the formal link between marriage and legal
privilege that serves to constrain both women's mothering and sexuality. See id. at 228-30.
Fineman's "Mother" is not a spinster, as Franke would have us believe, but a woman who is
free to arrange her intimate sexual relationships as she pleases without suffering the pun-
ishment of stigmatization and economic marginalization should she also choose to be a
mother. Id. at 229-30.
This does not mean that Franke is not on to something, however. Franke's concern about
feminist legal theory's negative or nonexistent depictions of women's sexuality are legiti-
mate, though perhaps misdirected, and the analysis presented in this Article suggests a
possible explanation. Franke asks why "feminists in other disciplines continue to simultane-
ously approach questions of sexuality in both negative (freedom from) and positive
(freedom to) terms," but feminists within law persist in reducing women's sexuality to the
negative experiences of "dependency and danger." Franke, supra note 35, at 182-83. One
explanation may lie in the theoretical context in which feminist legal theory emerged.
Feminist legal theory developed in reaction to androcentric depictions of the individual
presented in liberal legal and law and economic theory, and to the limiting effects of our
law's categorical framework and commitment to formal equality. See supra Parts III, IV. If
feminist legal theorists have unduly focused on characterizing women's sexuality as a site of
danger and dependency, it is because they have been seeking to garner recognition of
women's experiences within the uniquely constraining discipline of law. See supra Parts III,
V. As such, Franke may be barking up the wrong theoretical tree. As this Article suggests,
the culprit is law, not legal feminism. With this in mind, feminist legal theorists and queer
theorists should be working together to transform the law. A good place to start might be a
project that seeks to articulate the fundamental importance of women's sexual pleasure and
caregiving work.
427. See supra notes 39 and 46 and accompanying text.
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are to respond to the limited ability of economic and liberal legal
theory to recognize women's cultural experience of caregiving. We
have begun to develop such a theory by exposing the universality
of dependency428 and the society-reproducing function of caregiv-
ing work.4 9 An important additional account would explore the
extent to which women's cultural caregiving might also be a prod-
uct of choice, however constrained, and the positive meaning of
that choice for women. 43 0 A theory that presents women's cultural
caregiving in all its messiness as a condition of oppression and
power, drudgery and deep satisfaction, constraint and choice, will
be fundamentally more transformative than one that rests upon
squeezing women's caregiving experiences into the limited excep-
tions to the autonomous, equal, and rational person assumed by
our dominant theoretical paradigms. Such a thick conception of
caregiving also possesses greater potential to bring women to-
gether across their differences.
Quite simply, reasons matter, whether they are rooted in uto-
pian visions or liberal rights discourse. Concrete outcomes
achieved will always be a function of the justifications provided. In
the face of the limits of formal equality analysis and the rhetoric of
choice, justifying rights upon women's bounded agency is unlikely
to produce anything greater than a legal regime protecting women
from discrimination on the basis of their biological differences
from men. For, in the discourse over difference, women's cultural
differences are erased, because the theoretical frameworks that
construct our law are blind to such differences. The implications
of this problem with the current paradigm are serious: while unin-
tended, justifications based upon a concept of socially-bounded
agency will merely serve to reinforce the existing paradigm that
relies upon biological difference as a basis for painfully limited ac-
commodation (not to mention discrimination). Accordingly, the
repeated assertion of the fundamental morality and value of care-
giving work to society and to women is imperative for the project
of developing an alternative theoretical framework that will suc-
cessfully move the existing order. If women assert that they deserve
rights because they are "equal" to men, they are likely to be af-
428. See supra notes 396-400 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 416-23 and accompanying text.
430. Vicki Schultz has called for a parallel exploration of the meaning of wage work for
women. See Schultz, supra note 42. In doing so, she makes the controversial assertion that
the recent successful effort to end welfare as a federal entitlement may have a silver lining,
given that even mundane, dirty, or low-paid work carries fundamental political and social
value for those who engage in it. Id. at 1942-44, 1932-35. I suggest in a similar vein that
there is some fundamentally positive meaning to women of their caregiving work that must
be explored, as uncomfortable or risky as such an endeavor may be.
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forded rights only when they are in fact equal. If women assert that
they deserve rights because gender socialization or biological
forces dictate their caregiving, they will receive rights only during
the limited circumstances when society considers their agency to
be bounded. But if women assert that they deserve rights because
caregiving work is fundamental to the functioning of society, the
continuation of the human race, and the living of a full life, then
women-and men for that matter-will be afforded rights when
they engage in caregiving.
The utility of asserting the fundamental morality and impor-
tance to society and women of caregiving work should not be
underestimated for another reason. While it may be true that for-
mal equality language is key to achieving justice within the
American legal system, the influence of recent developments in
other areas of law upon the collective receptivity to accommoda-
tion as a legitimate solution to women's work/family conflicts
should not be underestimated. Specifically, I am referring to the
significant impact on the workplace and society more broadly of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), passed in 1990 to require
employers, governmental entities, and public accommodations to
reasonably accommodate persons with disabilities so long as such
accommodations do not effect a fundamental alteration of the
workplace, program, or activity in question.431 Similarly, Title VII's
religious accommodation provisions, which mandate that employ-
ers accommodate the religious beliefs and observances of their
employees unless doing so would cause the employer undue hard-
ship, offers a promising model of substantive equality on which to
build a theory of workplace accommodation for family caregiving
responsibilities.432 In fact, Title VII's religious accommodation
principle is perhaps even more suited than the ADA to answer the
rhetoric of choice that increasingly has come to pervade our po-
litical discourse and judicial decisions. Whereas the success of the
ADA can be explained, in part, by the societal view of persons with
disabilities as innocent and thereby deserving of assistance and ac-
commodation, particularly persons with physical disabilities, Title
VII's religious accommodation provision is based upon the notion
that a person's religious practices are a fundamental right, even if
431. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
432. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994) ("The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is un-
able to reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's busi-
ness.").
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voluntarily adopted.433 As such, it might be a fruitful paradigm for
gaining workplace accommodations for family caregiving, which is
constructed within our country's political and legal discourse as a
cultural practice, not as an immutable biological difference 4 4
Of course, the ADA has been plagued by relatively successful at-
tempts to squeeze the law into a formal equality box 435 by
constitutional challenges,3 6 and by recent Supreme Court deci
433. As aptly stated byJuan Perea:
We do not deem mutability relevant in protecting against discrimination because of
religion, an aspect of ethnicity which is easily and sometimes actually changed. The
possibility or actuality of religious transformation does not dampen the sincerity of
religious belief nor dilute its fundamentality to a person's identity.
Perea, supra note 229, at 867.
434. Similar arguments have been made with regard to discrimination on the basis of
national origin, race, and sexual-orientation. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of
"Coming Out". Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public
Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2416-22 (1997); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is
Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 55, 57 (1991); Perea, supra note 229, at 860-61,866-67.
435. See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 604 (1999) (finding that
persons with mental disabilities have a right to state services in the most integrated setting
appropriate for their disability only if they can demonstrate that to do so would be equitable
given the resources of the state and the needs of others waiting for services).
436. See Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Tr. v. Garrett, No. 99-1240, 2001 WL 167628 (U.S. Feb. 21,
2001) (holding ADA Title I provisions permitting state employees to sue states in federal
court for monetary damages for employment discrimination unconstitutional under the
11th Amendment); see also, e.g., Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167, 1175 (1999) (challenging
constitutionality of Title II of the ADA); Brown v. N.C. Div. Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698,
705 (4th Cir. 1999) (same); Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 438 (5th Cir. 1998)
(same); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433, 1442-43 (11th Cir. 1998) (same);
Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); Crawford v. Ind. Dep't
of Corr., 115 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1997) (same).
The Garrett case is part of a larger project of the current majority of the Court to resusci-
tate meaningful constitutional federalism. See Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (striking down a portion of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) as exceeding
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause and section five enforcement of the Four-
teenth Amendment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that
Congress did not have section five authority to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment im-
munity from suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)); City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act as exceeding Congress' section five enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating the Brady Handgun
Control Act because it "commandeered" state executive officials to implement a national
program); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress
lacks power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate the immunity from suit in federal
court afforded the states by the Eleventh Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995) (invalidating the Gun Free School Zones Act as exceeding Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause).
These decisions, which, inter alia, limit Congress' power to enact civil rights statutes that
go beyond the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, threaten the continued viability of
the FMLA, and certain provisions of Title VII as well, at least with regard to state employers.
E.g., Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding FMLA provision permit-
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sions limiting the definition of disability under the Act. 437 Similarly,
the Supreme Court's cramped interpretation of Title VII's relig-
ious accommodation principle has limited its utility for workers
seeking accommodation of their religious practices.43 8 Still, there
remains room under both statutes for fact-finders to conclude that
an employee has been discriminated against by an employer's fail-
ure to recognize and accommodate her differences. And while the
resilience and disciplining nature of formal equality within our
legal system should not be trivialized-indeed cannot-it also can
be said that these laws have transformed the way in which we think
about discrimination, sowing within the public consciousness a vis-
ceral understanding of the meaning of substantive equality. As
such, the time may be ripe for feminist legal theorists to bring
their call for the accommodation of women's caregiving work out
of the academic "closet" and into the policy arena. Of course, prac-
tical policy proposals need not mirror these statutes, but they can
at least build upon the political capital generated by the model of
substantive equality underlying them, particularly the more re-
cently passed ADA.
ting state employee to take leave to care for seriously ill family member and the employee's
own serious health condition unconstitutional); In re Employment Discrimination Litig.
Against Ala., 198 F.3d 1305, 1318-20 (11th Cir. 1999) (rejecting argument by state that,
because only disparate treatment is recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment, Title
VII's disparate impact provisions are not a valid exercise of Congress' section five enforce-
ment power). For a general discussion and defense of our country's anti-discrimination laws
in light of the Court's recent federalism jurisprudence, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegal,
Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110
YALE L.J. 441 (2000).
437. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that severely my-
opic applicants, who were denied positions as global airline pilots because they failed to
meet airline's minimum visual requirement, were not "disabled" within the meaning of the
ADA, because applicants could fully correct their visual impairment with corrective lenses);
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (holding that an employee was not
"disabled" due to his high blood pressure, within the meaning of the ADA, where condition
could be controlled through medication); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555
(1999) (holding that an employee with monocular vision was not "disabled" within the
meaning of the ADA, where his brain developed subconscious mechanisms for coping with
his visual impairment and thus his body compensated for his disability). Such limitations are
consistent with this Article's thesis about innocence and immutability. But cf Cleveland v.
Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 527 U.S. 795 (1999) (finding that a person who claims she is dis-
abled for the purpose of receiving Social Security Disability benefits is not estopped from
pursuing an ADA claim). See generally Symposium, Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary
Perspectives and Implicationsfor SocialJustice Strategies, 21 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2000).
438. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (narrowly defining
reasonable accommodation); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986)
(defining undue hardship as any cost to an employer that is more than de minimis). For an
analysis of the exceptionally narrow religious accommodation jurisprudence that has devel-
oped under Title VII, see Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEx. L. REv. 317, 389-92 (1997).
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B. Law
Were we to shift the theoretical justifications for accommodat-
ing women's unpaid caregiving work in the workplace from
notions of innocence and immutability to a generalized concept of
the fundamental importance to society and individuals of such
work, what might our employment discrimination laws look like
and how might they be applied differently by judicial decision
makers? First, I suggest that our country's employment discrimina-
tion laws can provide greater recognition of women's unpaid
caregiving work even as presently configured. Recall the sex-plus
theory of discrimination under Title VII and the requirement that
the "plus" characteristic in question must be an immutable trait or
a fundamental right as a predicate to demonstrating a prima facie
case of unlawful sex discrimination. 439Were caregiving work valued
as fundamental to the functioning of society, and to living a full
life, then the assertion that engaging in such work is a
"fundamental right" deserving of accommodation or at least non-
discrimination in the workplace would not entail a vast judicial
leap.440 Moreover, in such a world, perhaps courts would scrutinize
more closely employers' stated job requirements in determining
whether a plaintiff is "qualified for the position" under the McDon-
nell Douglas framework and in deciding whether an employer has
demonstrated a legitimate BFOQ defense. Rather than blindly ac-
cepting employers' stated job qualifications, valuing caregiving
work would require courts to balance employers' and employees'
stated needs in a manner that is more respectful of caregiving
work. Such a sensitive application of the sex-plus theory would not
transform Title VII into a law requiring accommodation of
women's caregiving work, but it might result in a favorable out-
come for more women plaintiffs, particularly those who can
demonstrate that their competing caregiving responsibilities would
not fundamentally impinge on the workplace. For example, Alicia
Martinez, who required only three, twenty-minute breaks a day to
439. See supra Part II.B.
440. Whether such a fundamental fight to engage in caregiving would have to find its
source in the Constitution has not been addressed by courts applying the Willingham test for
sex-plus discrimination under Title VII, see supra note 102, but there are certainly arguments
that such a constitutional fight could exist. E.g., Catherine G. Meier, Protecting Parental
Leave: A Fundamental Rights Model, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 177 (1997) (arguing that caregiv-
ing is protected by the fundamental constitutional right to privacy which the Court has read
into the Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Clause).
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pump her breast milk, might have benefited from such a sensitive
application of the sex-plus theory under Title VII.
How else might a theory grounded in the fundamental value of
women's caregiving work alter our antidiscrimination laws? Cer-
tainly, the identification of "neutral" employer policies and
practices that negatively and disproportionately impact women
might be facilitated by a theoretical framework grounded in the
value of caregiving work. Viewed through the lens of such a
framework, employer "non policies" such as long work hours and
rigid work schedules that heretofore have been subsumed within the
definition of work in America might more readily appear to plain-
tiffs and judicial decision makers as what they truly are: affirmative
employment practices that disproportionately discriminate against
women. Further, in a world where judicial decision makers recog-
nized and valued women's caregiving labor, courts might be less
accepting of employers' business necessity defense and more re-
ceptive to less discriminatory alternatives to the current structure
of market work.
Admittedly, such solutions are premised upon the transforma-
tion of societal attitudes, and in particular, upon the
transformation of judges' attitudes. A solution to women's
work/family conflicts so dependent upon judicial discretion, even
if such attitudinal shifts could be achieved, is unlikely to effect the
structural, institutional changes necessary to resolving the prob-
lems outlined in this Article. But such a vision of the
transformation in judicial values is a necessary start, which, in es-
sence, is why theory matters. As Robin West has asserted, "[t]he
work of doing legal justice-of remaining true to a judicial oath
[of integrity and fidelity] .. .- must be in the service of values
which are life-affirming, if the result is to be justice, and a just soci-
ety worthy of the name.,
442
Beyond the benefits to individual plaintiffs that would follow
from a recognition by judicial decision makers of the value of
caregiving labor, there are a number of concrete legal reforms that
would flow from a shift in our theoretical vision. Clearly, there are
too many to discuss in detail here, including an ADA-like statute
requiring the accommodation of caregiving work, referenced
above; expansion of the Family and Medical Leave Act;" 3 govern-
ment-subsidized wage-replacement for caregiving, in the form of
unemployment or disability insurance coverage, vouchers, welfare,
441. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.b.ii.
442. WEST, supra note 35, at 49.
443. See discussion infra notes 450-53 and accompanying text.
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or refundable tax credits; 444 universally available, high-quality day-
care, implemented through subsidies to private providers,
vouchers for families, the expansion of Head Start, 445 the public
44647education system, or other innovative mechanisms;" 7 and a
shortened standard work week," s just to name a few. These re-
forms present a range of visions of the role of the family, market,
and state in solving the crisis of care in America. They have been
and are likely to continue to be hotly debated within policy and
academic circles. While such proposals do not seem imminent
given the ossification of the values of autonomy, equality, and
choice within the American political and legal landscape, there are
a few concrete reforms that I will briefly address, because they are
currently on the table.
In his 1999 State of the Union address, former President Clin-
ton advocated the expansion of the FMLA to "smaller companies,"
citing "all of the evidence that it has been so little burdensome to
employers. 4 49 Since that time, several bills have been introduced in
both houses of Congress to extend FMLA coverage to employees at
worksites with at least twenty-five (as opposed to fifty) employees.5 °
444. The primary program currently in place is the Dependent Care Tax Credit. See 26
I.R.C. § 21 (2000).
445. Head Start is a federal matching grant program that provides early childhood
education and other services to low-income children. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9831-9852 (1994). For a
general discussion of Head Start and proposals for its expansion, see Edward M. Kennedy, A
Legislative Approach to Work and Family: Time for a Smart Start, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 391
(1989) (advocating widely available early childhood education for preschool-age children).
446. E.g., MARTIN CARNOY, SUSTAINING THE NEW ECONOMY: WORK, FAMILY, AND
COMMUNITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2001) (arguing that the new economy has placed
an increased premium on education and has exacerbated work/family tensions, and envi-
sioning schools and universities as the community centers and care providers of the future);
ANTHONY RADEN, UNIVERSAL PREKINDERGARTEN IN GEORGIA (Found. for Child Dev., Work-
ing Paper, Aug. 1999), available at http://www.ffcd.org/ourwork.htm (reviewing the history,
development, and lessons learned from the country's first universal prekindergarten pro-
gram).
447. E.g., Natalie M. Hanlon, Note, Child Care Linkage: Addressing Child Care Needs
Through Land Use Planning, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 591 (1989) (advocating regulations re-
quiring commercial developers to provide child care facilities in new or renovated
construction); Selmi, supra note 131, at 770-81 (advocating amendment of the FMLA to
require or encourage male employees to take family leave to care for newborns).
448. Jacobs & Gerson, Work Week, supra note 234, at 466-70 (advocating expansion of
the Fair Labor Standards Act's overtime provisions to professional and managerial employ-
ees, the provision of mandatory proportional benefits to all workers, and shortening of the
standard work week); Schultz, supra note 42, at 1957 (advocating an amendment of the Fair
Labor Standards Act to reduce the standard workweek to thirty-five or even thirty hours per
week for everyone).
449. 'My Fellow Americans... State of Our Union is Strong,' WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1999, at
A12.
450. Family and Medical Leave Fairness Act of 2001, S. 18, 107th Cong. § 512; Family
and Medical Leave Fairness Act of 2001, H.R. 265, 107th Cong. § 512; Family and Medical
Leave Fairness Act of 1999, S. 201, 106th Cong. § 3; Family and Medical Leave Improve-
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In both the 106th and 107th Congresses, representatives intro-
duced legislation seeking to expand the activities covered by the
Family and Medical Leave Act to include participating in a child's
school or extracurricular activities, "1 accompanying an elderly
relative to a medical appointment,"' and caring for seriously ill
family members outside of the traditional nuclear family.
45'
For the first time since the FMLA was enacted, federally-
subsidized wage-replacement may be an option for those taking
parental leave. In a May 24, 1999 memorandum, former President
Clinton directed the federal Department of Labor "to propose
regulations that enable States to ... [use] the Unemployment In-
surance (UI) system to support parents on leave following the
birth or adoption of a child.' 454 In December 1999, the Depart-
ment of Labor issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in
accordance with the President's directive,45  and the regulation and
final rule were promulgated inJune 2000.456 The regulation "allows
the States to develop and experiment with innovative methods for
paying unemployment compensation to parents on approved leave
or who otherwise leave employment to be with their newborns or
newly-adopted children." 457 In furtherance of this initiative, Clin-
ton's 2001 fiscal year budget included $20 million to fund roughly
fifteen competitive planning grants for states to study and develop
ments Act of 1999, H.R. 91, 106th Cong. § 2; Family and Medical Leave Enhancement Act,
H.R. 2103, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999).
451. Time for Schools Act of 2001, S. 18, 107th Cong. § 522 (amending the FMLA to al-
low employees to take twenty-four hours of "school involvement" leave per year to
participate in the academic school activities of their children or to participate in literacy
training); Time for Schools Act of 2001, H.R. 265, 107th Cong. § 522 (same); Time for
Schools Act of 1999, S. 1304, 106th Cong. (same); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
Enhancement Act, H.R. 2103, 106th Cong. (1999) (amending the FMLA to allow employees
to take up to twenty-four hours per year for "parental involvement leave" to participate in
their children's educational and extracurricular activities); Family and Medical Leave Im-
provements Act of 1999, H.R. 91,106th Cong. § 3 (same).
452. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 Enhancement Act, H.R. 2103, 106th Cong.
(1999) (amending the FMLA to allow employees to take up to twenty-four hours per year to
assist elderly relatives); Family and Medical Leave Improvements Act of 1999, H.R. 91, 106th
Cong. § 3 (amending the FMLA to allow employees to take up to twenty-four hours per year
of "elder care" leave to accompany an elderly relative to routine medical appointments).
453. H.R. 2104, 106th Cong. (1999) (amending the FMLA to permit leave to care for a
domestic partner, parent-in-law, adult child, sibling, or grandparent if the person has a
serious health condition).
454. President's Memorandum on New Tools to Help Parents Balance Work and Fam-
ily, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 978,979 (May 31, 1999), available at 1999 WL 12654559.
455. Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation, 64 Fed. Reg. 67,972 (1999)
(proposed Dec. 3, 1999).
456. Regulations for Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation, 20 C.F.R.
§ 604 (2000); Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,210
(June 13, 2000).
457. 20 C.F.R. § 604.1.
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wage-replacement programs for workers taking family leave.
Prior to the adoption of this regulation, states were prohibited
from using their unemployment insurance programs for employ-
ees who voluntarily left their jobs for family reasons without
jeopardizing their receipt of federal matching funds.459 These re-
cent regulatory changes are the culmination of a decade of
advocacy.4 ° Since the rule change has gone into effect, legislation
has been introduced in fifteen states that would expand unem-
461ployment insurance to cover family leaves.
Finally, a member of Congress recently introduced legislation
that would expand the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to include
breast feeding in Title VII's definition of sex, and would amend
the Internal Revenue Code to provide tax credits to businesses that
provide appropriate facilities for their employees to breast feed or
pump breast milk.62
458. White House Press Release, President Clinton Announces New Funds Enabling
States to Provide Paid Leave to America's Working Parents (Feb. 12, 2000), available at 2000
'L 150966. The Congressional version of this proposal is the Family Income to Respond to
Significant Transitions Insurance Act, establishing a grants program to states for demonstra-
tion projects that provide wage replacement to individuals responding to family caregiving
needs. See H.R. 226, 107th Cong. § 5 (2001); S. 18, 107th Cong. § 504; S. 1355, 106th Cong.
§ 5 (1999); H.R. 2500, 106th Cong. § 5 (1999).
459. Specifically, prior administrative interpretations of the Federal Unemployment
Tax Act (FUTA), 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1994), conditioned matching funds to states
upon state rules excluding those who depart work voluntarily or are not "able and available"
for work. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 614.
Such rules were at issue in Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial Relations Committee, 479 U.S. 511
(1987), in which the Supreme Court held that FUTA permitted Missouri to disqualify from
eligibility for unemployment compensation workers who voluntarily quit their jobs due to
pregnancy, so long as it similarly excluded all workers who terminate their employment for
non-work related reasons.
460. See Brown, supra note 132; Mary F. Radford, Wimberly and Beyond: Analyzing the Re-
fusal to Award Unemployment Compensation to Women Who Terminate Prior Employment Due to
Pregnancy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 532 (1988); Elizabeth F. Thompson, Note, Unemployment Com-
pensation: Women and Children-The Denials, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 751 (1992).
461. S. 1059, 45th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2001); H.R. 2458, 45th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 2001); S. 500, 2001 Leg., 103d Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001); H.R. 342, 146th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2001); S. 892, 21st Leg. (Haw. 2001); H.R. 30, 21st Leg. (Haw. 2001); S. 389,
92d Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2001); H.R. 1783, 112th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2001); H.R.
2232, 79th Leg., 2001 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2001); H.R. 933, 2001 Leg., 415th Sess. (Md. 2001);
H.R. 744, 182d Gen. Ct., 2001 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2001); L. 370,97th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb.
2001); S. 1923, 209th Leg. (NJ. 2000); A. 3049, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000); H.R. 528, 45th Leg.,
Ist Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2001); S. 241, 71st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2001); H.R. 240, 77th Leg. (Tex.
2001).
462. Breastfeeding Promotion Act, H.R. 285, 107th Cong. §§ 103, 201 (2001)
(amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k), by inserting "lactation" after
pregnancy, and amending the Internal Revenue Code to provide for tax credits to busi-
nesses that provide an appropriate environment on their premises for employed mothers to
breastfeed or express their breast milk); Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of
1999, H.R. 1478, 106th Cong. (amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k),
[VOL. 34:3
The Attachment Gap
It is too soon to know whether or to what extent the new presi-
dent will support any of these policy initiatives, but opposition by
conservative members of Congress and the business community is
certain. Just two weeks after the Department of Labor promul-
gated the unemployment insurance regulation, two small
businesses and a coalition of business organizations filed a lawsuit
challenging it under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA) , the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) ,' 6 and the
FMILA.. Legislation proposing to expand the coverage of the
FMLA and PDA has been introduced and died in committee for
461several years.
Moreover, even were these reforms to survive the political proc-
ess, they would not significantly address the serious limitations of
the FMLA and the PDA. Unemployment benefits are minimal in
4681most states, averaging $193.00 per week. While expanding cover-
age of the FMLA to smaller businesses will bring many more
employees within the Act's protections, adequate wage replace-
ment is key to making leave a viable option. The proposed
"parental involvement" and "elder care" leaves are symbolic more
than anything else, providing only three days per year of leave,
by inserting "breast feeding" after pregnancy) (both sponsored by Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney
of New York).
463. 145 CONG. REC. S10,434 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (statement of Sen. Gregg) ("Mr.
President, to consider expansion [of the FMLA] at this time is not just irresponsible, it is
unconscionable."); Fowler W. Martin, Plan to Fund Family Leave Raises Concerns, WALL ST. J.,
June 8, 1999, at BIA (reporting that the business community is claiming that changes to
the federal unemployment insurance program to cover FMLA leave cannot be legally ef-
fected through the administration process, as former President Clinton has proposed).
464. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1994).
465. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
466. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994); see also Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive and
Other Relief, LPA, Inc. v. Herman, No. 00-CV-1505 (D.D.C. 2000) (on file with author).
Specifically, the complaint alleges that: (1) the regulation violates FUTA, because FUTA
permits states to pay unemployment compensation only to individuals who are unem-
ployed, not to individuals who have suitable work available to them but voluntarily leave
work; (2) the regulation and rule violate the FMLA, because state unemployment benefits
are employer financed, and, in enacting the FMLA, Congress "determined that, as a general
rule, employers should be required to provide leave but not required to pay for that leave
.... "; and (3) the regulation and rule are arbitrary and capricious under the APA, "because,
among other things, the Regulation reverses the Department of Labor's long-standing in-
terpretation of federal unemployment compensation law without determining that the
Department's new interpretation will promote the goals of that law, because the Rule fails
to consider the legitimate interests of businesses, because the Rule fails to place any princi-
pled limitation on the payment of unemployment compensation to individuals on personal
leave, and because of various procedural violations including the failure to subject the De-
partment's regulatory impact analysis to public comment." Id. 1 3.
467. See supra notes 452, 453, and 462.
468. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE NAT'L DATA BOOK 395 tbl.625 (119th ed. 1999) (1997 data).
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enough for the annual school play and a couple of medical ap-
pointments, but nothing near what is required for day-to-day
caregiving of children or elderly parents. 469 Furthermore, still un-
resolved would be the exclusion of those employees who do not
work at least twenty-five hours per week on average or who have
not worked for their current employer for at least a year-
employees more likely to be women and people of color.47°
The inclusion of breast feeding in the Title VII's definition of
sex is the proposal most likely to be adopted given the law's bias
toward accommodating women's biologically-based differences
from men. 4" This proposal would prevent a court from dismissing
out-of-hand a Title VII claim of discrimination on the basis of
breast feeding, and may be of some assistance to a women who can
convince a court that her breast feeding would not significantly
disrupt the workplace, like Alicia Martinez, who sought a few
breaks and a private place to express her breast milk. 72 However, it
is unlikely that such an amendment to the PDA would change the
outcome for women like Rebecca Maganuco and Michele McNill,
who sought more significant accommodations, such as time off
from work to breast feed.473 And, of course, the limited recognition
of breast feeding does not address the bulk of life's caregiving
work, which extends to children who are not newborns and to
adults who are dependent due to sickness, disability, or age. In
sum, adding breast feeding to Title VII's definition of sex may be
of help to some women, but it will not transform the PDA into a
tool that can fundamentally challenge the structure of the Ameri-
can workplace.
Still, the proposed amendments to the FMLA, PDA, and our
country's unemployment compensation laws represent a small,
positive step in the right direction. They are a strong symbolic ac-
knowledgment that caregiving work extends beyond the first three
months of a child's life and that paid leave is crucial to making
caregiving leave a reality. Moreover, in the words of Mark Tushnet,
perhaps "itsy-bitsy" measures are all that can be expected given
"the reduced scope of national government in the new constitu-
tional order" that has taken hold over the past two decades. 4
469. See supra legislative proposals cited notes 451-52.
470. See supra Part II.C.
471. See supra note 462 and accompanying text.
472. See supra Part II.B.l.b.ii.
473. See supra notes 139-57 and accompanying text.
474. Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitu-
tional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REv. 29, 40 n.41, 55-56 (1999).
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At the same time, this "new constitutional order" makes a
broader vision all the more important. It is my hope that this
analysis of the limiting effects of the theories which predominate
our law on the recognition of women's work/family conflicts, and
the suggestion that we must shift our attention from depictions of
women as constrained by gender socialization toward recognizing
the fundamental importance of caregiving work, can serve as a use-
ful beginning for such a vision.
CONCLUSION
American employment antidiscrimination laws do not ade-
quately address the conflict between women's labor force
participation and their disproportionate responsibility for caregiv-
ing within the family. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act,
and judicial decisions interpreting these statutes provide job secu-
rity to some relatively privileged women in the limited instances of
pregnancy and childbirth. In contrast, women's experience of cul-
tural caregiving is virtually unrecognized by our laws prohibiting
sex discrimination in the workplace. In particular, while women
receive some limited protections if they can prove that they have
not been hired or promoted based upon "stereotypical" assump-
tions about their role as primary caregivers, once employed,
women remain largely unprotected from demotion or termination
on the basis of their culturally-based, i.e., non-biological, family
caregiving labor. This failure of our law has contributed to the
perpetuation of a labor force attachment gap between men and
women, persistent inequality in the economic status of women,
and the widespread impoverishment of children in America.
This Article has suggested that the stunted response of Ameri-
can employment discrimination law to women's work/family
conflicts is influenced, in part, by certain core values and assump-
tions within our legal tradition, particularly the value of formal
equality and the assumption that legal agents are rational decision
makers. Such robust doctrines cannot be dislodged or even mod-
estly disrupted through theoretical approaches that seek to fit
women's experiences of caregiving into the existing paradigm. As
such, the argument by many feminist legal theorists that employers
and the state should support women's family caregiving because
such work is dictated by gender roles will not succeed in a signifi-
cant transformation of the existing framework. Such an approach,
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by focusing on women's bounded agency, merely seeks to include
women's cultural caregiving within the existing paradigm that de-
fines biological incapacity as the outer limit of the law's protection.
An alternative approach that might achieve the accommoda-
tions caregivers require while at the same time challenging the
existing framework would be to assert the fundamental morality
of caregiving work, and the importance of such work to the suste-
nance of society and living a full life. While such a normative
solution represents a significant departure from law's premise of
neutrality, I contend that a defining moral vision must inform
practical claims of right before our legal decision makers, or soci-
ety more broadly, will be moved to recognize women's cultural
caregiving work. With such a normative vision in mind, perhaps a
more refined version of equality, autonomy, and rational choice
that accounts for differences between men and women with regard
to caregiving work might be possible. Moreover, given the influ-
ence of recent developments in other areas of law upon the
collective receptivity to accommodation as a legitimate model of
equality, the time may be ripe for feminist theorists to bring their
call for the accommodation of women's caregiving work into the
policy arena. Only when acknowledged and valued will women's
cultural caregiving work be recognized within our law and society.
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